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Dedication
This work is dedicated to the memory o f Sheryl Hoffer.
In other times, her spirit would have bound 
those feet to shamble cobbled convent walks, 
retracing the steps of habit, anonymous 
as one black bead on a chaplet; the Rule
—  that shrouds a gold-green life in lead and blights 
a proud name, a womb’s hope, a hearty will — 
have spread for her its stony shelter wings
and schooled her adventuring soul for flight
Then thorns and scourges, blood-drinks and barren fasts
— these Gothic novel props, Sadist trinkets— 
made literal, and twisted purposely,
might salve the mind that bums to die with Christ
and reconcile her to life, at last
Alas, for darker, more hopeful agesl
May He Who knows what suffering is worth
count hers, and reckon it as if she spent
herself on stony floors by Teresa,
or stood with Joan and mocked the flames that paled
before such incendiary spirits.
And my less fervent soul— dry clod of earth 
that strains to shove some ragged skeins of grass 
into the sun — may I compose myself 
to prayer, and force a single blade to yield 
at last, one dew-drop as pure as her tears.
— Good Friday, 1996.
Eternal rest grant unto her, 0  Lord, and may perpetual light shine upon her. May 
her soul, and all the souls o f the faithful departed, through the mercy o f God, rest in 
peace.
ii
A cknow ledgm ents
I would like to thank my director, Dr. John May, for his ongoing help, advice, 
encouragement and virtually paternal concern during my long sojourn in this 
department, over which he ruled so benignly for many years. Also, to the members of 
my committee: Dr. James Babin and Dr. Edward Henderson, and especially Dr. Louis 
Simpson who interrupted his retirement to serve, I offer thanks for their patience, per­
sistence and generosity. Other teachers whom I have special cause to thank include 
(but are not limited to) Dr. Fred Hobson, Dr. Robert McMahon, Dr. Lawrence Sasek, 
Prof. Rick Blackwood, Dr. Charles Bigger, Dr. Andrew Horton, Dr. John Lowe and 
Dr. Robert Edgeworth. In an age of helots, I have fallen among gentlemen.
For their love and loyal friendship, I thank: Ellen Chauvin, Paul Connell, Denise 
Matychowiak, Wilfiedo Cornelias, Charles Richard, Allen Kirkpatrick, Chris Zentner, 
Duncan Anderson, Lisa Shreve, Margaret Hart, Charles Coulombe and Lawrence 
Auster.
For the greatest gift, the gift of Faith, I first thank my mother, Theresa Marie 
Zmirak; then Miss Gertrude Best, Father John Hardon, S.J. and Father Dermot 
Mulloney, C.S.Sp.
For the financial support that made my work possible, I thank the LSU Alumni 
Federation, Intercollegiate Studies Institute, the taxpayers of this state, and all those 
who have employed me during these ten years, particularly Roy Fletcher and Rolfe 
McCollister.
For all that I am, for showing me all I could ever hope to become, I thank my 
father, John Patrick Zmirak, Sr. His industry, decency, honor, intelligence, piety, and 
his kindness shine always for me as a beacon of what a man should be, and a glimmer 
of the Fatherly love of God. May I someday live up to his example, and bring honor 
to his name.
iii
Table of Contents
Dedication ...........................................................................................................  ii
Acknowledgements ...........................................................................................  iii
Abbreviations .................................................................................................  v
Abstract ..............................................................................................................  vi
Chapter One: Sex and Metaphysics ..................................................................... 1
Chapter Two: The Moviegoer — Exodus from the Wintry Kingdom....................50
Chapter Three: The Last Gentleman — And the Flight from W oman.................  105
Chapter Four Lancelot — A Blood Wedding with the Feminine......................  145
Chapter Five: The Second Coming — The Ecstasy in the Garden....................  183
Works Cited .............................................................................................. 222
Vita......................................................................................................................  227
iv
A bbreviations
W orks By W alker Percy:
M The Moviegoer. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960).
LG The Last Gentleman. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1966).
LR Love in the Ruins. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1971).
MB The Message in the Bottle. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1975).
L Lancelot. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1977).
SC The Second Coming. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1980).
LC Lost in the Cosmos: The Last Self-Help Book. (New York: Farrar, Straus,
and Giroux, 1983).
. ^
TS The Thanatos Syndrome. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1987).
SSL Signposts in a Strange Land. Ed. Patrick J. Samway, S.J. (New York:
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1991).
By W illiam Alexander Percy:
LoL Lanterns on the Levee. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941).
These works will be referred to in the text of this dissertation by these abbrevia­
tions, followed by page number. All other works will appear in footnotes at the bot­
tom of the page.
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A bstract
What has been lacking in the corpus of interpretation of Walker Percy's work is a 
synthesis of approaches, a reading of the novels that unites the philosophical, psycho­
logical, theological, and linguistic insights that have accrued over three decades of 
criticism, and applies them to the vexing question of sexuality within his novels. In 
the present work, Percy’s four central, non-satiric novels, The Moviegoer, The Last 
Gentleman, Lancelot and The Second Coming, arc analyzed in the light of the 
Christian allegorical tradition, which employs sexual categories to explicate the meta­
physical order, and to inform sexuality with meaning.
In each of Percy's novels, the center of consciousness is a male protagonist who 
has experienced a radical alienation from the feminine— as traditionally conceived in 
the Christian tradition, to entail both the lower reaches of Dionysian emotion and the 
highest capacity of the human soul for supernatural faith. This alienation recapitulates 
the “flight from woman'' described by Catholic psychoanalytic writer Karl Stem. Such 
an alienation is endemic in the post-Cartesian West, subject to ideologies that denigrate 
the feminine even as they purport to liberate women. The Cartesian cogito severed the 
mind from the senses, effecting a split in human consciousness whose ramifications 
are still being felt Post-Cartesian philosophy has encouraged the rejection, denigra­
tion, and denial of the feminine aspects of man— especially the body, the emotions, 
and religious faith. This rejection found itself repeated in the Southern Stoic philoso­
phy to which Percy was heir through William Alexander Percy. Cartesian and Stoic 
traditions were major influences for Percy, in response to which he accepted the 
Catholic faith, largely for its sacramental resistance to dualism.
The persistent trouble which Percy’s male protagonists encounter when they 
attempt to form relationships with women is itself an allegorical representation of the 
Western rejection of the feminine, which can only be healed through the reintegration
of the feminine as an active principle within the psyche. We find such a re-integration 
only in Percy’s fifth novel, The Second Coming.
C hapter One: Sex and Metaphysics
If literature is about anything, it is about human nature. If it serves any purpose 
higher than diversion— a mental enactment of that incessant travel which Pascal 
diagnosed as the flight from unresolved anxiety— then it serves to ask questions and 
suggest answers about the mysterious predicament in which every individual finds 
himself on this earth. The novel, the first “modem genre” to arise after the shattering 
of Western thought in the Reformation, directly addresses the nature and prospects of 
the newly problematic, “historical” human self.1 If we see the novel as the literary 
formthat arose to meet a specific need— the “self’s” need to interpret itself in relation 
to desacralized Time —  then we understand the “philosophical novel" not as a mixture 
of genres, or an “impure” form of literature, as some “aesthetic” critics have suggested 
(most notably Nabokov, who assails Dostoevsky with precisely this complaint). If the 
novel’s cultural task is to attack the problem of selfhood, then the philosophical novel 
is simply the most direct form of assault, a charge head-on into the heart of the matter. 
The problem is— as Pickett learned— that most such charges fail. In this study, I 
hope to show why most of the novels of Walker Percy succeed, to examine Percy’s 
choice of objectives, his angle of attack, the forces against which he straggled, and the 
nature of his achievement
The model of creation that I think most applicable to Percy’s work differs 
considerably from the images of the artist that have pervaded modernist aesthetics. 
Briefly summarized, these have images have included Matthew Arnold’s high-priest of 
culture, whose function is to conserve, interpret, and contribute to “the best that has 
been written and thought"; James Joyce’s Promethean creator, whose rebellion against 
God the Father cuts him off from mother country, mother Church, and material
1 Lewis Simpson, The Brazen Face of History (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1980), pp. 210-211.
reality,2 a self-consecrated mystagogue in the gnostic religion of art; Donald 
Davidson's ethnocultural bard, who defends a way of life in its particularity by uniting 
his own vision with the myths and history of that place, elaborating and re-ordering 
them for use in the future, and fighting his people's enemies as his own.3
Instead, we find in Percy an artist who attacks the problem of selfhood directly, 
struggling to establish a personal anthropology that makes his own life and artistic 
creation possible, to claim and embody in writing the Catholic faith that he had 
accepted at the very outset of his writing career. To make this faith his own, to form 
himself according to it so that it became integral to him rather than an accretion or a 
pious ornament, Percy needed to elaborate the Catholic inteipretation of the self in 
novelisdc form— to show why that gospel was not simply another theory of man 
presented to the intellect for inspection, but the very “news” Percy had been waiting 
for, which made sense of his life in the here and now and the hereafter. Like Dante’s 
pilgrim conversing with the souls in Hell, Percy’s heroes encounter a series of figures 
who espouse or embody false gospels, whose supposed answers to man's alienation 
are themselves symptoms of that condition. Such ideological constructs cobbled 
together to replace or eclipse the complex, traditional representation of man in the 
orthodox Western tradition Eric Voegelin calls “second realities.”4 Always a pungent 
satirist, Percy allows characters who promote such misconceived theories of man to 
damn themselves in their own words, allowing the cracks in their rhetoric to speak 
volumes, to adumbrate the truth by way of negation. Indeed, the voice of orthodoxy
2Walter Sullivan, Death By Melancholy (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1972), pp. 104-106.
3Simpson, p. 167 ff. In Davidson’s self-conscious adoption of the bardic vocation, he continued 
and improved upon the work of such 19th century southern apologists as Timrod and Page. Ironically, 
even as white southern writers largely abandoned this role, black authors seemed to adopt it. Even 
today, novelists such as Toni Morrison and Alice Walker are seen as spokesmen for the ethnos of 
"African America,” whether or not they in fact represent the attitudes of most black citizens. It is a 
curious anomaly.
4Eric Voegelin, “The Eclipse of Reality," in What is History? Thomas A. Hollweck and Paul 
Carangella, ed. (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1990), p. 112 ff.
volumes, to adumbrate the truth by way of negation. Indeed, the voice of orthodoxy 
itself is usually muted, distorted or disguised in Percy's fiction, allowed to express 
itself only in the Kierkegaardian mode of “indirection."
The literary results of Percy’s philosophical skirmishes vary in quality and 
complexity, according to how deeply a particular false gospel appealed to Percy and 
how much energy he expended in exorcising i t  Generally, the more tempting Percy 
found an ideology, the more imagination he put into the characters who embodied it; 
the less it attracted him, the more likely he was to depict it in simple caricatures, using 
his consummate ear for dialogue, jargon, and inauthentic speech to render, say, the 
superstition of the actress Dana in Lancelot, the pseudo-eastern mysticism of Doris 
More in Love in the Ruins, or the conspiracy-paranoia of Mrs. Vaught in The Last 
Gentleman. In some contexts, Percy resorts to simple taxonomy, drawing in a few 
simple strokes the range of existential alternatives his characters are pursuing. In one 
scene in Lost in the Cosmos we encounter eleven different people, each in his own 
“orbit of transcendence," ranging from an abstracted nuclear physicist at Los Alamos 
to an unreflective tourist from Moline, Illinois (LC, pp. 130-133). Such scenes are 
often uproariously funny, and frequently serve to illuminate philosophical distinctions 
that Percy considers essential; nevertheless, they also shift our attention away from the 
texture of the literary work, towards the realm of intellectual history and polemic.
They risk “the loss of the creature” — missing the dramatic particulars of a given 
man's situation for the rhetorical satisfaction of classifying him and refuting his 
position.5 This was a risk from which Percy could not afford to flinch. As an 
explicitly philosophical novelist he was hunting for an authentic, metaphysically 
complete account of the self— large quarry indeed, requiring high-caliber
5Cf. Patricia Lewis Poteat, Walker Percy and the Old Modern Age (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 
1985). Poteat spends the whole of this readable and enlightening book applying Percy’s own 
strictures against Cartesian theorizing to his own philosophical work.
ammunition. The scattershot weapon of broad satire allowed Percy to give the self- 
deifying, self-cancelling ideologies of our time the most important gift a novelist is 
authorized to offer, in Percy's words “a good kick in the ass."
Sometimes he delved far deeper, and it is those trips that plumb the gnostic depths 
of the post-Christian psyche, yielding the most powerful pleasures, rewarding the 
reader with insight and pathos, as the addled, bemused Percy protagonist approaches 
the moment of decision between salvation and spiritual death. On these trips into the 
underworld, two antagonists stand out in bold relief in novel after novel, grim and 
stem, armed with mighty temptations and woeful countenance, burnished bright by 
tradition or gleaming with angelic knowledge and raw power, like two golems grimly 
barring the road back to life: the white southerner as hero, and the western scientist as 
Faust. These two inauthentic selves imposed themselves on Percy, the first through 
his upbringing and social position as an aristocratic southerner, the second through his 
intellectual aspirations in a “scientific" age. Quarreling with them, he quarrelled with 
his own deepest longings and oldest compulsions and, in doing so, left behind a 
legacy of provocative intellectual dissent and high literary art6 This study will treat 
four of Percy’s novels in detail: The Moviegoer, The Last Gentleman, Lancelot and 
The Second Coming, omitting Love in the Ruins and The Thanatos Syndrome because 
these two primarily satirical works function less as explorations of the self than as 
intellectual tours deforce, sophisticated spoofs of ideologies and anthropologies that 
Percy considered heretical— satires on the order of C.S. Lewis’ Pilgrim's Regress or 
Erasmus’s The Praise o f Folly.
6William Rodney Allen, “Father Smith’s Confession in The Thanatos Syndrome,” in Walker 
Percy: Novelist and Philosopher, Jan Noiby Gretlund and Karl-Heinz Westaip, ed. (Jackson: 
University Press of Mississippi, 1991), p. 196.
Prometheus on Horseback: The Southern Hero as Ersatz Messiah
In a slim but perceptive study of southern'narrative, The Figure o f the Hero in
Southern Narrative, Michael Kreyling suggests that Walker Percy’s first and most
powerful antagonist, the presence with whom he would always have to wrestle on his
path to personal and literary productivity, was the lingering figure of the southern
hero, a literary-cultural type that southern letters had inherited from Europe and
transfigured to meet the needs of the region. As Kreyling points out, the hero is a male
figure who possesses
an inherent and instantaneously acknowledged capacity to 
render the provisional nature of any situation or condition 
into part of a consecrated pattern.... [T]he heroic figure 
guarantees meaning “from above” the horizontal plane of 
simple contingency.7
In the south, the situation to be consecrated was the paternal order, the rule of the
white fathers who headed the plantations and the legislatures, who dominated the
regime of “extended families” (as WJ. Cash described the south), whose leadership
was deferred to in times of crisis, who led the south through the nightmare of invasion
and defeat, and through the long resistance to Reconstruction. As Richard King points
out in A Southern Renaissance, the southern hero was not merely a figure of fiction,
but an exemplar set up for eligible white men to emulate that exerted real force on the
behavior of the leaders of the region. The hero stood at the center of the mythic
structure King calls the “southern family romance"— a psychological and social
semiotic that allowed generations of upper-class southern white men and women to
construct their identities and find their places in society, to preserve what the Agrarians
extolled as an organic, traditional society in -a country that tends toward atomism and
levelling.8
7Michael Kreyling, The Figure o f the Hero in Southern Narrative (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 
1987), p. 5.
8Richard King, A Southern Renaissance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 26-36.
In the teeth of America's love affair with democracy and egalitarianism, men of 
the south wove a different, equally compelling myth, based on subordination, ritual, 
and paternalism. This myth formed the self-conceptions of the most powerful men in 
the south from the age of Jackson until the administration of Johnson, teaching them 
that their duty as white men was to preserve order and honor, both of which depended 
on certain hierarchical political arrangements and social distinctions. An assault on 
these institutions was an encroachment of utter chaos upon the region and the family 
like an assault by a gang on the family demense. It is no wonder that so many 
southern men fought so heroically in the War for Southern Independence— and so 
bitterly afterwards, to pull together the pieces in defeat
In literature, then— and putatively in history— the southern hero is the locus of 
political power in his immediate region, the patriarch who rules one of the extended 
families that constitute southern society. He preserves women from dishonor, 
summons men from lives of chaos or cowardice, preserves the hierarchy (hieros- 
archos: meaning “sacred order”) from the collapse of distinctions, and “protects" the 
slaves from their own impulses and the depredations of poor whites. By guaranteeing 
political stability, he stands above and against history, transcending the entropic, 
feminine matter of temporality, and conferring upon it the masculine stamp of eternity. 
The hero attains his transcendence by restraint* self-restraint in the face of temptations 
to venality, sexual “dissipation” and cowardice— and restraint of others who threaten 
the “transcendent" order he imposes and embodies.
The hero, by right of inheritance and inner virtti, defends the traditional order 
against foreign incursion and internal revolution; by his very presence he magnetizes 
the disordered elements of society that otherwise might collapse into the miasma of 
anarchy, social levelling, and miscegenation. He is “the linchpin of a powerful social, 
historical, and psychological myth, which supports the unanalyzed structures of
individual and group awareness and behavior.”9 The hero restores a consecrated 
order, preserving it against material enemies who would overwhelm it by force or 
fraud; likewise, the author of an heroic narrative summons his readers to rally around 
the order thus consecrated, to fend off intellectual enemies who would attack the 
“sacred” origins of the hierarchical order with economic or historical explanations.
The hero “forg[es] a foundation myth that in large measure aimed to supplant 
history in the southern imagination as the explanation of the nature of things.” In 
resorting to the heroic tradition, the writer seeks nothing less than “the power of 
directed myth to establish unity where history supplies only contingency.”10 The hero 
controls the interpretation of the past— making it “sacred" and unassailable— and 
thereby seals off the future, freezing it in the amber of myth.11 Events are neither 
random, nor defined by the my sterious progress of the City of God through history 
towards the eschaton; rather they culminate in the actions of the hero, self-consecrated 
military Messiah on the Old Testament model.12 His actions are exempt (it is asserted) 
from historical critique; thus he transcends the past. The order he founds (it is hoped) 
is exempt from change, and thus determines the future. The heroic self attains a 
secular eternity through the enactment of a ritualized pattern; he escapes the realm of 
contingency not through grace but by his own efforts. If (as Kreyling suggests) the 
cultural power of this figure is borrowed from Christ, the nature of his ambitions make
9Kreyling, p. 11.
10Kieyling, p. 29.
1 ̂ usan V. Donaldson, “Tradition in Amber,” in Gretiund and Westarp, p. 65 IT.
12Kreyling suggests, following Theodore Ziolkowski, that “the historical Jesus is the prototype 
of all Western heroic figures, and the messianic narrative is the keystone of Western history that 
obtained until the modem age” (p. 4). I think it more fruitful to consider this: since Christ’s kingdom 
was explicitly “not of this world,” and He disappointed the Jews to whom He came precisely by 
renouncing the possibility of an immanent, politicized messiah-state, it is rather in heretical 
movements that we find secularized messiah-figures, such as Joachim of Flora famously predicted. As 
Eric Voegelin suggests, such movements generally began by declaring Christianity either corrupt or 
superseded, and proceeded to “perfect” Christ’s wok through secular means. Generally, this entailed a 
radical critique of creation and a rebellion against God the Father. (Cf. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, and 
Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor.) The hero who imitates Christ is always in danger of becoming 
Antichrist.
him the rightful heir of Prometheus. He participates in the modem gnostic revolt 
against the order of being.
In The Dispossessed Garden, Lewis Simpson makes this link directly, refuting 
the 19th century mythmakers (north and south) who linked the “chattel garden” of the 
plantation order with the feudal heritage of Europe.13 He describes the attempt to 
found a pastoral order on the basis of chattel slavery and capitalism as a southern 
variation on the basic American theme:
Throughout our national history we have tended 
strongly to idealize the Republic in a gnostic spirit 
Having secularized Christian perfectionism and 
millenarianism, we have assumed that we know the end of 
history; and that this is America, which is the 
“immanendzadon of the Chrisdan idea of perfection." In 
sheer idea— in the most commonly accepted version of 
the American Dream— America is one of the most alluring 
fantasies of a new world the gnostic imagination has 
conceived. Our whole national character, and our 
existence as individuals, is colored by the assumption that 
America is a “recreation of being.”14
Nor were the men of the South immune to this fantasy:
The imagination of the Old South responded to the 
dynamics of the revolutionary redemption of mankind 
from the past by the gnostic concepts of modernity.
Southerners, for example, spurred by recurrent dreams of 
perfecting the South as a great tropical slave empire— 
embracing Mexico, Central America, Brazil, the islands of 
the Caribbean— transferred the magic of nineteenth- 
century “American Manifest Destiny” into terms of a 
“Southern Manifest Destiny.”15
As Lewis Lawson points out in his analysis of William Alexander Percy, even in 
decline— in the hands of a self-consciously failed generation— the gnostic ambition
13Allen Tate preceded him in this observation. The shabby “feudal” tournament in The Fathers 
parodies attempts by southerners to identify their order with that qf medieval Europe. Simpson 
reiterates: “Early ovemin with a divisive and fragmenting Protestantism, the Old South, as Allen Tate 
pointed out long ago, found no center in the profession of a traditional religion and thus was without a 
prime requirement of a traditional society,” Lewis Simpson, The Dispossessed Garden (Baton Rouge: 
LSU Press, 1983), p. 80.
14Simpson, Dispossessed Garden, p. 77.
15Simpson, Dispossessed Garden, p. 80.
embodied in the “traditional” heroic order slept lightly, “vexed to nightmare by a 
rocking cradle,” ready to awaken when the time came.16
The suggestion that the Stoic/heroic position contains the seeds of gnosticism and 
a Promethean revolt against the orthodox order of being finds support in the writings 
of W.A. Percy, Walker Percy’s older cousin, the man who raised Walker to adulthood 
after his father’s suicide and his mother’s suspicious death. In both his autobiography 
Lanterns on the Levee and his poetic works, W.A. Percy combines in his world view 
an absolute, unshakeable elitism, and an insistent hostility to Christian faith. In fact, 
the two attitudes seem to be inextricably linked for him, as his attempted critiques of 
that faith repeatedly make clear. For instance, to describe the ethics of ordinary 
Christians, he selects a tendentious example— people who believe that their status as 
“born-again” guarantees them salvation, regardless of their sins— and offers it as 
typical. (As a well-catechized Catholic who’d frequented the confessional until age 
sixteen, he certainly should have known that his former church teaches no such thing 
— nor indeed, do most Protestant churches.) Having thus ‘demonstrated’ the 
ignobility of Christian ethics, he dismisses the whole edifice of faith — that produced 
or preserved most of the cultural treasures he so reveres— with the phrase “Thus the 
Negroes believe!”
We see similar sentiments expressed in W A. Percy's long poem “Enzio’s 
Kingdom," a mournful celebration of the heretical Emperor Frederick II (and implicitly 
of W A. Percy’s own father, LeRoy, whom he idealized as an exemplar of the 
southern heroic tradition) by his imprisoned son, Enzio. The Emperor sets forth his 
religious policy as follows:
“Protect the masses in their breeding moil;
Feed them; and sweeten them by fear’s remove:
But do not build for them, for they are doomed
16Lewis Lawson, Another Generation (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1984), p. 122
To everyday contents and grievances—
Unspeculative, level, themselves their study.
But, oh, the flashing-eyed minority,
The Enzios of the world, die sons of light—
These would I turn free-pinioned on an earth 
That they would make august and radiant!” . . .
“I will concede the masses to the Pope:
Their stultified obedience makes for peace.
But m  not give my eaglets to his cage:
For them there shall be freedom if it takes 
The very toppling down of Peter’s throne....”17
Seen in the light of these verses— which surely speak for W.A. Percy himself
— the Stoic creed of noblesse oblige that so charms a reader throughout Lanterns on
the Levee seems more like the creed of a revolutionary gnostic elite; albeit one fallen on
hard times, awaiting a riper moment, a leader who will redeem its cause. W A. Percy
explicitly stated that he hoped for the coming of such a mystagogue, for the “seer or
saint who sees what I surmise— and he will come, even if he must walk through
ruins”(LoL, p. 321).18 His dreams are mirrored in The Moviegoer by Aunt Emily,
who used to talk with Binx and Sam Yerger of
the new messiah, the scientist-philosopher-mystic who 
would come striding through the ruins with the Gita in one 
hand and a Geiger counter in the other. (M, p. 145)
W A. Percy’s yearning for the lost greatness of the age of the Fathers and his 
casting ahead to a forceful restoration of order by a warrior wielding secret knowledge 
are both characteristic of the southern heroic tradition. As Lewis Lawson shows, the 
Stoic world-view in the south reached back to Thomas Jefferson himself — the 
archetype of gentleman planters. (Indeed, Percy’s description of the “dubious" truth 
value of the Gospels echoes Jefferson almost word for word.) The Stoic system, 
Lawson points out, was particularly well-suited to a slave-holding society. Unlike 
Christianity, which at least contains implicitly the moral equality of all men— as 
Abolitionist clergy were never slow to point out— Stoicism specified a rigid moral
l l The Collected Poems of William Alexander Percy (New York: Alfred A  Knopf, 1943), p.
18See also Lawson, Another Generation, p. 128.
11
hierarchy, at the top of which stood “aristocratic virtues.” While orthodox Christianity 
teaches that all men are sinners and anyone may be saved by repentance, the Stoic view 
divides the world dualistically between those who uphold such values as duty, honor, 
good manners, honesty, and graciousness, and those who neglect them.19
In Southern Honor, Bertram Wyatt-Brown distinguishes the “genteel” tradition of 
southern Stoicism, with its emphasis on inward righteousness and the willingness to 
patiently endure evil, from the “primal honor” code that demanded public revenge for 
wrongs and the preservation above all of a “good name.” If an adherent of primal 
honor esteemed himself based on the approval of the community— especially of other 
men of honor — the southern Stoic drew that jury of honor into himself.20 He created 
an internal tribunal of great men, whose lives he learned to revere in classic texts 
(especially Plutarch), in works of history, and by reputation. These heroes might 
range from Socrates and Marcus Aurelius to Robert E. Lee and even one’s own recent 
forebears. An admirable result of the Stoic tendency was the filial pride it evoked — 
moving Robert E. Lee to spend his final years writing not about his own, but his 
father’s exploits; inspiring William Faulkner to memorialize his great-grandfather Col. 
William C. Falkner in The Unvanquished.21
Less happy was the immense psychological burden such an internal pantheon 
placed on the shoulders of the latter generations, who lived in a political and economic 
world that left little room for heroic action. Faulkner portrayed the plight of these heirs 
in his sagas of the latter-day Compsons, the Reverend Gail Hightower, and other 
“degenerate scions" of heroic forebears. These scions displayed, according to Richard 
King,
19Lewis Lawson, Following Percy (New York: Whitston Publishing Company, 1988), p. 73.
^Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 88 If.
21 William Pratt, “Andrew Lytle and the Cultivation of American Letters," Chronicles 18:5 
(May 1994), p. 30. Pratt suggests that Col. John Sartoris was an amalgam of Col. Falkner and Gen. 
Nathan Bedford Forrest.
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a gradual decline in energy and will as generation gave 
way to generation. As Florence King has sardonically 
suggested, the Southern scion was urged by his mother 
“‘be half the man your daddy was,* and the son took her 
injunction to heart’’ The upshot was that, after three 
generations or so, the heroic age of the grandfathers who 
had fought the Yankees and driven out the carpetbaggers 
had given way to grandsons, pale copies of their fathers, 
and fallen prey to brooding, drink, or other destructive 
impulses. Colonel John Sartoris gives way to young 
Bayard Sartoris, hell-bent on self-destruction; General 
Compson is followed by the psychotic Quentin Compson.
Though lacking the dramatic flourishes, this pattern was 
at work in the Percy family; at least Will Percy felt it to be.
This pattern was in part the result of historical change, of the inevitable 
breakdown of the southern version of the American gnostic dream. Stoicism served 
veiy well as a code of action for Thomas Jefferson, leader of the first American 
Revolution, or Robert E. Lee, leader of the Second. The Redeemers who fought 
Reconstruction, and the Bourbons (such as W.A. Percy’s own father) who protected 
“their” blacks from the depredations of the poor whites, could alike function within the 
confines of the same heroic code. But for Percy’s generation, the mantle of heroism 
had been tainted; it had been seized in Europe by demagogues left and right, while in 
America the heritage and symbolism of the Confederacy had been seized upon by the 
lowest sort of race-baiters. Heroic action— once approved, applauded, and 
demanded by an educated public — had suddenly been thrown into question. The 
World War, in which Percy partook without seeing much action, was a grim spectacle 
of mass slaughter fueled by propaganda machines, ending in a vengeful and fragile 
peace. The struggle at home in Mississippi, to uphold the civic order and protect the 
blacks from the poor whites and from themselves, was a long and fruitless one whose 
end promised (Percy thought) only the destruction of his own social class and the 
triumph of barbarism. Seeing all this, Percy created a personal version of Stoicism 
more wintry and melancholic than the creed of Jefferson, imbued with a Victorian 
pessimism that seemed more and more justified as the dark decade of the 1930’s wore
on.
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The Mississippi River, and the levees that held it in check, are important 
presences in Will Percy’s autobiography— indeed, one might consider them as 
characters, so central are both to the region he inhabited, and to the chronicle that 
emerges from his life. For Percy, the river incarnates the mighty, destructive life* 
giving forces of nature (and the anima), the levee man's cultural and ethical defenses 
against its chaotic power. In his analysis of the changing relationship of levee to river, 
we see reflected his mournful sense of the gradual displacement of the heroic tradition 
from the world, and his own exclusion from its male pantheon:
The low levees of 1893, ineffectual as they were to keep 
the Mississippi off the cotton fields, themselves had certain 
real advantages. When they broke, the water trickled in 
gradually, stood quietly over the land two or three weeks, 
deposited a fine nutritious layer of sediment, and withdrew 
without having drowned anybody or wrecked any 
buildings or prevented a late planting of the crop. You 
called that an overflow. Our great dikes of today, when 
once breached, hurl a roaring wall of water over the 
country, so swift, so deep, so long-lasting, it scours off 
the top soil from the fields, destroys everything in its path, 
prevents crop-planting that year, and scatters death among 
the humble, always unprepared and unwary. (LoL, p.
244)
The new levee, “forty feet high. . .  built by caterpillars and drag lines,” cuts off 
the land around it from the life-giving forces of nature, containing them until the point 
of inevitable collapse, when they break loose in a flood of destructive energy and ruin.
A symbol for Percy of modem mass democracy and the technology that guarantees its 
rigid, fragile order, the new levee leaves him feeling superfluous. The old levee— 
like the old order— was policed by aristocrat volunteers with pistols, and allowed 
more contact between man and nature.
Percy here posits a radical difference between men of his own generation and the 
fathers who came before them; while the fathers contained and controlled these 
chthonic forces (the lower classes, blacks, women, physical nature, and sexuality), 
they were never alienated from it; indeed, the very realm of heroic action served to
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mediate between the masculine ego and the world of anima. Percy’s latter generation, 
as suggested by Kreyling, carried on the anxieties and expectations of their forebears, 
without the warrant to act on them.22 The only possible responses were withdrawal 
into melancholy resignation, the adoption of aesthetic solipsism, or the search for an 
heroic death. Each of these alternatives occurs prominently in Lanterns on the Levee.
W.A. Percy — always self-conscious and artful in his choice of symbols— 
draws an explicit link between the decline of the heroic and the change in the levee. He 
mourns the passing of the old system, with its greater possibilities for heroic action 
and its closer contact with the feminine, in the following recollection of the heroes who
i  •
patrolled the porous levee walls:
While off duty the guards played freeze-out poker for licks 
administered by the winner with Mr. Cousen’s broad, 
water-soaked razor strop to the squinched posterior of the 
loser as he bent miserably over a log. No winner ever 
stayed his hand out of friendship or compassion. The 
game was gay and brutal. Hotspur and the heroes beneath 
Troy would have joined it and have been companionable in 
that company. It attracted participants from the whole 
neighborhood One planter, affable and tipsy, rode up on 
his five-hundred-dollar mare as the players were 
recovering from the last game in a swim. Without 
dismounting he whipped his snorting mount into the thick 
of the swimmers, roaring out the while: “Gotta head like a 
fish and a tail like a man. I’m a mare-maid” Evidently the 
Delta gentry of fifty years ago were not effete or decadent.
I like to hear about them — theirs was such a magnificent 
male combination of gentleman and pioneer— but I doubt 
if I should have been at ease living among them. They 
were a bit too lusty and robustious; that good rough streak 
of Rabelais in them was unfortunately omitted from my 
make-up. (LoL, pp. 243-244)
Percy stands at the remove of an entire generation, behind the concrete wall of an 
impermeable, fragile levee, contemplating the fathers he so reveres cavorting in the 
murky waters. These men are unafraid of the river’s power, having become by their 
actions the happy masters of nature. (One of them goes so far as to claim a special
22Kreyling, p. 125 ff.
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kinship to the water, as a “mare-maid”; he does so without ever surrendering the 
masterful position, sitting on horseback with a whip.) These men are neither alienated 
from the feminine nor subject to it; they rule over it as untroubled lords of creation— 
at least, that is how William Alexander Percy, watching the sun wink out behind the 
cypress trees, recollects i t
■it**
As I will explore in greater depth in Chapter 2, for most of his life the elder Percy 
could not manage to renounce the possibility of some heroic restoration, or to absolve 
himself for failing to bring it about Building and preserving a masculine identity, for 
Percy, depended on filling one’s niche in the socio-cosmic hierarchy and fighting to 
preserve that order— to keep “the bottom rail” from “getting on top.” Richard King 
suggests that the leaden shadow of this implicit expectation lay so heavy on Percy’s 
generation of southerners that many of them were crushed by i t  King cites Percy as a 
noble and tragic instance of this, and speculates that William Faulkner might have 
become another— and joined the string of failed and self-destructive would-be heroes 
in his early works. Only by creating and then sacrificing the figure of Quentin 
Compson, a man transfixed by the twin fetishes of heroic action and female chastity, 
could the South’s greatest myth-maker escape the soul-consuming “Southern Family 
Romance," the heroic order in all its sexual and political implications.23
Walker Percy’s own escape from the nightmare that consumed his elder cousin 
and the heritage of doomed and death-dealing father figures is well documented by 
William Rodney Allen in Walker Percy: A Southern Wayfarer.7* Extending and 
supplementing Allen’s insights, in this work I will explore Percy’s treatment of fathers 
and mothers; of male protagonists and female characters; of the masculinizing spirit of
23 King, p. 77 ff.
^William Rodney Allen, Walker Percy: A Southern Wayfarer (Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 1986).
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modernity and the feminine reality that it eclipses; and finally, of the relation between 
the heroic masculine ideal and the paternity of God I hope to link the psychological 
analysis (and self-analysis) that pervades Percy's novels with the allegorical 
conventions of the Catholic tradition; to show that his treatment of masculine and 
feminine characters is in part a reflection of a well-known traditionalist critique,25 
which points to the suppression of the feminine as an aspect of gnostic modernity; and 
finally to suggest that in the four novels I am treating here, Percy’s own philosophical 
analysis is profound and frequently subtle.
. According to this broader critique, the poison of gnosticism runs deeper, and 
rises higher, than a purely psychological study could suggest. It corrupts the 
individual’s relation to God, driving him into competition with Him for dominance and 
suppressing the psychic habits that make faith possible?6 ; it taints his relationship to 
physical nature, sexuality, and reproduction, invoking the crippling ghost of dualism 
— that tendency of the self to identify with the mind and treat the body as “other,” a 
hostile anti dehumanizing force.
This implicit Manichaeanism becomes explicit in Faulkner’s early works, where
such “degenerate” scions of great families as Bayard Sartoris, Gail Hightower, and
Quentin Compson share a
repulsion. . .  toward woman. . .  sanctioned by the myth 
that woman is not a conscious being, is in fact inimical to 
the conscious (logic, reason, will, art) by virtue of the 
involuntary ebbs and flows that control her life. Man 
pursues the antithesis of woman in art or science or the 
angelic fraternity of war and is denied fulfillment by her 
intrusion.27
^T he term “traditionalist” is used for lack of a better one; thinkers who took part in this 
critique might well disclaim it. I use it to denote such defenders of the core traditions of Western 
Christian teaching on transcendence, immanence and creation as Eric Voegelin, Henri de Lubac, Karl 
Stem, Martin D'Aicy, Jacques Mari tain, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Gertrud von le Fort, Louis Bouyer 
and others.
26John Finlay, Hermetic Light (Santa Barbara; John Daniel and Co., 1994), p. 119 ff.
27Kreyling, p. 142.
The hero does not find a social context that will allow him to wield power fruitfully, 
find an appropriate mate, and father a line of worthy heirs. Women are no longer 
reliable “vessels of honor,” but instead the emblem of a chaotic and soul-extinguishing 
nature. Even worse, thanks to their sexual power, they remind him of his own fleshly 
nature, of his status as a mere creature subject to death and history— rather than a 
creator of order who freezes history in his wake. They reveal the truth o f his being, 
and he hates them for i t
The feminine is the sign of creaturely existence, from the Song of Songs to 
Goethe’s Faust, the emblem of immanence, earthly limitation, and natural vitality.28 
He who would assume “angelic" or divine existence must deny it, must repress his 
own affinities with the body, the earth, and women. In so doing, he turns the earth 
itself into a monstrous and alien place— a charnel house that imprisons the “pure” 
spirit of mind and masculine will-to-power. He begins the love affair with death that 
haunts the literature of the Decadents, and the works of Walker Percy. In this light, 
we begin to see in Percy’s literary corpus an extended act of exorcism— and reunion.
So viewed, the psychological degeneration of the southern hero was no historical 
accident, the fruit of Appomattox or Reconstruction. Even if the southern states had 
triumphed, repelling the brutal and unconstitutional invasion of their territory by 
federal power, even if they had in fact founded a vast slave empire as Fitzhugh 
dreamed of doing, there would still have been no escape from the reality of human 
limitations or the continuing processes of history. Just as America’s sense of mission 
and Manifest Destiny has collapsed into an orgy of guilt and multicultural 
recriminations, so the victorious south would have suffered the depredations of human 
history, and awoken from its gnostic dream.
^Louis Bouyer, Woman in the Church (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1979), pp. 40-44. See 
also Karl Stem, The Flight From Woman (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1965), pp. 232-233.
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No set of material circumstances, however favorable, will permanently support
the metaphysical distortion that tries to freeze history in place— especially in the West,
where the Gassical heritage and Christian doctrine alike reveal the absurdity of such a
quest. As Eric Voegelin demonstrates throughout his works, any attempt to locate
immanent meaning and closure in history— whether through heroic political action,
intellectual speculation, or technological progress — violates the order of being and
belies the fact of every person’s submersion in history. It is built upon a lie, and
doomed to failure. What motivates this futile quest? Voegelin suggests one answer:
The attempt at immanentizing the meaning of existence is 
fundamentally an attempt at bringing our knowledge of 
transcendence into a firmer grip than the cognitiofidei, the 
cognition of faith, will afford; and Gnostic experiences 
offer this firmer grip in so far as they are an expansion of 
the soul to the point where God is drawn into the existence 
of man.29
This “firmer grip” replaces the theological virtue of faith, which is infused directly 
by God as a gift to the soul, mediated through human authorities and conveyed by an 
historical institution, the Church. Instead, the intellect grasps by its own power a 
“gnosis” bom of speculation or experiment. While faith comes from hearing— in 
Percy’s terms, from the trusting acceptance of “news” — gnosis is an attempt at 
attaining salvific knowledge sub specie aeternitatis, as a discovery or deduction that 
grants the knower explanatory power. The gnostic will not wait with the Virgin for the 
Dove to descend upon him; he looks for transcendence in the laboratory, in the maze, 
in the lurid pink eyes of starving rats. Or he makes a laboratory of society, and then 
the starving eyes belong to men and women in the millions, as our century has learned 
all too well.
29Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p.
124.
The Angel in the Corpse and the Will to Power
Another figure inhabits Percy’s fiction— a father-figure to rival the hero— who 
offers his protagonists some of the same psychological satisfactions in a more 
contemporary form. The Faustian scientist, unlike the hero, does not rely on cultural 
nostalgia or the power of tradition. His prestige is not subject to decline thanks to 
social change, since it grows not from the structure of a particular social order, but 
from the demonstrable power of empirical science and the technology it creates. 
Consequently, he always seems a modem figure, a man of the future, even though his 
historical origin predates the southern plantation order. For this reason, when Percy’s 
characters turn away from Robert E. Lee and begin to emulate Descartes, they do not 
feel they are reaching back but racing forward.
Like the hero, the scientist gains the power to interpret the future by controlling 
the interpretation of the past— in this case by replacing nostalgia with iconoclasm.
For the post-scholastic philosopher and scientist (the two were not clearly 
distinguished until the late 19th century), the past is a dross, a burden, a decaying 
mass of unfounded theories, chthonic prejudices, and deadening authorities — the 
“idols” Francis Bacon sought to smash.30 Marlowe’s Dr. Faustus was the first 
eloquent spokesman for this rejection.31 In the first scene the good doctor runs 
through the whole body of received knowledge— logic, medicine, law and theology 
— naming the fathers of each field and rejecting them. Aristotle, Galen, Justinian, and 
Jerome are all invoked and dismissed, in favor of the more “practical” art of magic and 
its sponsor
30Even today, words like “revolutionary," “innovative," and “new" bear a positive valence in 
popular culture; they are “sexy” words which sell magazines, medicines and movements. If many of 
our best minds have become cynical about technology and progress, popular culture has yet to catch 
up.
31Christopher Marlowe's Dr. Faustus: Text and Major Criticism, Irving Ribner, ed. (New York; 
The Odyssey Press, 1966), p. 6.
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O, what a world of profit and delight,
Of power, of honor, of omnipotence 
Is promised to the studious artisan!
All things that move between the quiet poles 
Shall be at my command. Emperors and kings 
Are but obeyed in their several provinces,
Nor can they raise the wind or rend the clouds,
But his dominion that exceeds in this 
Stretcheth as far as doth the mind of man 
A sound magician is a demi-god.
Here try thy brains to get a deity! (I, i: 54-64)
The mind contains within itself the power of self-deification. For the moment, Faustus
is bound to the opaque “lines, circles, signs, letters, and characters" of magic. Soon
enough, in the mind of the real philosopher Descartes, these would be replaced by
“clear and distinct ideas" that shine luminously revealing the mind to itself, washed
pure of sensual occlusions and the sediment of the past.
Descartes declares in The Discourse on Method: “[A]s far as all the opinions I had 
received thus far were concerned, I could not do better than to undertake once and for 
all to get rid of them."32 This might seem the hubris of a single thinker, certainly it 
would have seemed so to any Classical or Medieval philosopher, for whom 
“originality" generally implied “heresy." In the event, Descartes’ dictum became the 
axiom that drove western intellectual history from that point on, as Jacques Mari tain 
points out:
[EJveiy modem philosopher is a Cartesian in the sense that 
he looks upon himself as starting off in the absolute, and 
as having the mission of bringing men a new conception of 
the world.33
The scientific or philosophical magus exerts control over the past, removing himself 
from its causal chain of tradition, reducing it to shadowy prehistory. He thereby 
dominates the future, through the explanatory power of his theory and the 
technological power it unleashes.
32A s quoted by Jacques Mari tain, The Dream of Descartes (New York: Philosophical Library, 
1944), p. 20. According to Jay Tolson this was one of the pivotal books in Percy's intellectual 
development. Cf. Pilgrim in the Ruins (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1992), p. 237.
33Maritain, p. 167.
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And power is the point, for Descartes, Faustus and their heirs. St. Thomas put 
sensible reality (physics) at the base of science, building up concepts from perceptions, 
positing an unbreakable connection between the mind and the world. He placed 
metaphysics at the apex of thought, the highest science that pointed by the analogia 
entis beyond nature to its Author. Descartes turned medieval science on its head, 
declaring that sense data and tradition were alike unreliable, that speculation within the 
mind was the basis of all certainty. In his famous cogito, Descartes designates self- 
awareness as the ground of truth. Almost as an after-thought, he posits God as a 
guarantor that his mind can be trusted; after that, little more is made of theological 
matters, and Descartes quickly moves on to the serious business of physics and 
mechanics.34 Rather than the mind’s highest object, the proper study of all men and 
the crowning jewel of human knowledge, God becomes a theoretical step, a certainty 
device for a scientist with more important things to do, a mathematical cipher like V2.
In Descartes’ quest to make men the “masters and possessors of nature,’’ God is 
replaced as the telos of all speculation and research by applied science.
If theology and philosophy must be adapted and truncated, the better to serve as 
foundations for technology, the new Queen of Sciences,35 philosophic anthropology 
suffers a worse fate. As the awareness of mystery is banished from human 
consciousness— or diverted into the “depths” of the irrational or the unconscious— 
the scientific thinker finds himself explaining his fellow men and their behavior, even 
their innermost thoughts and highest aspirations, according to “objective,” reductionist 
theories. He must implicitly exempt his own thoughts from this reduction, of course, 
or he cannot claim to “know” anything at all. (MB, p. 22) By this theoretical step, he 
cuts himself off from the human family, the bonds of community, the vital world of 
nature, and even his own body— all of these are “other,” subject to distortion and
34Maritain, p. 112.
35Maritain, p. 91.
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illusion, impossible to know in the particular. It is possible to know about them 
through generalized laws, even to control them through technological means; it is never 
possible to commune with them. It’s lonely at the top.
Patricia Lewis Poteat describes the disturbing picture of the self that the scientist
(and his lay disciples) must confront:
Descartes describes his body as a “machine made up of 
flesh and bones" and then goes on to suggest that his 
living flesh is not importantly different from that of a 
corpse. This rather unnerving comparison comes in the 
midst of his discussion of “thinking thing" (mind) and 
“extended thing” (body), and in the wake of both his 
proposition “Cogito, ergo sum" and his superordination of 
mathematical reasoning as the model for all knowing.. . .
Implicated therein is a picture of the self: reasoning intellect 
riven from corpselike body, aspiring to the certitude of 
clear and distinct ideas modeled upon the univocal meaning 
of a mathematical equation. This is the picture of the self 
funded by that spirit of abstraction and obsession with 
theory which issue in the Cartesian model of clarity. This 
is also the picture of the self which equates the personal 
with the “merely subjective” and so renders it 
philosophically trivial.36
In such a world, one’s own body becomes an alien realm. It cannot be the bearer
of meaning, the place where the soul indwells, the site of visible means of grace—
from eating the Eucharist to the marital act of love— the ground of holiness, the
mediator of beauty and joy that declares that the individual is welcome in the world.
As Karl Stem points out, this modem ontology recapitulates the reaction of a neurotic
who has been traumatized in early childhood, his vital period of identification with the
mother foreshortened or marked by coldness, hostility, or absence:
the words for mater and materia, mother and matter, are 
etymologically related in more than one language. The 
sense of mystery which the poet and contemplative have 
towards nature; the sense of imbeddedness, of a personal 
relationship of protectiveness or cruelty, of the familiar or 
the awe-ful— all this is not a matter of animism or of a 
vague sentiment which will eventually be repealed by
36Poteat, Walker Percy and the Old Modern Age, p, 16.
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scientific elucidation. Quite the contrary; if a kind of 
Cartesian ideal were ever completely fulfilled, Le. if the 
whole of nature were only what can be explained in terms 
of mathematical relationships— then we would look at the 
world with that fearful sense of alienation, with that utter 
loss of reality with which a future schizophrenic child 
looks at his mother. A machine cannot give birth.37
This cold and hostile world, where the “wire mother” has replaced mother nature,
is the Faustian scientist's utopia, his answer to the southern slave arcadia. Once he has
reduced his fellow men to “nature," to mere links in the chain of mechanical causality,
it is simple for him to go one step further, to make himself the “master and possessor"
of men, the rational principle that helps them to become ever-happier organisms in
ever-improving environments, under his paternalistic control
The transaction becomes easier when laymen, impressed by the prestige of
science, eagerly agree to this transaction. Imitating their scientific teachers— without
their knowledge or intellectual rigor— these consumers identify themselves entirely
with their minds and their desires, and dispossess their own bodies as scientists have
the world’s body. They imagine themselves as angels or gods, inhabiting a pleas ure-
and-survival machine with certain needs but without moral significance. Sexual ethics,
indeed the whole sacramental sense, fade into oblivion; sexually transmitted diseases
become the new moral contagion, to be avoided by any means necessary except
abstinence. The body, whatever it does, must not get in the way of the will to power,
when it does, it must feel the full wrath of technology: Contraception reduces sex to
utility and caprice; abortion turns infants into options; forms of plastic surgery from
liposuction to “sex-reassignment" literally carve the resistant flesh into the shape
demanded by the will When religious scruples interfere with the will, they suffer
“reinterpretation" in the light of “human dignity." When the Christian notion of the
person makes inconvenient demands— when it specifies that suffering is preferable to
37Stem. pp. 77-78.
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sin — it is temporarily dispensed with, to be called back as soon as sentimentality 
demands. This is the world depicted in full poetic truth in The Thanatos Syndrome. It 
is the hell we currently inhabit
The Cartesian dystopia is not as a despairing Victorian humanist might have i t  
the tragic but inevitable result of man's progressive use of his reason. Rather, this 
world is an arid, unreal partied existence that usurps and impoverishes the experience 
of people who subscribe to its tenets. Chief among these tenets is the exclusive reliance 
upon only one mode of rationality. Recognized by Aristotle and described by S t 
Thomas long ago, the abstract mode of knowing that Descartes isolated and his heirs 
have fedshized was dubbed by S t Thomas ratio. We might profitably refer to it as 
"discursive reason." This mode of knowing seeks to remove the subject from his 
concrete situation and allow him to survey the universe as if from an infinite height 
This approach is exactly what is called for by certain human tasks; chemistry, 
mathematics, applied science, physics, and formal logic (among other endeavors) 
would be impossible without the objectivity ratio affords. It makes possible 
intellectual distinctions, the division of phenomena into categories, the formulation of 
general rules, and the predictive power of every empirical science from meteorology to 
seismology.38
Literary criticism, philosophy, and theology all make use of ratio for the 
elaboration of particular insights into larger troths— but none of them originates with 
it. Each of these phenomena— art, the love of wisdom, and the knowledge of God 
— depends upon individual experiences, whose integrity must always be respected, 
and which must always stand ready to test the validity of systematic and theoretical 
constructs that claim to account for them. Intellectus is the rational faculty that best 
describes these experiences, rooted as they must be in the immanence of the knower in
38Stem, p. 53 ff.
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the world and his predicament as a mortal man. The difference between ratio and 
intellectus comes to Binx Bolling as his ‘Vertical search’* for meaning through abstract 
speculation lumbers into a dead end: "The only difficulty was that though the universe 
had been disposed of, I myself was left over.” (A/, p. 60)
A significant residue. Perhaps the Socratic injunction “Know thyself’ was a 
warning against taking precisely such a route as we in the West have pursued, at least 
since the so-called Enlightenment Certainly, it was a dictum that Percy took seriously; 
as I said at the outset of this chapter, the quest to understand the self and its 
possibilities stands at the very heart of his work. (It is also the essential task of the 
novel as a genre, as Simpson points out.)
Of course, Percy would never deny the validity of experimental science or the 
abstract mode of knowing; in fact, he identified with the scientific quest for truth, 
labelling his own novels “diagnostic.” In his philosophical essays he strove to use the 
methods of objective science to demonstrate the essential uniqueness of man, to deny 
the applicability of determinism to the psyche, and to explore that strange 
phenomenon, the self. In The Message in the Bottle he describes his own attempt to 
found a “broad and untrammelled empiricism" (p. 287), which will take account of the 
self and its mysterious predicament as an “organism in an environment" that aspires to 
divinity. As we will see in the four Percy novels to be considered here, this 
predicament drives that self to adopt any number of impersonations, existential roles 
that it adopts in order to resolve the mystery of its existence. In turn, the self fancies 
itself as a disappointed god, a rebellious angel, a poorly adapted primate, a sinful son 
of a loving Creator, a happy consumer of pleasure just one step away from “achieving 
its full human potential,” a sentimental lover of art and music, and a killer.
Whether Percy succeeded in his quest to account for human existence is beyond 
the scope of my inquiry. It suffices for my purpose that Percy did indeed insist that 
science, impoverished and blinkered by the Cartesian heritage, does not offer an
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exhaustive, all-encompassing Method, sufficient for all tasks. Especially in his 
novels, he recognized that in order to account for the full range of human experience
— to rebuild the bridge between mind and body, the transcendent self and the world
— we must recover the mode of knowledge that builds from the immanence of the 
self, which reaches back into the mists of childhood and the inner recesses of aesthetic 
experience, which incorporates the insights of mystics and poets alike. We must not 
put them in a tightly sealed compartment labelled "humanism: do not remove under 
penalty of law,” but rather retain the “openness to being” that Voegelin finds in all the 
great philosophers. We must allow ourselves to be challenged by them, to realize that 
our most rational activities may reenact pre-radonal conflicts and the drama of 
salvation, that our lives are not determined but overdetermined— regaled with causes, 
explicable in a dozen different ways, each one containing a truth. To do justice to 
reality and especially to the self, we must recognize the equal scientific validity of 
another mode of knowing.
The Pregnant Virgin and the Wire M other: Reflections on the Feminine 
Intellectus, or knowledge by union, does not begin with the radical division of 
self from environment, but rather with an intuition of oneness and connection, which 
Karl Stem associates with the “primary process” phase of childhood consciousness, 
the “oral” phase when a child learns by taking in rather than taking apart. This mode of 
knowing, recognized by S t Thomas, Dante, and the whole Christian mystical 
tradition, proceeds from immanence, a deep-seated awareness of the self's status as 
creature, connected to and nurtured by the material universe. Because of a whole range 
of associations— from “mother nature" to “mother earth” — it seems natural to call 
this mode of knomngfentinine. Stem elaborates on why it is fitting that knowledge of 
the particular, of individuals, of the self, be associated with women and their 
mysterious power to contain and nurture life:
the sense of the infinite importance of the single individual 
is rooted in the experience of pregnancy, birth, and 
nursing. Scripture and theology teach us that the world 
has been created for Man to dwell in. But while someone 
is reading this line, a woman gives birth, with that 
immediate sense of certainty that the world has been 
created for this particular new human being. This certainty 
is not the result of abstraction. It arises out of an 
irreducible fusion with creative being. Hence the calculus 
of human logistics, that horrid concept of the human 
“material,” which can be thought of as usable and 
expendable, is forever inimical to the feminine.. . .
The uniqueness and sanctity of the human person can be 
reached only by contemplation. It is elusive to discursive 
reasoning. “But Mary treasured up all these sayings, and 
reflected on them in her heart,” (Luke 2,19). Now the 
mystery of the alter Christos in everyman; the fact that each 
single one of the myriads of births in the world is a 
Nativity; that each molecule of suffering in the world is a 
Gethsemane— these are facts on the plane of Grace, but 
as immediate irreducible insights they are natural to every 
mother.39
The feminine is an obstacle to any system of thought or disease of the spirit that would 
deify the self. Think of the great female characters in western literature whose very 
being repels or restrains the Promethean hopes of men: Dante’s Beatrice, Goethe’s 
Margarethe, Dostoevsky’s Sonia (and, might we add, Percy’s Allie). These women 
“save” the souls of prideful men by calling them back to the earth, teaching them a filial 
love of nature and a bridal love of God.
Women stand as the emblem of the feminine, especially in their power of 
motherhood, but it is not limited to them. As the southern hero found out to his 
disgust, femininity inheres in every created thing; in women and his desire for them he 
encounters an unbreakable link to the flesh, the ineradicable sign of his mortality— of 
the Fatherhood and mastery of God. This is no better news to the Faustian scientist, 
who resents the intrusion of an authority alien to his will, the existence of any order of 
being prior to his cogito, which might bind him to idols of custom or morals.
39Stem, pp. 286-288.
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Thus we see at last the deep affinity between two such apparently different 
figures, the southern hero and the scientific magus. As Patricia Lewis Poteat aptly 
points out in her analysis of The Thanatos Syndrome, it is only at the very end of his 
career that Percy could articulate in novelisdc form this deep and deadly affinity, in the 
form of Bob Comeaux and John Van Dorn. These two men apply the power of 
scientific reductionism to the task of societal restoration: to the recreation of a garden of 
slavery, a racially and socially striated human-fann, where men are in fact reduced to 
happy animals by chemical means. In linking both the “conservative” and “liberal” 
forms of gnosticism, Percy in his last novel uncovers the deeper evil of which they are 
both manifestations: the demonic masculine spirit, the will to power.40
I will argue that Percy’s novels trace the progression and ultimate exorcism of this 
dread spirit, and the return to the feminine that becomes possible in its absence. First, 
it makes sense to explore the depths to which this spirit plunges in its rejection of 
creation, to gauge its motives, to treat it with due respect.
Hello! My Name is Legion — Summoning the Demonic Masculine
Rather than continue with my adversarial presentation of the masculinizing spirit, 
let me offer the testimony of a partisan — Camille Paglia, who in her brilliant, epic- 
scale investigation of the role of sex in western literature and life offers a powerful 
evocation and defense of the aristocratic, world-denying gnostic spirit:
Everything great in western culture has come from the 
quarrel with nature. The west and not the east has seen the 
frightful brutality of natural process, the insult to mind in 
the heavy blind rolling and milling of matter. In loss of 
self we find not love or God but primeval squalor. This 
revelation has historically fallen upon the western male, 
who is pulled by tidal rhythms back to the oceanic mother.
It is to his resentment of this daemonic undertow that we 
owe the grand constructions of our culture.
Apollonianism, cold and absolute, is the west’s sublime
40Patricia Poteat, “Pilgrim’s Progress," in Gretlund and Westaip, p. 210 If.
refusal. The Apollonian is a male line drawn against the 
dehumanizing magnitude of female nature.41
With her characteristic compression, Paglia has summarized the self s grievance
against nature, the flesh, and the feminine. Her very picture of nature, of course,
presupposes its guilt— treating the human soul and consciousness a priori as an
accidental epiphenomenon of a dead and deadening nature, the enemy of life and form:
Everything is melting in nature. We think we see 
objects, but our eyes are slow and partial. Nature is 
blooming and withering in long puffy respirations, rising 
and falling in oceanic wave-motion. A mind that opened 
itself fully to nature without sentimental preconceptions 
would be glutted by nature’s coarse materialism, its 
relentless superfluity. An apple tree laden with fruit: how 
peaceful, how picturesque. But remove the rosy filter of 
humanism from our gaze and look again. See nature 
spuming and frothing, its mad spermatic bubbles endlessly 
spilling out and smashing in that inhuman round of waste, 
rot, and carnage. From the jammed glassy cells of sea roe 
to the feathery spores poured into the air from bursting 
green pods, nature is a festering hornet’s nest of 
aggression and overkill. This is the chthonian black magic 
with which we are infected as sexual beings; this is the 
daemonic identity that Christianity so inadequately defines 
as original sin and thinks it can cleanse us of. Procreative 
woman is the most troublesome obstacle to Christianity’s 
claim to catholicity, testified by its wishful doctrines of 
Immaculate Conception and Virgin Birth. The 
procreativeness of chthonian nature is an obstacle to all of 
western metaphysics and to each man in his quest for 
identity against his mother. Nature is the seething excess 
of being.42
Of course, it is all a matter of “filters”; Paglia’s own jaundiced filter belongs not 
to an ordinary human, whose reaction to natural bounty is unmediated pleasure, which 
upon reflection can develop into the virtue of gratitude.43 Paglia’s voice is rather that 
• of a disappointed god, a human who has discovered— to her immense discomfort— 
her deep connection to the earth, her own finitude. The substance of this connection,
41Camille Paglia, Sexual Personae (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 28.
42Paglia, p. 28.
43For cosmic perspective, compare the “relentless superfluity" of the earth with the cool, 
restrained austerity of inorganic chemistry, as we find it in deep space or on the surface of the moon; 
sometimes Paglia sounds for all the world like C.S. Lewis' Screwtape.
30
she claims, is sexual in nature: a “chthonian black magic with which we are infected”; 
this “daemonic identity” constitutes original sin, and its purgation is the mission of 
Christianity— one that it does not in fact accomplish.
If this were a fair exposi of Christian teaching on original sin, it would indeed be 
a failed creed— a gnostic creed, in fact, dedicated to undoing the Creation of an 
omnipotent God who had somehow “erred" by making human beings dimoiphous and 
heterosexual. The flight to androgyny and sexual perversion that Paglia advocates 
throughout her work would be as logical a response as any. Indeed, it is this very 
response— motivated by the same theological mistake— that fuels the Decadent 
movement, driving writers such as Huysmans, Baudelaire, Wilde, and D'Annunzio 
away from nature and inward, into the artificial paradise of fantasy.
But the Decadent reading of Christianity is wrong; it is not even particularly 
sophisticated, and seems to grow out of negative adolescent experiences with 
Jansenistic catechism teachers, rather than an honest examination of Church teaching.
The Church does not define sexual desire as original sin — as a reading of Genesis,
St. Paul, and even the most ascetic Fathers of the Church would reveal. The 
“daemonic identity” that infects man because of the Fall is pride— not lust, which 
pertains to the animal faculties, and at worst could be classified as besdal. (A little 
eytmology would be helpful here; “daemons” are spirits.) Genesis is careful to specify 
that the Lord created and found good the duality of the sexes, their mutual attraction, 
and their urge to populate the earth. It was 1st and 2nd Century gnostic speculation, 
and not the Jewish-Christian tradition, which suggested that the division of mankind 
into sexes was a consequence of the Fall, that the desire for sexual pleasure or 
procreation is evil.44
^Manfred Hauke, Women in the Priesthood? (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990), p. 199.
For all the hostility he is reputed to have displayed against sexuality, S t 
Augustine specifies in his writing against both the Manichaeans and the Pelagians that 
sexual difference, sexual intercourse, and marriage are good things, made good by the 
three proper ends God intended them for: “offspring, chaste fidelity, [and an] 
unbreakable bond."43 Augustine further asserts that sexual pleasure in marriage is 
“honorable."46 The harshest thing he has to say for sexual desire is that libido — what 
we might call the “pleasure principle” — has been unhinged from the control of reason 
by the Fall. This powerful disassociation drove S t Paul to complain to the Romans 
“about the sin-engendered concupiscence which held him captive... [and] his longings 
to be freed from the law of sin that dwelt in his members."47 The sin dwells in his 
members, as if an unwelcome guest; it does not consist in them, or constitute them in 
being. S t Paul does not wish, with Hamlet that his “too-too solid flesh" would melt 
away— only that it would act in concert with his reason.
Libido is a carnal force that imposes demands on the will against the promptings 
of reason; because its proper object is a conscious human being with an independent 
will and rights, its dominion can be disastrous.48 Untrammeled libido turns a rational 
animal into a sexual predator or anarchist, perpetrator of adulteries, seductions, 
promiscuity, and the whole catalogue of sexual sins that the Church condemns. All of 
these, for Paglia as for Sade, are mere variations on the original sin of sex, which is 
defined as daemonic and exploitative. As we will see later, Lancelot Lamar derives 
from the inferno of his own experience the very same lesson:
TOE GREAT SECRET OF LIFE 
God’s secret design for man is that man’s happiness lies 
for men in men practicing violence upon women and that 
women’s happiness lies in submitting to it.
43St. Augustine, De pecc. origin., C. 37, n. 42, as quoted in Cormac Burke, “St. Augustine and 
Conjugal Sexuality,” Communio, 17:4 (Winter 1990), pp. 548-549.
46Augustine, De nupt et conc. II, c. 9, n. 21,. cited in Burke, p. 552.
47Buike, p. 550. Cf. Rom. 7:8,23-24; Gal 5:17.
48Burke, pp. 559-560.
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The secret of life is violence and rape, and its gospel is 
pornography.. . .  The Jews in the Old Testament knew 
the secret: that man is conceived in sin. (L, p. 224)
This radical misreading of Jewish-Chrisrian Revelation serves the ideological purposes
of a Promethean thinker— such as Lance— because it displaces the blame for flawed
creation onto the Creator, and assumes for itself the vocation of reversing the order of
being. The phrase “original sin” is used to describe God’s error, which will be
remedied by man’s revolt This is not a variation on a Christian theme; it is the Lucifer
Symphony.49
This metaphysical hubris — not the stinting of their loins— led Eve and Adam 
into sin, as Genesis teaches. (It is telling that early Gnostic heresiarchs felt the need to 
apply their own Higher Criticism to the Creation narrative, suggesting that the 
“original” dualist account had been suppressed by the Christian community.50)
Scripture and Tradition both insist that sexual shame came as a result of the Fall, and 
was not the substance of i t  The rebellion of Adam against God’s will is inscribed in 
human nature, and repeated in the rebellion of libido against the sinner’s will The 
rejection of divine authority injures human reason, and propels men into the struggle 
for domination (sexual and social) of other men— to the subjection of other rational 
beings to the promptings of blind instinct51 Having rejected Zeus, Prometheus 
becomes the slave of Priapus, and degenerates into an exploiter and a tyrant It is no 
accident that Faust shares with Don Juan a taste for seduction and abandonment
If Paglia misreads Christianity, she also displays a certain blindness regarding her 
own Manichaeanism. She blames the fragility of the individual self on its sexual 
nature— as if making love were itself an assault on one’s identity. But when we read 
a little further, we see that the Apollonian’s quarrel with Mother Earth is really
49Cf. Clean th Brooks, “Walker Percy and Modem Gnosticism” in Broughton, p. 260 IT, and 
Lewis Lawson, Following Percy, p. 216 IT,
50Hauke, p. 198-199.
51Burke, p. 564.
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motivated by the fear of death, the realization that however completely the self 
represses nature, it cannot escape i t  The self is permanently enfolded in “the blind 
grinding of subterranean force, the long slow suck, the murk and ooze.. . .  the 
dehumanizing brutality of biology and geology, the Darwinian waste and bloodshed, 
the squalor and rot we must block from consciousness to retain our Apollonian 
identities as persons.” Sexuality is simply the most potent reminder of the self s 
insufficiency, its carnality, its femininity.
More even than death, it is the power of materiality, its consequence for man’s
spirit, that haunts and disgusts the dualist, who cannot conceive of a relation of body
and spirit in which the former is anything but filthy dross, weighing down and
hampering the mind— even if it is also an occasional playground for highly artificial
pleasures. Like other thinkers of Manichaean inclination, Paglia resents the body
because it resists the w ill:
She that gives life also blocks the way to freedom.
Therefore I agree with Sade that we have the right to 
thwart nature’s procreative compulsions, through sodomy 
or abortion.52
Here, her resentment is not of sexuality or even of mortality, except as they serve to 
remind her of the body’s presence, its heavy, constricting weight, its dark processes 
that chum inwardly without consulting the mind, the instincts that frustrate the liberty 
of pure spirit. The problem with the body is that it is literally humiliating: it induces 
humility with every eruption of gas, and every bathroom function.
Like S t Paul, she chafes at the demands the body imposes on the will; unlike the 
saint, she assimilates libido to the will, then crowns the individual, Apollonian will as 
sovereign. Rejecting the authority from above, she is haunted by anxieties from 
below. Unwilling to acknowledge the divine masculine, Paglia makes a fetish of the
52Paglia, p. 14.
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Apollonian, a phobia of the feminine. And yet the chthonic reaches up to her, with 
tendrils that unfurl in the nave and the bone.
For a more balanced view of the symbolism of the sexes, and the interrelation of
the various dimensions of human existence, I will turn to Fr. Martin D’Arcy, S.J., a
highly influential writer in the English-speaking Catholic world of which Percy was a
part As D’Arcy writes of the two principles, which he christens (following Jung)
animus (masculine) and anima (feminine), although with quite a different import:
[Tin each individual the characteristics of each remain to 
this extent that there is a positive and a negative principle 
or movement and one is called masculine or feminine 
according to the dominance of one or the other of these 
two in the individual. Each person has an animus and an 
anima, each is in different proportions masterful or 
clinging and submissive, fierce or gentle, hard or soft 
Appoline or Dionysiac, intellectual or emotional, selfish or 
devoted.53
While drawing upon the animal kingdom and the analogies of inanimate nature to 
give content to the sexual distinction, D’Arcy is careful to assert that a difference of 
kind enters the formula as it is applied to the human realm. While the distinctions 
between men and women are not negligible or meaningless (a nominalist position54),
53Martin D’Arcy, S J ., The Mind and Heart o f Love (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1947), p.
185.
^Hauke warns against the tendency to simplify the problem of sex by asserting a bland 
androgyny or interchangeability of the sexes—as some feminist theologians do in order to advance 
arguments for the ordination of women. He writes: "Those who scorn any such philosophical 
summarization that aligns masculinity and femininity with distinct poles just abandon themselves to 
the random play of sociological processes and to mindless conformity with those processes.
Moreover, they renounce the possibility of seeing the human sexual polarity as part of a wider horizon 
whose significance extends—as will be seen later here—all the way up to the image of God” (p. 119). 
The denial of such a horizon of significance—traditionally called the "analogy of being”—is entailed in 
nominalist thought, the philosophical ground from which Protestantism arose. Hauke summarizes: 
"Nominalism holds, of course, that our concepts can signify absolutely nothing of the essence of 
things, but are only stuck-on, interchangeable 'names' (nomina). This philosophical doctrine was also 
taken over as a basis for thought in theology. Nominalistic theologians maintained that God’s 
redemptive actions were not inherently intelligible and illuminated by divine reason but were, rather, 
mere emanations of a sovereign divine will... The omnipotence and freedom of God”s actions are 
misrepresented as mere arbitrariness. Thus, the view was sometimes taken that, since there was 
absolutely no reasonable explanation for the fact that the Second Divine Person was incarnated as a 
man, Christ might just as well have assumed the form of a donkey" (p. 74). Hauke goes on to show 
how this sort of nominalism—especially as taken over by Barth and Tillich—laid the groundwork for 
feminist attacks on the masculinity of God and the all-male priesthood. In a very different context.
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the sexual divide is not so radical as we find in lower animals. Women and men each
participate constantly in both animus and anima, and it is only in finding the balance
between the two proper to one’s individual vocation that one can cooperate with divine
grace and attain a right relation with God and neighbor. D’Arcy elaborates:
They are the human equivalent of what the dominant and 
. passive, the masculine and feminine are in the animaL We 
have to look, therefore, for what in the spiritual part of the 
self corresponds with the dominant and possessive and 
what with the recessive and sacrificial.55
D’Arcy’s account of the spiritual analogs of masculine and feminine is subtle and
comprehensive, and informed by a profound understanding of traditional Catholic
mysticism and theology.56 I quote D’Arcy at length because his is the best single
elaboration I have found of the orthodox teaching against which the heroic or scientific
gnostic rebels. The nature of that rebellion is suggested in the following admonitory
passages from D’Arcy:
[B]y the reason, then, the animus is analogously what the 
dominating instinct is in the animal. It is essentially an 
imperialist. The reason is not, however, an absolute king 
who can rule unchallenged. The animal side of man still 
survives, and when the reason is forced to abdicate or is 
tempted to lower its dignity, it descends to the level of 
brand mastery or cold selfishness or becomes a mere 
prejudice, a rationalization, a judgement which is swayed 
by passion.57
By contrast, he describes the anima as
a longing, a breaking away of desire from the self towards 
an object or a person....[T]he selfish impulses of man
Yvor Winters suggests that the decline of the Puritan mind into “obscurantism" and chaos is an 
exfoliation of the inner contradictions of nominalist theology. Cf. In Defense o f Reason (Denver 
University of Denver Press, 1943), pp. 374-430.
55D’Arcy, p. 185.
56This leaves aside the problematic issue of “Catholic feminism," most versions of which differ 
from official Church teaching so radically as to lose any claim to the religious title, at least in the 
strict sense in which I use it here. For documentation, see Donna Steichm, Ungodly Rage (San 
Francisco: Ignatius, 1991), especially pp. 29*75.
57D’Aicy, pp. 185-186.
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have to be balanced by consideration for others, sacrifice 
for the community or the family, and, as we shall try to 
show later, by a movement of the anima towards its Lord 
and lover, God.58
Thus in this account (as in Paglia’s), the feminine principle is associated with the loss 
of ego, the acceptance of otherness, the willingness to sacrifice oneself. But there is a 
radical difference between the two thinkers and the traditions they represent.
As an aggressively consistent atheist, Paglia cannot see any advantage for the self 
in surrendering to the feminine principle, in sacrificing the demands of the ego to the 
needs of community, spouse or species. Such a surrender is inevitable— at the 
moment of death — but it has no positive human meaning. The triumphant feminine is 
nothing more than the imperious force of blind, impersonal nature extinguishing the 
fragile spark of selfhood, crushing personality in the gears of evolution and physics.
The feminine is the enemy— an oveipowering one, fated to swallow all in the end— 
which the masculine self must resist by any means necessary.
D’Arcy follows the Catholic tradition in asserting a positive content to the 
feminine movement of the spirit, which is conceived not as passive but as receptive.59 
That tradition teaches that this movement contains within itself the potential for an 
intuitive knowledge (intellectus) that is higher than discursive reason, that the loss of 
self is necessary for eternal salvation (a deification in which individuality will 
paradoxically be preserved), and that the masculine and feminine movements of the 
soul can operate harmoniously in a mutually-correcting spiritual whole.
To say that such a harmony is possible is far from asserting that it is inevitable; 
indeed, one could construct an entire ethical theory around the proper and improper 
uses of the sexual attributes of the soul. (As D’Arcy points out, such a theory was 
attempted by Paul Claudel and Henri Bremond and— in a very different way— Carl
58D’Arcy, p. 186.
59Hauke, p. 118.
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Jung.60) Nevertheless, it was such a harmony that Percy sought in his novels, as my 
analysis of his most important works will show. D’Arcy’s scheme will be important 
for this analysis, and will recur in subsequent chapters.
Reading Sexual Personae through to the end is exhausting— and possibly 
superfluous, like  a crystal, one can deduce the whole from any of its parts, lik e  
Sade’s sexual combinations, Paglia’s literary and artistic readings, for all their fiendish 
perversity, take on the dreary sameness of a repetition compulsion, of a chimp 
compulsively masturbating or a schizophrenic running through a litany of obscenities.
I am sure this is what Miss Paglia was aiming to do— to impose her pattern of 
interpretation on every possible cultural phenomenon, whatever the genre, from 
Nefertiti to Emily Dickinson and beyond. Indeed, her theory is by its very nature 
imperial and totalizing, relying for its explanatory force upon a single metaphor, 
endlessly transmuted but always recognizable: the self rising in a flash of glorious, 
Apollonian identity, shimmering in the sun, then sinking back down into the muck to 
be devoured, forgotten, and replaced.
Paglia’s manifesto is more important than her purple prose and crotchety public 
persona will let us believe. Its seriousness lies in this: more thoroughly than Marx, 
more readably than Sade, Paglia has documented what the “death of God” implies. If 
no transcendent spirit stands above the wrack and ruin of nature, rescuing our 
personalities from extinction, sanctifying physical reality and promising us eventual 
reunion with our bodies, as Christian eschatology declares, then indeed Miss Paglia is 
right Her preoccupation with lurid pornography and theatrical violence ceases to be 
histrionic, once the capital that liberal humanism, feminism, and egalitarianism stole 
from Christianity has been squandered; it becomes blank realism. Body and spirit are
60D,Arcy, pp. 145,174,186.
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at war, body is winning, and Sade’s gut-churning Fantasia of horrors is merely the Six
O’ Clock News reporting from the front
The same fascinated horror of the material universe imbues the work of Jean-Paul
Sartre —one of Percy’s literary ancestors— driven by the same metaphysical
ambition. Karl Stem cites the following passages from Sartre’s Nausea, in which
Roquentin, the narrator, relates a vision:
If anyone had asked me what existence is, I would have 
answered, in good faith, that it was nothing, simply an 
empty form which was added to external things without 
changing anything in their nature. And then all of a 
sudden, there it was, clear as day: existence had suddenly 
unveiled itself. It had lost the harmless look of an abstract 
category: it was die very paste of things, this [tree] root 
was kneaded into existence. Or rather the root, the park 
gates, the bench, the sparse grass, all that had vanished: 
die diversity of dungs, their individuality, were only an • 
appearance, a veneer. This veneer had melted, leaving 
soft, monstrous masses, all in disorder— naked, in a 
frightful, obscene nakedness.. .  All these objects.. .  how 
can I explain? They inconvenienced me; I would have 
liked them to exist less strongly, more dryly, in a more 
abstract way, with more reserve. The chestnut tree 
pressed itself against my eyes. Green rust covered it half­
way up; the bark, black and swollen, looked like boiled 
leather. The sound of the water in the Masqueret Fountain 
sounded in my ears, made a nest there, filled them with 
signs; my nostrils overflowed with a green, putrid odor.61
Sartre is here evoking, in powerful narrative detail, the prelinguistic phase of
thought that Freud called primary process.62 In this period of development, the infant
has no conceptual framework of names through which he can place objects outside
himself. Nor can he repel them by force; he is awash in immanence, and must accept
what comes, experiencing either
bliss and a sense of well-being, o r . . .  sadness and a 
sense of discomfort The infant is still open to the world 
in the most literal, carnal sense of the word. The child’s 
first relationship to another occurs through the mouth. The
61Jean-Paul Same. Nausea, as cited in Stem, pp. 127-128.
62Stem, p. 131 ff.
mother and the world en large and the mother and food still 
form an ill-defined whole. Hunger and joy and satiety and 
nausea and sadness make up the psychic elements of mat 
which one takes in or rejects. This kind of acceptance or 
rejection is the only mode of relationship with an other.63
In Nausea, the impingement of the “other," the intimacy with materiality which
me feminine imposes on man from without and within, is experienced as an assault, a
sensory rape committed by a phallic mother, nature. Sartre elaborates on mis
experience of me feminine in his essay on Baudelaire:
He had a deep intuition of that amoiphous, stubborn 
condngence called Life— exactly me opposite of Work— 
and he is in honor of it because it reflects mat 
gratuitousness of his own consciousness which he wants 
to cover up at any cost. . .  If a man is terrified at me 
bosom of Nature, it is because he feels trapped in a huge 
amorphous and gratuitous existence which penetrates turn 
completely with its gratuitousness: he has no place 
anywhere, he is just put on earth, aimless, without any 
reason to be mere, like a briarbush or a clump of grass.64
The key word here is “gratuitous.” The conscious self— me “for-itself” (pour- 
soi) mat for Sartre constitutes human being— is everywhere confronted with me 
horrifying realization mat its existence is not necessary, but contingent. Even worse, 
its existence is “gratuitous” — given, non-compulsoiy, by “grace.” Who has given 
me self this existence? A Christian would answer with St. Thomas “God,” and go on 
to point out mat He maintains us in existence every moment by intention, mat should 
He remove His gaze from us for a moment, we would vanish. Sartre refuses this 
answer, asserting instead mat his life comes from “nothing,” that it is borrowed from 
me void, is in fact a nothingness, a tiny opening of freedom in me dead, weighty midst 
of maternal, material “being-in-itself” (en~soi).
Why does Sartre make mis refusal, choosing me “abyss” rather man God? We 
see me answer in his system: The self is defined as absolute freedom, as me one locus
63Stem, p. 133.
^Sartre, Baudelaire, as cited in Stem, p. 136.
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of unconditioned force in the universe, the ability to negate all influence, all claims, all 
impositions of causality. As a god.
To be sure, as a temporary god, but as a god nevertheless, and a jealous one.
When Sartre defines love as a dialectic of mutual objectification that we both yearn for 
and dread,65 his reasoning is obvious. If the self is defined as the negation of all 
claims of obedience, what room is there for permanent vows, or mutual subjection?
Love would entail surrender. When he condemns as “bad faith" the self s tendency to 
try filling its negativity with definitions, associations and labels, Sartre is guarding the 
divinity against fetishism: like the Lord in the Old Testament, the Divine has no 
permanent dwelling place, and may not be represented by any graven image, nor may 
its Name be spoken.
As a Christian, Walker Percy might be expected simply to reject Sartre’s vision of
the self as a delusion of pride; but he does not Rather, he finds it valuable and draws
on it, extracting from it an essential grain of truth that will persist in his later works: the
idea of the “self as Nought." As Kathleen Scullin explains,
Percy credits Sartre with accurately describing the 
“predicament” of being human: the feeling of inner 
emptiness, of nothingness; the inability to know what one 
is, to discover an identity or name that fits; and the 
consequent desire to seek out ways of living in “bad faith"
— assuming a false identity, an impersonation, to fill in 
the void.. .  Percy maintains, however, that Sartre’s 
emphasis on the human predicament amounts to an 
elevation of psychology over ontology, that is, mistaking 
how it feels to be human with what it is to be human.66
For Percy as for Sartre, the human self is an irreducible datum, the starting point 
of consciousness that can never be explained away (subsumed) by a system of 
knowledge that accounts for the world of physical objects and their interaction— what
65Stem, p. 139.
66Kathleen Scullin, “Lancelot and Walker Percy’s Dispute with Sartre over Ontology,” in 
Gretlund and Westarp, p. 111. Scullin directs us to Percy’s essay "Symbol as Hermeneutic in 
Existentialism" (MB, p. 286).
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he calls “dyadic” events (LC, p. 85 fl). The “anxiety” and sense of interior absence 
that Sartre and other existentialist writers embody in their works are symptoms for 
Percy of a real disorder, whose persistence is an essential clue about man’s real nature. 
Percy describes this disorder variously as “feeling bad in good environments, and 
good in bad environments;” “the unspeakability of the self;” “the catastrophe of the 
self’ and “the Fall.”67 Recognition of this disorder is a precondition for any true 
understanding of men in general, and the self in particular
A theory of man must account for the alienation of man.
A theory of organisms in environments cannot account for 
it, for in fact organisms in environments are not alienated.
Judeo-Christianity did of course give an account of 
alienation, not as a peculiar evil of the twentieth century, 
but as the enduring symptom of man’s estrangement from 
God. Any cogent anthropology must address itself to 
both, to the possibility of the perennial estrangement of 
man as part of the human condition and to the undeniable 
fact of die cultural estrangement of Western man in the 
twentieth century. (MB, pp. 23-24)
For Sartre and the rest of the Promethean tradition, that estrangement is due to 
some fault in the universe, not the self. In no sense can the self accept the blame, or 
the responsibility for change— since it is precisely changelessness, infallible 
knowledge, unconditioned existence, divine existence, which the self seeks. The 
anxiety that the self suffers is the fault of the “other” — whether that other is the “blind
67Concemed that the very familiarity of Christian terminology has rendered it nugatory, Percy 
tries whenever possible to speak in parables, metaphors, and other “defamiliarized" ways when talking 
about central Christian mysteries such as this. I hope that my “de-coding" of these will not turn his 
work to naught, opening it like a dogfish on a laboratory table: “Oh, it’s only a religious allegory." 
Perhaps orthodox Christian rhetoric has by now become so scarce in the academy as to become itself 
defamiliarized. Imagine an MLA conference in Sante Fe, attended by the usual critics, job-seekers, 
interviewers, mildly curious, etc. A speaker, a youngish American of medium height, has just begun 
his lecture on “The Displacement of Feminine Power and the Rhetoric of Virginity." As he speaks, 
he looks anxiously for the women in the crowd, concerned about their reaction, eager for approval. He 
is looking for a job— and maybe a date. He dims the lights and shows a few slides: phallic symbols 
in western act, femmes fatales by Aubrey Beardsley, the Venus of Willendorf, the Mona Lisa, and 
finally the Virgin of Guadalupe. People nod, getting the idea, wondering about lunch. As he 
describes this final slide, he notices someone walking to the front of the room. It is a young Indian 
girl, in traditional clothes except for her shoes, which are Nikes. With great composure, she comes up 
to the slide screen and kneels before it, saying the Rosary audibly in her native tongue (not Spanish) 
to the image of the Madonna. What will the lecturer do now?
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mechanism of nature"; or the ignorant masses who usher in a new Age of Bronze by 
rejecting the leadership of their betters; or women who violate the sexual honor code; 
or old, sick, helpless or unborn people who with the incurable suffering they endure 
disrupt the construction of utopia; or (as Percy will argue in his most polemic moment 
in The Thanatos Syndrome) Jews, whose veiy survival is a sign of the transcendent 
dominion of God, and every man’s supernatural calling to bridal union with God68 
That “other" is defined as the feminine, and its threat is not merely to the male self s 
political or social dominance, but to his identity.
The demonic masculine self is not entirely closed to the possibility of salvation, 
but it looks in the wrong place: it examines religious dogmas, truths of science, bits of 
historical data, as pieces of knowledge sub specie aeternitatis, from the standpoint of a 
transcendent knower interacting with other transcending knowers: “Doctor, look at this 
slide. See the color it has turned? Let me tell you what I think..." Such a mind looks 
to each of the “World’s Great Religions" in turn, for the key to the cosmic crossword 
puzzle, the gnosis. Not surprisingly, the Gospel heard in this mode sounds 
outlandish, archaic, reactionary (MB, p. 119, LG p. 276).
Since it is not “in the mode of hearing," the self has two choices: To watch 
grimly as the others perpetuate this alienation, adopting a Stoic pride in endurance. Or 
to do violence to the “other,” and force it back into place. If the self chooses the Stoic 
pattern of slow acceptance, it may achieve tragic pathos, “transcending" the ruin that 
surrounds it by retreating into complete isolation; a more likely end is suicide, as we
68Cf. Stem, p. 120. Here Stem discusses the Manichaeanism of Schopenhauer, his loathing for 
physical nature, reproduction, women, and others: “Among Schopenhauer’s many hatreds there was 
one remarkable one— the Jewish people. And besides all possible accidental personal factors there is a 
hidden reason for that The Jews are the live testimony of the Incarnation. No matter how many 
philosophical systems come and go — the Jews bear witness to something which defies all systems: 
the drama o f history. Moreover the Jews are earthy. I do not mean this at all in the sense of 
materialism. If there has ever been a people in whom reason was nuptially bound to nature, it is the 
Jewish people....To him Christianity has a dual aspect: in its pure ethical content it is akin to the 
Vedas, but its association with Jewry is an unpleasant encumbrance— an historical freak.” We will 
see many other parallels between Stem’s argument and Percy’s literary and philosophical concerns.
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read in Percy’s work. If the self chooses to retake its tradition “by violence” (as Allen 
Tate proposed for the South in early, intemperate days), then it enters the lists of the 
heroic tradition, attempting to impose from above an order that resolves the alienation.
By forcing the “lower ” elements back into place— whether they be poor whites, 
women, blacks or even the body — the self asserts its own sovereignty. By denying 
the transcendent nature of others, while denying its own immanence in history, 
community, and the flesh, the heroic self assumes the position of God the Father.
As Voegelin suggests in his analysis of the young Marx,69 atheist humanism is 
driven by the desire of the individual self to dethrone and then usurp the Fatherhood 
and sovereignty of God. (Marx’s doctoral dissertation contained a celebration of 
Prometheus; in it, the young Marx adopted that God-slayer’s anguished cry as an 
epigram: “I hate all the gods!”) Percy’s polemical quarrel is not with Marxism, of 
course; it was so alien to him as not even to constitute a respectable temptation or 
enemy. Instead, Percy fought the ghosts that haunted him, those which — bequeathed 
to him by upbringing, region, and temperament— demanded his allegiance. For only 
in the space he manages to win back from these ideologies can Percy (or his heroes) 
practice the “little way" that leads to heaven: live a life, marry a wife, work and pray 
and watch and wait Such a vision may sound trite or banal, but in fact is the fruit of a 
humbled spirit— one that has chosen and earned i t  after plumbing the depths of 
gnostic self-delusion.
The Promethean spirit promises the self a world-creating power, decapitating the 
hierarchy of human being,70 removing off the apex (God the Father) and putting man 
in His place. In the orthodox account of reality, man does not dwell in the divine 
Nous on this earth— as the idealists would have i t  Neither does he find his nature
69Eric Voegelin, Science, Politics, and Gnosticism (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1967), pp. 34-
36.
70Eric Voegelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience" in Anamnesis (Columbia: University of 
Missouri Press, 1978), p. 114.
exhaustively explained by any lower level of being— by truths of physics, biology, 
evolution or anything else— as reductionists would insist Rather, he marches on a 
pilgrimage towards the divine Nous, under the sign of death, seeking commerce with it 
through obedience, union with it by obeisance. If men are in fact divinized, as the 
theologians of the Eastern tradition speculate, it is not by usurping the privileges of the 
Father and dragging the virtues of Divinity back down to earth (pace Feuerbach and 
Marx), but only by marrying their souls to the Son, within His Mystical Body the 
Church, on the model of the first Christian, Maiy. Men must admit their helplessness 
before sin, and accept that the only contribution their wills can make is to cooperate 
with Grace.
The first refusal of this surrender could be called man’s fall. One might even 
describe the fall of man as simply his rejection of a bridal relationship to God. (In 
Genesis, Satan’s temptation is presented first to Eve: Is this because women are 
weaker-willed than men— or rather, because man’s femininity constitutes his right 
relation to God?) The Promethean self of either sex rejects its subjection to God and 
its rootedness in matter — while in turn subjecting other human beings to itself, 
denying their transcendent natures, the “masculine” spark that animates them and calls 
them to eternal life. The masculinizing self rejects the “Fiaf' of the Blessed Virgin, 
crying instead with Lucifer "Non serviam!" It looks up at the Father, and sees a dying 
tyrant; it looks down at the earth and sees a world of potential concubines and slaves.
Its body is alternately a prison and a toy.
In the analogical language of Catholic theology, which I am appropriating here, 
neither masculinity nor femininity is exhausted by physical sex; no living woman 
participates purely in the immanence of the feminine, since she is also broadly capable 
of wielding masculine attributes such as abstraction, analysis, and authority.
Likewise, living men experience the immanence of nature, the body, and childrearing,
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although in a less complete way.71 Without asserting an androgyny that would
destroy the very basis of the sexual analogy, we must nevertheless speak of men
participating in the feminine, and vice versa. Indeed, insofar as every created soul is
subject to God the Father, its nature is bridal (and feminine); insofar as the salvation of
each human soul is of more significance than the material existence of the universe, its
nature is transcendent (and masculine). For Christian mystical theology, the human
soul is feminine and is called to respond to grace as a bride responds to her
Bridegroom. For Catholic ecclesiology, the corporate whole of redeemed humanity
(the Church) is called both the Mystical Body72 and the Bride of Christ.73 According
to poet and mystic Gertrude von Ie Fort, the very nature of prayer is feminine,
modelled on Mary's response to the Angel:
In the humble fia t of her answer to the angel lies the 
mystery of Redemption in so far as it depends on the 
creature. For his redemption, man has nothing to 
contribute to God other than die readiness of unconditional 
surrender. The passive acceptance inherent in woman, 
which ancient philosophy regarded as purely negative, 
appears in the Christian order of grace as the positively 
decisive factor. The Marian dogma, reduced to a brief 
formula, denotes the doctrine of the co-operation of the 
creature in the work of Redemption.
The fia t of the Virgin is therefore the revelation of the 
religious quality in its essence. Since, as an act of 
surrender, it is at the same time an expression of essential 
womanliness, the latter becomes the manifestation of the 
religious concept fundamental to the human being. Mary 
is therefore not only the object of religious veneration; but 
she herself is the religious quality by which honor is given 
to God; she is the power of surrender that is in the Cosmos 
in the form of the bridal woman.74
71Bouycr, pp. 56-58.
72Pope Pius XII, Mystici Corporis (Washington, D.C.: National Catholic Welfare Conference, 
1943).
73 Josef Cardinal Ratzinger, “Mariology and Marian Spirituality," in The Church and Women: A 
Compendium, Helmut Moll, ed. (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1988), p. 73.
74Gertrud von le Fort, The Eternal Woman (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company,
1954), p. 4.
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For her, as for the Catholic tradition, the surrender that we see most clearly in woman, 
and which pertains in a special way to her, is demanded of men as welL It is a 
fundamental requirement for salvation that human beings surrender their proud spirits 
and become Brides of Christ, that they surrender their individuality and enter the 
Mystical Body of Christ— the Church, always referred to as feminine — which will 
be united to Him corporately at the end of time, that they surrender their wills to the 
promptings of the Spirit that dwells within them, urging them to obey the Father, 
rather than try to supplant Him.
Only the soul that has accepted its femininity towards God, its status as embodied 
creature, its predicament as alienated from the Master who calls out to it, will be 
capable of hearing the “news" that saves. Enabled by the consciousness of catastrophe 
to know the immanent world without “emptying" it into the transcendent nought of self 
— like a soldier awake on a battlefield, who notices for the first time the lovely 
intricacy of a sparrow— that soul will be able to accept the word of one who comes 
“with authority,” the apostle who represents Christ
As I will show in my examination of Percy’s four non-satirical novels, it is no 
accident that his protagonists approach the point where salvation is possible as they 
approach the feminine. Their relations with women are emblematic of their attitude 
towards creation, especially their willingness to be entailed in i t  to be subject to a 
Creator. A healthy relation to a woman accompanies a grateful, trusting acceptance of 
physical nature and one’s own creaturely condition; by finding a woman with whom 
he can overcome otherness, accept their common humanity, and love another person, 
Percy’s men just might find redemption.
What then, of human masculinity? What place is there in the Divine economy for 
the virtues particular to the human male, who “represents that which goes beyond
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him,'* symbolizing the absolute transcendence in which he does not partake?75 Is the 
male qua male nothing more than an empty sign, a negativity, a Sartrean nought?
This is the question Percy’s heroes try to answer throughout his novels, as they
struggle against the demonic masculine heritage. They look for a true masculine role,
for the rightful prerogatives and duties of a man within the Christian dispensation. As
we will see, this does not entail the absolute renunciation of male authority, or every
form of paternalism. Percy's heroes still do fulfill the patriarch’s role of gathering
together and defending an extended family, black and white, against the ravages of an
impersonal cosmopolitan wbrld. As Kreyling points out:
Walker Percy’s fiction seeks to reimplant the hero at the 
center of a world order, revoke the feeling of being 
extraneous that has hampered him, and assert his necessity 
once again.76
Likewise, Percy’s characters do not renounce the pursuit of scientific knowledge, 
the endeavor of understanding reality and theorizing about it, or the technological 
benefits conferred by it. Will Barrett, for all his spiritual healing, does not reject the 
psychiatric medicine that can treat his Hausman’s Syndrome. (The Percy character I 
have omitted from this study, Dr. Tom More, continues to make use of Freud and 
Jung in taking care of his patients.) Percy himself draws heavily on the likes of 
Chomsky and Skinner in constructing his linguistic paradigms. Percy’s men, if 
anything, become less androgynous and more effectual as they approach salvation.
So what are we left with, at the end of Percy’s work? A pair of dangerous, 
would-be father figures, renounced then covertly accepted, dressed a little differently, 
dusted off for fresh use but fundamentally unaltered? Are Percy’s ironized heroes and 
hung-over scientists really any better off for their adventures— and are we? Has the
75Bouyer, pp. 48-49.
76Kreyling, p. 166,
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dread spirit of gnostic masculinism been exorcised, or has it merely gone 
underground?
A definitive answer will have to arise in the context of a close reading of the
metaphysical allegoiy that underlies the sexual relationships in Percy's novels. I will
argue that the newly Christian heroism and faithful science that characterizes Percy’s
heroes after their redemption is healthy and appropriate, that it recapitulates the marital
relationship called for by S t Paul writing to the Ephesians:
Husbands should love their wives as they do their own 
bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself. Observe 
how no one ever hates his own flesh; no he nourishes it 
and takes care of it as Christ cares for the Church — for 
we are members of his body. (V: 30-32)
If man is the head of his wife, it is only by her consent and only insofar as he imitates
Christ the Head of the Church. That implies a willingness to die for her, a total
surrender to her needs and her well-being, a link of fleshly charity that rejects utterly
the nightmare of dualism and the dream of domination. By adopting this code, insofar
as they successfully do, Percy’s men recapture the true heroism of Christ, the full
“science” of Faith.
If we see in Percy’s female characters a series of women who have been 
wounded, stunted, rendered helpless or speechless and in need of protection, perhaps 
we should view them as emblems of the feminine under attack. In subsequent chapters 
I will explore Percy’s women in this light, with a sharp eye to what has wounded 
them, and what the hero intends to do about i t  At some times a Percy hero (such as 
Binx Bolling and Will Barrett) tries to restore to the woman he loves her transcendent 
dimension, while at others he falls into grotesque bad faith (such as Lance Lamar 
displays towards Anna). Using D’Arcy's scheme for analyzing the sexual components 
of human psychology and spirituality, I will attempt to break down the 
pneumopathologies to which the central characters in four Percy novels were subject,
to the end of creating an inteipretadve scheme that ties together the minutiae of detail 
and imagery with the broad allegorical motive I argue underlies Percy’s work.
C hapter Two: The Moviegoer — Exodus from the W intry Kingdom
In The Flight From Woman ,* Karl Stem employs a technique of literary and 
philosophical analysis, grounded in careful interpretation (Deutung), using the 
Freudian concept of overdetermination (without Freud’s determinism and 
reducdonism) in the service of a neo-medieval hermeneutic, one that affirms the 
simultaneous validity of the literal sense and multiple allegorical levels of meaning.2 
Stem’s central claim, which I support, is that through such an eclectic technique, a 
sensitive reader can uncover in a philosophical author’s work the intimate, inextricable 
matrix that links his (or her) conscious metaphysics and his semi- or unconscious 
attitudes toward the feminine— a category which includes women, sexuality, nature 
and the body. D’Arcy makes the same point in The Mind and Heart o f Love, 3 
referring to what Stem calls “the feminine” as “the anima.” (I will use these terms 
interchangeably throughout the present work.) In this chapter I will apply the 
interpretative technique suggested by Stem — which one might call allegorical 
Freudianism— to the heroic tradition and its Stoic underpinnings, as they are depicted 
in Walker Percy’s first published novel, The Moviegoer.
The rhetoric and imagery of the heroic tradition, I argued in Chapter One, exert a 
variety of psychological pressures on the aristocratic white man for whom the hero 
serves as a governing myth. It encourages him to minimize or deny the presence of 
the anima in his own psyche; to insist on a rigid social hierarchy as the only alternative 
to the collapse of community and meaning; to view individual women as the 
instruments of sexual satisfaction and genetic survival; to regard nature as entirely 
other, or purely instrumental to the satisfaction and aggrandizement of the individual
^Stem, p. 41 ff.
2See Stem, pp. 111-113 for a detailed exploration of this technique.
3D’Arcy, p. 174 ff.
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will; and finally, I will argue, to rebel against the Fatherhood of God, insofar as it 
competes with the sovereignty of the imperial self.
If this reading of the southern stoic hero is correct, then the apparently 
tradidonalist and "orthodox" conception of the self that Walker Percy inherited is in 
fact one more version of the modem, Promethean individual, engaged in a gnostic 
revolt against the order of being. His movement to Catholic orthodoxy necessarily 
entailed that he reject this account of the person, a necessity he avowed explicitly in 
“Stoicism in the South." (SSL, p. 85) In the novels I am examining here, we see the 
gradual, tortuous exorcism of the heroic shadow, whose lingering power is most 
obvious when viewed in the light of the anima.
Lewis Lawson, the critic whose work has been most important for my own 
reading of Percy, views The Moviegoer as both a philosophical critique and a 
conversion story— a multi-layered narrative that subtly depicts the conflict Percy felt 
between his southern, aristocratic Stoicism, and the Catholic faith that he accepted as 
he began his writing career.4 I propose to explore further this interpretation of the 
novel, with particular attention to Binx Bolling’s own Stoic heritage— to the 
psychological weight exerted by the heroic tradition on the men of Binx’s family, and 
the resulting disturbances in their relationships with individual women and the anima. 
Since Percy’s own ambivalent appreciation of the Stoic/heroic tradition is so closely 
tied to his filial love for "Uncle" William Alexander Percy (the man who raised him 
after his parents’ untimely deaths and imparted this tradition to him), I will make 
further reference to W.A. Percy’s own works, the better to understand the ghosts with 
which the younger Percy wrestled in this and his later novels.
William Rodney Allen5 writes that Binx’s successful conversion from despair to 
hope hinges upon his confrontation with the memory of his tortured, suicidal father.
4Lawson, Following Percy, p. 70 ff.
5Allen, Southern Wayfarer, p. 29 ff.
For Allen, the core conflict in The Moviegoer (and indeed, in each of Percy’s novels) 
is the protagonist’s struggle to assimilate and overcome the ongoing influence of such 
a father, and the psycho-intellectual inheritance he passed along— in the form of a 
Stoicism which for Allen is largely an imperfect adaptation to chronic depression.6
Whether or not this is the case, and the psychic distress indeed precedes the myth 
that shapes and reinforces it, we can certainly identify a powerful synergy between the 
heroic tradition in general and the individual experiences of severe depression that 
afflicted Walker Percy, W A  Percy and so many men in that family, later finding 
expression in so many literary works. Certainly, Allen is right to identify the struggle 
with a weak and despairing father as the key structural element in the four Percy novels 
considered here, including The Moviegoer. In this chapter, I will proceed on that 
assumption and explore the controlling importance for Binx of his father’s heritage and 
the psychological impact of the heroic tradition. The confluence of psychic and 
philosophical forces that shape Binx’s character may be most easily teased out and 
made explicit by examining Binx’s own relationship to the anima—  especially to 
nature, to individual women and to the feminine elements within his own psyche. We 
will see that the heroic/Stoic tradition (like other modes of metaphysical rebellion) 
poisons that relationship, with results that will become apparent below.
The defining symptom of this poisoning, I suggest, is the chronic depression 
suffered by Binx’s father— who significantly is never named in the novel. Burdened 
with a vast weight of heroic tradidon and expectations, equipped only with the tools of
6In his biography of the Percy family, The House o f Percy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994), Bertram Wyatt-Brown echoes this position. Richard King suggests the opposite, arguing that 
the heroic tradition (or “Southern Family Romance”) in fact induces depression and a sense of personal 
inadequacy and futility, at least in a modern, post-aristocratic context, (p. 92 ff) Michael Kreyling's 
reading largely seconds King’s, (p. 159) For my part, I follow Stem in proposing that it is 
impossible to assign causal priority in such complex matters as the intertwining of metaphysical 
"heresy” and psychic disturbance. Perhaps the most subtle analysis of these and other modem 
"pneumopathologies” can be found in Voegelin, “The Eclipse of Reality” in What is History, p. 139
Stoicism and irony, the elder Bolling is finally crushed by the isolation his grandiose 
self-conception imposes. He escapes his marital depression only by rushing with a 
suicidal eagerness into combat.7
It is his father's misery that haunts Binx as a possibility, one which he struggles 
desperately to avoid— turning towards an aesthetic, shallow existence that seems the 
very converse of the stem asceticism prescribed by the Stoic code. But escape and 
avoidance will not suffice for Binx, as he learns in the course of the novel Nor will it 
be enough for him simply to assimilate the haunting memories of his father that linger 
in the back of his mind, fueling his desire for escape. For (as we will see) it was the 
temptation to escape from the realities of mortal life— most centrally, from the 
feminine— that drove the senior Bolling to his early death. Rather than reenact this 
escape in another direction, Binx must find psychic resolution (and enter the religious 
phase of existence) through an unflinching encounter with the living reality of the 
central women in his life— his mother Anna, Aunt Emily, and Kate. By exploring his 
father’s decline and fall he can find “clues” to his own malaise, but it is only in a 
renewed relationship with the anima that he can open himself to the workings of 
Grace.
At the story’s outset, Binx’s own connection to the anima is tenuous and 
unhealthy — and for this veiy reason he is drawn towards a tenuous and unhealthy 
woman, Kate Cutrer. By loving her, he can learn to love his own feminine nature— 
his creaturely existence under God, his body, his kinship to nature. We see here in 
operation a device Percy uses consistently, throughout each of his novels: the key 
women in the lives of each male protagonist serve double duty— as possible objects 
of love, and as objective correlatives o f the male's state o f mind, especially his 
relationship to the anima. Lance Lamar, who has crushed and punished the feminine
7The elder Bolling's self-destructive eagerness for combat— partly as an escape from the 
psychic danger posed by women— recalls the frustrated hero Bayard Sartoris, cf. Kreyling, p. 125 ff.
element in his own nature in an attempt at self-deification, desires Anna, who has been 
raped and traumatized into silence. The young Tom More, vacillating wildly among 
Faustian, heroic, and Christian self-conceptions, cavorts among wildly different 
women: Moira, the sweet young thing who responds to his seduction techniques as 
surely as nature obeys the power of technology; Lola, a post-Hollywood southern 
belle, who summons him to climb on horseback and rejoin the heroic tradition (in its 
degraded, Hollywood-Mafia incarnation); Ellen, the stem, “lusty Presbyterian armful'* 
who calls him to duty, fidelity, and fertility. And so on, through each of the novels.
Percy hints at the existence of this device early on in The Last Gentleman, when 
Will Barrett spots Kitty for the first time:
His heart gave a leap. He fell in love, at first sight and 
at a distance of two thousand feet. It was not so much her 
good looks, her smooth brushed brow and firm round 
neck bowed so that two or three vertebrae surfaced in the 
soft flesh, as a certain bemused and dry-eyed expression in 
which he seemed to recognize— himself! She was a 
beautiful girl but she also slouched and was watchful and 
dry-eyed and musing like a thirteen-year old boy. She was 
his better half. {LG, p. 14)
One could view M il’s reaction as the result of simple narcissism, or it may be taken as
a hint from the author that Will is reaching for the individuation prescribed by Jung,
the reconciliation of psychological opposites into a whole. I would suggest that we
accept these insights, then move beyond the psychological level of reading,
remembering that in the Catholic tradition masculine and feminine represent far more
than psychic modes, and cannot be exhausted by intrapsychic archetypes. Rather, the
sexes are symbols of metaphysical realities, of the mysterious relationship between
Creator and Creation.8 Seen in this light, Binx’s quest for wholeness— for peace
with the anima— takes on more significance. His internal conflicts, childhood
anxieties, and sexual pursuits may be viewed as part of the drama of Salvation History
8Hauke, p. 184.
and the whole complex of philosophical issues that preoccupied Percy all his writing 
life.
Nicholas Berdyaev makes the following remarks about Dostoevsky's novels,
which are also broadly applicable to Percy's:
Nothing exterior, whether it belonged to nature, to society, 
or to manners and customs, had any reality in itself for 
Dostoievsky [sic]. His drink-shops where the “Russian . 
boys" discuss the problems of universe are themselves 
only projections of the human spirit and of the ideological 
dialectic that is bound up with its destiny; all the 
complications of the story, the external diversity of the 
persons who are mutually attracted and repelled 
distractedly in a gale of passion, reflect the inner deeps of 
that same unique spirit; they are necessary in order to make 
clear the hidden moments of destiny, but the human riddle 
remains the same.
Dostoievsky’s novels are all built up around a central 
figure, whether the secondary characters converge towards 
it or die reverse. This chief figure always represents a 
puzzle which everybody tries to solve.9
Applied to Percy’s novels, the structural principle developed by Berdyaev can 
help explain why so many of Percy’s heroines seem less than satisfactory, when 
considered outside of their function in the protagonist’s salvation drama. Percy’s 
novels are not novels of manners or social criticism; they are investigations of the 
individual self. However memorably Percy depicts secondary characters, they never 
usurp the story. Our interest as readers is directed toward the fate of an individual soul 
— and toward other characters mainly insofar as they tell us about the condition of the 
soul, and help or hinder its spiritual progress.10 Percy’s female characters act as 
lenses, through which we look to gain new insight about the protagonist’s spiritual 
state. Given the attitude toward the feminine implied in both the heroic ethic and the
9Nicholas Berdyaev, Dostoevsky (New York: Meridian Bodes, 1957), pp. 40-41.
10The same thing could be said of The Divine Comedy, whose “pilgrim" Dante is presented 
with the vast spectacle of damnation, purgation, and beatitude for the sake of his individual salvation. 
(Even Beatrice appears more as the instrument of Grace than as an independent, self-motivated 
character.) Reading this way, one discovers a strong, if submerged, allegorical motive underlying all 
of Percy’s fiction.
scientific mystique — the two most powerful cultural forces his characters must 
confront— it is hardly surprising that the women in Percy's novels are generally 
wounded, inarticulate, or perverse. Their symptoms are part of the syndrome he is 
trying to diagnose— a cultural and psychological rejection of the feminine.
This observation about Percy’s work, which fits well with D’Arcy’s scheme of 
sexual symbolism, helps turn aside such facile cridques as we find in Timothy K. 
Nixon,11 who suggests that the very fact that Percy depicts the spiritual quest for 
meaning in the lives of male protagonists makes it impossible for female readers to 
identify with them— and therefore to benefit from the novels’ “philosophical 
affirmation” — unless those readers are willing to “place themselves as cridcs of other 
women.” By accepting a separatist aesthetics that insists upon identification with a 
protagonist of similar sexual and sociopolitical breakdown, Nixon renders the cross- 
cultural appreciation of art incomprehensible— and puts himself in the curious 
position of outflanking on the left such prominent female Percy scholars as Linda 
Whitney Hobson and Mary K. Sweeney, implying that they have somehow failed in 
their duty of gender solidarity by offering sympathetic appreciations of The 
Moviegoer.
On a deeper level, by failing to understand the orthodox tradition in which Percy 
continues— and its use of the sexual categories of animus and anima to describe 
realities that inhere in every human being— Nixon misses the broad philosophical 
import of Percy’s entire canon (an import many female critics have understood with no 
trouble whatsoever), which applies equally to men and women. While Percy, for 
biographical and cultural reasons that I and others have explored, felt comfortable 
mainly in depicting the quest for transcendent, incarnate meaning through the male 
perspective, his insights are broadly applicable to both sexes, and available to women
11“The Exclusionary Nature of The Moviegoer," in Walker Percy's Feminine Characters, Lewis 
Lawson, ed. (Troy, New York: The Whitston Publishing Company, 1995), p. 50 ff.
readers through the ordinary aesthetic magic of imaginative sympathy, just as Jane 
Austen's insights are attainable by a perceptive male reader. All this is not to deny the 
particularly male, southern, white context of the quandary in which Percy's 
protagonists found themselves, struggling against the heroic tradition; rather, we must 
explore this context in all its singularity, before moving to the more universal, 
metaphysical questions (including Promethean revolt and gnosticism) that troubled 
most of his major characters.
Seen in this light, the tortured figure of Kate Cutrer becomes far more than a 
conveniently fragile love interest Like Binx a victim of Emily's Stoic ethics and 
heroic expectations, Kate incarnates the psychic damage inflicted on the feminine by 
the cool, tight-lipped Bolling code — more vividly than Binx, since she was raised 
from adolescence by Emily, a wiry stepmother. Better than Binx, Kate recognizes her 
affinity with the protagonist:
“Aren’t you supposed to tell me something?”
“Yes, but I forgot what it was.”
“Binx Binx. You’re to tell me all sorts of things.”
“That’s true.”
“It will end with me telling you.”
“That would be better.”
Kate does tell him something; in fact she goes on to utter the most critical sentence in
the novel:
“You’re like me, but worse. Much worse.” (M, p. 40).
This is the piece of “news" that Binx must hear and accept, before he can begin to 
redeem his life. He must accept his own affinity with the wounded feminine— as 
embodied in Kate— and begin a process of healing, before he can accept his genuine 
masculine responsibilities, and come into a true relationship with the eternal masculine, 
God the Father. Until that happens, he will roam the earth (in reality or in the 
shadowplay of cinema) a proud spirit defended from truth by an exquisitely refined 
irony and a Stoicism to which he does not admit Certainly, at novel’s opening Binx is
not ready to recognize any affinity with Kate. He dismisses her insight with a 
patronizing diagnosis of her condition:
She is in tolerable good spirits. It is not necessaiy to 
pay too much attention to her. I spy the basket arm of a 
broken settee. It has a presence about if  the ghost of 
twenty summers in Feliciana. I perch on a bony spine and 
prop hands on knees. (Af, p. 41, italics mine)
It is no accident that as Binx ignores the words of life, his narration fills with images
of death. Having neglected this chance to recognize the inextricable connection
between soul and body and animus and anima, Binx’s mind reverts to a Cartesian
mode: he sees a world populated by ghosts and skeletons.
The next memory Binx relates to us suggests that he has been stirred into more 
serious reflection. He offers us a history of Kate’s relations with her parents —  of the 
“dialectic” that drives her from hatred of one to hatred of the other. On one level, 
Binx’s discursus is a perceptive analysis of the forces that have stunted his cousin’s 
psyche— and by implication, his own. Read another way, Kate’s personal history 
can be seen as an allegory of the degeneration of the Western spirit, from the medieval 
to the modem age. By using Hegel’s term for the progress of world history, Percy 
nudges us to look for exactly such an allegory (as we will see, the literal level sustains 
it).
As Binx relates events, Aunt Emily entered Kate’s life as a stepmother when Kate 
was ripe for a rebellion against her father’s “dogged good nature, his Catholic 
unseriousness, his little water closet jokes, his dumbness about his God." In his 
bawdiness and his untroubled faith, Jules Cutrer suggests the Chestertonian stereotype 
of a well-balanced, medieval man. Comfortable with body and soul, untroubled by 
Promethean fantasies, not curious enough to doubt his religion, metaphysical in a 
thoroughly earthy way, Jules seems never to have experienced the modem division of 
mind and body. His relation to creation (and therefore the feminine) is whole and 
healthy— and to sophisticates like Emily, Kate, and Binx, intolerably naive. In
Faustian fashion, Emily, an “enchanting person,” brought to the Cutrer household a
kind of Enlightenment:
Her stepmother had taken her in charge and set her free.
In the older woman, older than a mother and yet something 
of a sister, she found the blithest gayest fellow rebel and 
comrade. The world of books and music and art and ideas 
opened before her. (M, p. 42)
At first, Kate revelled in Emily’s brand of liberation, which allowed “the soaring 
of the spirit beyond the narrow horizons of the parochial and into the lofty regions of 
Literature and Life.” Kate progressed, logically enough, from Enlightenment to 
Utopianism, specifically “the girlish socialism of Sarah Lawrence.” Even this was 
allowable, under Emily’s regime, until Kate took the next natural step, into 
Revolution. When Kate got involved in “political conspiracy here and now in New 
Orleans,” the limits Emily set on revolt become apparent.
She could not allow Kate to pursue something that might have actual, tangible 
effects in the world; in fact, she could only reconcile herself to Kate’s activities by 
explaining them away as part of her Studententage. She compares Kate’s dead- 
serious, dangerous politics12 with the aesthetic quibbles of her own past, “when we 
Wagnerians use to hiss Old Brahms— O for the rapturous rebellious days of youth.” 
Emily’s response to Kate exposes her own “rebellion” for what it has become— an 
aesthetic pose, a pretended encounter with dangerous questions by a mind already 
certain of the answers (those found in southern heroic conventions). One sure marker 
of Emily’s bad faith, recurring throughout the novel, is her constant recourse to 
German phrases and references— many of them lifted, as Binx notices, straight out of 
the kitschy operetta The Student Prince. By equating Kate’s most serious aspirations 
with her own particular brand of merde, Emily has cut Kate off at the knees,
12While Binx doesn't specify what kind of activism Kate was engaged in, it likely involved 
civil rights— a dangerous cause, indeed, in the New Orleans of 1960.
trivializing her and finally earning her hatred Binx receives the same treatment at 
Emily's hands, as he begins to explain to her his idea of a “search”:
“Of course!” she cries. “You’re doing something every 
man used to do. When your father finished college, he 
had his Wanderjahr, a fine year’s ramble up the Rhine and 
down the Loire, with a pretty girl on one arm and a good 
comrade on the other. But what happened to you when 
you got out of college? War. And I’m so proud of you 
for i t  But that’s enough to take it out of any man.” (M, p.
49)
In fact, the Korean War had treated Binx pretty well. It is Emily herself who really has 
the power to “take it out o f ’ him:
Wanderjahr. My heart sinks. We do not understand 
each other after all. If I thought I’d spent the last four 
years as a Wanderjahr, before “settling down,” I’d shoot 
myself on the spot (M, p. 49)
Let us take his statement seriously, for the moment On some level, hearing 
Emily’s account of Binx’s life makes him think of suicide. Considering the effect 
Emily seems to have had on Kate, Binx’s reaction is less surprising. In Emily’s 
attempts to make life more aesthetically meaningful — to transfigure “all that is 
feckless and gray about people. . .  into an unmistakable visage of the heroic or the 
craven” — Emily has instead helped render it virtually unliveable for both the children 
she has had a hand in raising.
After this encounter with his aunt, Binx is drained, compliant and sleepy, unable 
to speak his mind. Seeing him falter, Emily presses her advantage, and extracts from 
him a promise that by his thirtieth birthday — the next week— he will have decided 
“what he wants to do with his life.” He numbly agrees, and settles down to massage 
her neck. Emily’s unwillingness to take Binx seriously is for him a kind of spiritual 
castration, cutting him off from the realm of action he has chosen— a search for the 
eternal masculine, for God— and diverting him instead towards a mundane life of 
research, noblesse oblige, and elitism. This life would be a close imitation of his 
father’s, driven by a dim emulation of shadowy heroic ancestors, a rejection of
transcendence in favor of a spurious “spiritual freedom,*’ and a chilly, isolationist 
Stoicism that boils down to little more than emotional numbness and social snobbery. 
Binx rejects this sort of future, but has not yet figured out what to construct in its 
place.
When applied to Kate, Emily’s dilettantism is even more crippling: cut off from 
the metaphysical (her father’s faith), dismissed and patronized when she tries to do 
something effectual (political activism), Kate feels trapped within her stepmother’s 
world of aesthetic impersonation, of life conceived as a dance of masks. She responds 
by doing the one thing that Emily will take seriously— plunging into despair. Even 
so, she does not escape her stepmother’s categories; for now Emily may view her in 
the caricatured terms of southern female fragility, a fitting bride for any “southern 
hero” Emily can arrange.
As degenerate a scion in her way as any of Faulkner’s latter-day Compsons, Kate 
finds her relationship with the masculine (animus) imperilled by Emily’s heroic 
expectations: deprived of her childhood faith in a heavenly Father, turned for a long 
time against Jules, driven into such complete passivity that she resents the men who 
love her, Kate rejoices when hsxfianc&e dies in an accident Emily herself, dimly 
aware that her step-daughter is alienated from men, arranges rendezvous with such 
virile characters as Sam Yerger, placing great, hopes in their transformative powers. Of 
course, these encounters do no more good for Kate than Binx’s fleeting affairs do for 
him. Kate is drawn instead to seek13 a man who has himself suffered from the 
malaise, who can know “how frightened” she is; a modified hero who may tell her 
how to live, but will “not laugh” at her. Binx is on the way to becoming such a man; 
first he must come to understand his alienation from the feminine, to reject thoroughly
13As Emory Elliott makes clear in “Gesture and Style in The Moviegoer," Kate does indeed 
pursue Binx, employing an indirection worthy of Kierkegaard to awaken Binx from his aesthetic trance 
and turn his attention to the woman who loves him. (Lawson, ed., p. 34 ff)
Emily's aesthetic gamesmanship, and the heroic assumptions that underlie i t  At the 
beginning of his stoiy, he considers his “search" a solitary quest, and cannot imagine 
that Kate really understands it too— that she is not patronizing him (Emily-style), 
when she starts to question him:
“Is this part of the repetition?”
“No."
“Part of the search?”
I do not answer. She can only believe I am serious in 
her own fashion of being serious: as an antic sort of 
seriousness, which is not seriousness at all but despair 
masquerading as seriousness. I would as soon not speak 
to her of such things, since she is bound to understand it 
as a cultivated eccentricity___(M, p. 69)
In fact, Binx has no way of knowing this for sure. Kate may be perfectly sincere 
in her interest; in her persistent, acute questions she displays a considered 
understanding of Binx's mental dynamics. Certainly she seeks the same answers as 
Binx and suffers similarly from a malaise. But Binx cannot at this point accept this 
possibility; his experience of women tells him that he will not find in their ranks a 
fellow-seeker. From his own mother, who used to patronize his intellectual interests 
as the work of “Dick Rover, the serious-minded Rover boy," to Aunt Emily, who 
interprets his every deed in the light of The Student Prince, Binx has learned to distrust 
women. They are potential threats to his masculine seriousness.
Of course, Binx throughout his narrative is reluctant to admit that there are any 
other seekers at all, male or female; on his account, according to a poll “98% of 
Americans believe in God and the remaining 2% are atheists and agnostics— which 
leaves not a single percentage point for a seeker.” He believes himself to be alone— 
and this suits him just fine. There is also something about Kate’s femininity that 
prevents him from empathizing with hen
Kate parses it out with the keen male bent of her mind 
and yet with her woman’s despair. Therefore, I take care 
to be no more serious than she. (M, p. 70)
Kate is scalded by Binx’s refusal to take her seriously:
“You’re a cold one, dear.”
“As cold as you?”
“Colder. Cold as the grave.” She walks about tearing 
shreds of flesh from her thumb. . .  “It is possible, you 
know, that you are overlooking something, the most 
obvious thing of all. And you would not know it if you 
fell over i t ”
“What?”
She will not tell me. (M, p. 70)
Binx expects a formulaic answer, an abstraction suited to the old, failed “vertical 
search." In fact, what his relationship with Kate promises is an experience, leading up 
to a realization. By experiencing her full humanity and learning to love her 
empathetically, he will realize his own status as a creature among creatures, in mutual 
relation to a Creator. This is an answer he is not ready to hear, which he could not 
begin to understand, as long as he refuses the company of a true fellow-searcher, and 
refuses to recognize himself reflected in her. Until he can connect with the feminine on 
grounds of kinship rather than lust, Binx can never open himself to God— he will in 
fact view Him not as Bridegroom but as a rival.
Herself vulnerable and wounded, Kate is able to recognize these qualities in Binx 
— better than he can himself. Using the emotional distance and irony that Kate lacks 
(and could make good use of), Binx maintains his investment business, dates 
regularly, leads a clean and orderly life, asking only that “old ladies" and such allow 
him “to plan their futures.” But when we dig below the surface of Binx’s cool 
narrative, we find a dark realm of disconnection and alienation, a psyche poisoned by 
“malaise,” whose tenuous grip on the realm of physical existence depends entirely on 
transitory sexual encounters, decorated with romantic trimmings from the movies. He 
is indeed “cold as the grave,” still trapped behind the siege-works surrounding “the 
wintry kingdom of self.’’14
14This phrase is take from Walker Percy’s critique of “Uncle” Will’s Stoic code: “Its most 
characteristic mood was a poetic pessimism which took a grim satisfaction in the dissolution of its 
values— because social decay confirmed one in his original choice of the wintry kingdom of self.. .  
His finest hour is to sit tight-lipped and ironic while the world comes crashing down around him.” 
(SSL, pp. 85-86)
Nursery of a Seducer: Womanizing and the Flight from Woman
Binx is not wholly unaware of his condition, and throughout the novel makes
tentative, misdirected attempts to break out of his isolation. Because he is dimly aware
that his problem lies in the realm of the anima, most of these attempts involve
flirtations with attractive young women. As a close reading of the novel will show,
each time Binx confronts “the malaise,” the cloud of meaninglessness that he feels
descending periodically on his world, he turns to thoughts of women as a solace—
then calls someone up for a date, or goes tooling down the highway with one of his
“Lindas,” presumably en route to some cheerful, inconsequential sexual encounter.
Binx’s modus vivendi, while it may appear to be adolescent escapism, is far more
than that; it is his attempt to reconnect himself with the world and the body, in Percy’s
terms to achieve “re-entry” from his “orbit of transcendence,” and to place himself
once again in the world of creatures. Typically such attempts are futile, as he
acknowledges himself:
. . .  the affair ended just when I thought our relationship 
was coming into its best phase. The air in the office would 
begin to grow thick with silent reproaches. It would 
become impossible to exchange a single word or glance 
that was not freighted with a thousand hidden meanings.
Telephone conversations would take place at all hours of 
the night, conversations made up mostly of long silences 
during which I would rack my brain for something to say 
while on the other end you could hear little else but 
breathing and sighs. When these long telephone silences 
come, it is a sure sign that love is over. No, they were not 
conquests. For in the end my Lindas and I were so sick of 
each other that we were delighted to say good-bye. (M, p.
15)
These encounters fail to satisfy Binx, giving way to renewed despair, because the 
bond they establish with the anima is fleeting and purely instrumental, barren of love 
and life. The woman’s body absorbs his anxiety, relieves his impersonal desires, 
flatters his ego, and leaves him free to wander. More like a booster shot of B-12 than 
the act of love, such encounters recall the relentless couplings of Mozart’s Don
Giovanni, the restless search for satiety of Goethe’s Faust (two important sources for 
Percy). Further, they habituate Binx to treating his own body as a mere instrument for 
relieving the anguish of his soul— rather than as the natural seat of the sacred (of the 
sacraments, in fact). Since he takes a god-like approach to his body— inhabiting it as 
Zeus would a swan or a bull— his carnal activities do not succeed for long in 
reestablishing his link with nature. If they do manage to make him “coincide with 
himself’ in the way cats appear to do— or as his heroic forebears Judge Anse, Dr. 
Wills, and Alex Bolling seem to do in old photos — then their success is fleeting, and 
gives way quickly to the returning malaise. His connection to mother Earth 
disappears, and he floats once again in the upper atmosphere like George Meredith’s 
Lucifer, alien from the world of men, frustrated in his attempts at transcendence by the 
“army of unalterable law.”15
Binx’s relations to women reflect his attitudes about earthly existence. By 
association, each woman is imaginatively linked with organic nature— his own 
mother most powerfully of all. As Binx recounts his encounters with these women, he 
never fails to attach descriptions of natural phenomena, colored by his emotions:
It is a gloomy March day. The swamps are still burning 
at Chef Menteur and the sky over Gentilly is the color of 
ashes. The bus is crowded with shoppers, nearly all 
women. The windows are steamed. I sit on the 
lengthwise seat in front. Women sit beside me and stand 
above me. On the long back seat are five Negresses so 
black that the whole rear of the bus seems darkened. (A/,
P-17).
The sky outside the color of death, the Edenic swamps burning like Hell, Binx 
takes a kind of refuge in a steamy, all-female environment, reminiscent of the nursery 
— down to the black women who customarily played “mammy” to white children. 
Stem suggests that the intuitive mode of knowledge (intellectus) that tradition has
15“Lucifer in Starlight," The Poems of George Meredith, Vol. I, Phyllis B. Bartlett, ed, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 285.
labelled “feminine" has its roots in early childhood experience, in the world of union 
with the mother.16 This passage confirms such a connection in Binx’s case. By 
returning to the maternal, Binx is able to shed the armor of irony and egoism, and 
make himself vulnerable to intuitions of God; it is no accident that at the end of this bus 
trip he recalls his forgotten notion of a “search."17 Such a brush with the anima entails 
a terrible vulnerability, a return to childlike perception and a willed helplessness — 
something especially unacceptable for a man reared according to the heroic code. Such 
a man, especially in a post-heroic age, is apt to experience his rigid self-conception as a 
kind of fragile levee, which once breached might never be repaired.18
Binx experiences such anxiety on the bus, revealing his own troubled relationship 
to the feminine and hinting at its origins. Settling into this suffocatingly female 
environment, the first individual woman he notices is a “very fine-looking girl" sitting 
across from him. What makes this passage remarkable are the terms he uses to 
describe this girl. She is a “solitary Amazon," a “strapping girl done up head to toe in 
cellophane” with a “helmet of glossy black hair” and “Prince Val bangs.” Binx 
perceives her as masculinized, stripped of any maternal attributes, inorganic— like the 
“wire mother" discussed in Chapter One, or the “phallic woman” of Freudian theory (a 
concept with which Percy was quite familiar, after three years of rigorous 
psychoanalysis). This progression, from the suffocating warmth of maternal 
closeness, to a cool contemplation of woman-as-soldier, mirrors Binx’s own 
experiences with mother figures. After his father flew eagerly off to his death in
16Stem, p. 96 ff.
17This same vulnerability characterized Binx’s first intimations of a search; lying wounded in a 
ditch in Korea, “pressed hard against the ground as if somebody sat on me,” he gazes at a dung beetle 
and begins the search. The immediate evidence of his own mortality, and his sudden intimacy with the 
earth— and not metaphysical proofs, however valid, or inspirational tracts, however heartfelt— these 
are what provoke Binx to search for God. We will observe this pattern throughout Percy’s work— 
culminating most spectacularly in The Second Coming, when Will Barrett ends up dropping into 
Allie’s greenhouse and (ultimately) the arms of Mother Church.
18As we have seen, the image of the levee on the Mississippi as a symbol of civilization itself 
holding back primal chaos is central to W.A. Percy, even appearing in the title of his autobiography.
World War n, Binx was sent to complete his education with Aunt Emily, a veritable 
swoTd-madchen of the southern heroic tradidon.
Unnerved by this complex of ambivalent responses to the presence of women,
Binx banishes the ghosts of childhood with a leap towards adolescent behavior: he
makes eye contact with the “Amazon” and proceeds to fantasize about her. As if to
defend himself, he falls back on his usual tacdc, attempting to touch the feminine on
terms of romantic “conquest”
Our eyes meet Am I mistaken or does the comer of her 
mouth tuck in ever so slightly and the petal of her lower lip 
curl out ever so richly? She is smiling— at me! My mind 
hits upon half a dozen schemes to circumvent the terrible 
moment of separation. (M, p. 17)
At last an organic, traditionally feminine image enters Binx’s description of this 
woman. Once she has evinced some shadow of sexual interest (as Binx imagines it), 
her masculine attributes vanish and “the petal of her lower lip” unfolds like a rose. As 
the encounter moves into the sexual realm— familiar territory over which he can 
exercise control— Binx is able to give voice to the emotion that haunts him throughout 
the book. He dreads the “terrible moment of separation” from the anima, the alienation 
from life and the earth entailed in both the rigidity of the heroic code and the abstraction 
of the scientific intellect He seeks contact with the feminine without the vulnerability 
entailed in an authentic encounter— in a self-giving act of love, the self-forgetting of 
aesthetic experience, or the self-abnegation of contemplative prayer. Unable yet to 
partake of the feminine, to admit his participation in i t  Binx tries to savor it instead— 
as a Decadent might collect aesthetic experiences in a mental ‘cabinet of curiosities,’ 
safely labelled and classified, unthreatening to the edifice of self.19
In this strategy, Binx resembles no one so much as his Aunt Emily, who has 
harnessed and tamed the life-transformative force of art transfigured it into a decorous
19Cf. J.K. Huysmans, Against Nature, tr. Robert Baldick. (London: Penguin, 1959).
abstraction that grants “the men of our family" a certain cultural prestige. This is not to 
say that Emily does not truly enjoy works of art, music, or literature; far from i t  She 
enjoys such works as self-contained, satisfying experiences that give a pleasing, if 
temporary form to the chaos of life outside the fortress of self, before one withdraws 
back within the gates. Binx shows his understanding of her aesthetic in his description 
of Emily’s piano playing:
We talk, my aunt and I, in our old way of talking, 
during pauses in the music. She is playing Chopin. She 
does not play very well; her fingernails click against the 
keys. But she is playing one of our favorite pieces, the E 
flat £tude. In recent years I have become suspicious of 
music. When she comes to a phrase which once united us 
in a special bond and to which I once opened myself as 
meltingly as a young girl, I harden myself. (M, p. 43)
Binx’s moments of true vulnerability in the story are few, and most of them lie
well in the past— the day he lay wounded in Korea; the summer when he neglected
“research” because he was enraptured by the sunlight with a sense of “wonder,” and
— we now learn, his one-time love of music. In each case, he had been offered a
tentative contact with the anima, a hint of his kinship with the created world of nature
and humanity. Not surprisingly, both his war wound and his summer of “research"
contributed to his discovery of the “horizontal search.” When it came to music, events
turned out differently, however. Listening to music with Emily, Binx discovered, was
not an invitation to communion with the composer and his vision, or with the world
his work was depicting— but to a “special bond” with Emily, admission to her airless
inner circle of cultural/aesthetic heroes. Feeling betrayed by the unwanted affinity he
feels with Emily— and the lingering power of what she has taught him— Binx turns
against the aesthetic impulse altogether, later in the novel declaring:
Beauty is a whore. . .  Money is a good counterpoise to 
beauty. Beauty, the quest of beauty alone, is a whoredom.
Ten years ago I pursued beauty and gave no thought to 
money. I listened to the lovely tunes of Mahler and felt a 
sickness in my very soul. Now I pursue money and on 
the whole feel better. (M, p. 156).
The “raptures” Emily allows herself to feel in the presence of music, the arts, or 
philosophy — each of which she talks about frequently, dropping names like a social 
climber—  are not true to the word. Whatever else it denotes, the word “rapture” 
connotes a loss of control, a surrender to the work itself, an experience that might 
demand a change of life. Emily is immune to any such appeal; she wields Art as a 
sword that divides the cultured from the uncultured, then gleams impressively in the 
setting sun. For all that she can work herself up into an emotional state over an opera 
or etude, she never quite forgets to enjoy herself enjoying it, to savor— more than the 
music itself— her own aesthetic sensitivity. This behavior, as Binx sniffs out, is 
simply a premium grade of merde, no different in kind than Eddie Lovell’s love of 
renovated shotgun houses, or the humanistic values that Nell Lovell pronounced 
“pretty darned enduring” after seeing them confirmed in The Prophet.
In order to understand frilly the roots of Binx's alienation from the anima at 
novel’s opening, and his inability to lose himself either in aesthetic experience or 
romantic love, one must have a full appreciation of the nature of the heroic tradition 
with which he struggles in the person of Aunt Emily. Much critical work has been 
done tracing the resemblances between the fictional Aunt Emily and her real-life model, 
William Alexander Percy— especially the work of Lawson,20 which establishes that 
the younger Percy’s first published novel was in large part a critique of the world-view 
his adoptive father passed on to him. When we examine Emily’s aesthetics, we come 
up with yet another parallel between Walker Percy’s art and his “Uncle Will’s” life. 
Throughout the tender, heart-rending pages of Lanterns on the Levee, Will Percy’s 
autobiography, the closest this profoundly lonely author comes to communion with the 
world are certain fleeting encounters with natural or man-made beauty. In such
20Following Percy, p. 69.
passages as the following, the ice seems to melt away from the ramparts of the “wintry 
kingdom*’ he inhabited:
While I was missing so much, I collected some 
imperishable memories: Luxor in moonlight; Notre-Dame 
in any light; the hill-towns of Italy, particularly Perugia; 
my fust nightingale at Nunes; my first Greek temple at 
Passtum; the brumal gold interior at S t Mark’s before it 
was cleaned; Shelley’s grave with camellias blooming 
against the wall of the Protestant cemeteiy and violets in 
gold shallows over the graves; the tall Egyptian women at 
dusk bearing on their heads to the Nile their water-jugs, 
the night air stirring the veils half from their faces and 
flattening their single garments in ripples against their 
straight proud bodies. (LoL, pp. 111-112)
Magnificent writing, surely— far more evocative than anything the younger
Percy gave Aunt Emily to say in The Moviegoer. But as lovely as this series of
descriptions is, lilting and musical, positively melting with affection for the world of
men, it also suggests the problem in the elder Percy’s aesthetics — and in the
metaphysics in which they are wrapped up. Like each passage in the memoir dealing
with art and culture, the above is a mere catalogue of moments, none of which is
elevated to the level of a significant experience, with the capacity to change the
viewer’s life — snapshots from an extended Wanderjahr. While some of the events
in Lanterns on the Levee transcend this level of recollection— particularly those
depicting the author’s friendship with “Fode,” and the filial awe he felt toward his
father — none of his recollections of aesthetic experience rise much beyond a
sentimental appreciation of the pretty and the poignant
Aesthetic appreciation, for WA. Percy, seems to have consisted in particular
delectations, succulent moments of experience that he was able to isolate from context
then savor in solitude. To be fair to him, he was very much aware of this and his other
personal limits. Relentlessly self-critical, W. A. Percy all but condemns himself as a
man unable to enter life, who must remain content merely to observe it*
[T]he place I have won here and there, early and late, 
though a good place and a proud one, was never first place
in any life, and what was mine to possess utterly and 
sovereignly, without counterclaim, was only the jackdaw 
pickings of my curious and secret heart When your 
heart’s a kleptomaniac for bits of color and scraps of god- 
in-man, its life hoardings make a pile glinting indeed, but 
of no worth save to the miserly fanatic heart Now is the 
time, now when the air is still and the light is going, to 
spread my treasure o u t . .  .1 gaze down the long slope 
with its grass that bends and shivers and the memories, my 
very own, drift through me like dim music, like that 
appeasing heart-broken theme of the PatMtique or Gluck’s 
glimpse of the Elysian fields or the unbearable peace and 
tears of the Good Friday Spell or Bach’s Komm' susser 
Tod, only the music is blurred, with the anguish gone. It 
has all been good and worth the tears. I see it as a dream I 
long to hold, but not to relive. ([LoL, pp. 336-337)
Will Percy’s choice of metaphor is candid and revealing: his memories of life are 
“jackdaw pickings,” “hoardings” that he now treasures in classic “miserly” fashion — 
he takes them out and gazes at them, then puts them back. Rather than episodes in a 
tale of spiritual growth, incidents from Percy’s past function here as fetishes, items of 
interest that he savors from a distance, like a Decadent aesthete. Lest one think this 
merely the impulse — indeed the prerogative— of a sickly autobiographer who sees 
the onset of death glimmering on the horizon, examine with care Percy’s description of 
his aesthetic experience as a youth:
Even at this age I had great affection for the world and 
did not want to miss any of its beauties. This obligated me 
to appreciate whatever men of taste and heart found lovely, 
which in turn drove me to study, to school my eyes and 
ears, to train the sensitive and unruly bondsman in my 
body. (LoL, p. 107)
Note the choice of words: as a young man he felt “obligated" to feel aesthetic
enjoyment in the presence of works canonized and approved by “men of taste and
heart.” For all that Percy was indeed a sensitive man and a fine minor poet, these
words of his point another way; they suggest a  certain conformism, a mimetic desire to
associate himself with items of cultural prestige, to consume aesthetic experiences, and
then to move on with his life.
In The Moviegoer, this epicureanism repeats itself, in a discounted form, in Aunt 
Emily's fetish for things of the 19th century and things German (one can imagine her 
collecting musical beer steins, keeping them on the mantle alongside programs from 
Bayreuth and an autographed copy of The Decline o f the West). We see the same 
aesthetic habits in Binx, whose tastes are less elevated, focused as they are on young 
women and movies. His thirty-year ironic glide over the surface of experience is not a 
rejection of his aunt's creed, but an ingenious modem application of i t  As Percy 
knew from his study of Kierkegaard, such a glide needs to be violently interrupted, if 
one’s “search” is ever to lead anywhere but further into the dark wood of error. The 
action portrayed in the novel is a minute psychological record of how that interruption 
happened to Binx, what it felt like at the time, and what it meant to him later.
That there are serious spiritual consequences flowing from the aestheticism of
W A. Percy (and therefore, of Aunt Emily) should be clear from the following
passage, occurring near the end of his memoir
[I]t is given man to behold beauty and to worship nobility.
He is shaken when he sees these two, but not because he 
feels them alien. Only when he is in their presence does 
the air taste native and the place seem home. These only 
are reality to his profoundest self; he needs no proof of 
them and no explanation. They are, he is, and over him 
there passes the shudder of a recognition. These 
recognitions are brief moments, but moments we may live 
by for our brief years. Who gave us these perceptions 
gave too, no doubt, the heavens’ laws and conjured up 
creation. I think if one would sit in the Greek theater 
above Taormina with the wine-dark sea below and /Etna 
against the sunset, and meditate on Jesus and the Emperor, 
he would be assured a god had made earth and man. And 
this is all we need to know.
But we trouble our hearts with foolish doubts and 
unwise questionings — the fear of death, the hope of 
survival, forgiveness, heaven, hell.. . .  (LoL, p. 320)
Another passage of soul-stirring beauty, high-minded and deeply held —  but 
there is something wrong here, a rhetorical sleight of hand the author employs to 
advance his agenda of melancholy Deism. We see in this passage precisely the same
rhetorical technique that the younger Percy lampoons in his portrait of Aunt Emily— 
the appeal to aesthetic beauty as a way of closing off metaphysical discussion. The 
certainty with which Will Percy concludes his credo falls like an iron curtain on further 
consideration of the possibility of God's providence, His intervention in history, or the 
immortality of the soul. Perhaps the central question men have asked since the dawn 
of human consciousness — how can the life of an individual make sense when he is 
doomed to die? — is left unanswered, ruled out of court, dismissed as beyond the ken 
of men; in compensation, we are given a patch of pretty (if purple) prose.21 The 
experience of aesthetic union with the author displaces any hope of kinship with 
Creation or union with the Creator; a fine example of Joyce’s “Faustian Aesthetic.”22 
No wonder Binx is suspicious of beauty.
From the Levee to the Bayou: Binx Bolling’s Return to the Feminine
Built as it was on what Allen Tate called a “minor myth,"23 rooted in temporary 
social conditions rather than eternal verities, the southern version of Stoicism was 
doomed to the extinction that WA. Percy saw approaching it. A philosophy that 
rested not on universal truths but on the virtues of an aristocratic class, it had 
developed to help guide that class in the just exercise of paternalist power over social 
and moral “inferiors.” The form that these virtues took was particular to a social class, 
and could not offer a code of behavior for poor or working-class folk— apart from 
suggesting coolly that they defer to the leadership of their betters. Any critique of the 
paternalist structure must therefore have appeared to the Stoic as an assault on decency 
and the finer things. This is borne out by history: to “Bourbons” like the Percys the 
incipient Populist movement was a struggle between the virtuous nobility and the 
roiling demos. The virulent racism wielded by such demagogues as Watson,
21In Science, Politics, and Gnosticism, Voegelin identifies this rhetorical strategy — the 
“forbidding of questions’*— as the hallmark of a gnostic thinker, an “intellectual magician” (p. 23 ft).
^Sullivan, p. 104.
^ “What is a Traditional Society?" in Collected Essays (Denver Allen Swallow, 1959), p. 298.
Vardanian and Bilbo lent that interpretation its air of plausibility. However, the 
moralizing Stoic account also masked the genuine economic inequities perpetuated 
against poor whites by the combination of wealthy white planters with cheap black 
labor.
If it depended upon elitism, the Stoic code also promoted a kind of individualism,
largely by denying the common ground of human dignity between black and white,
rich and poor, which existed at least implicitly in old Christendom (and which was
underscored in Catholic slave societies such as Brazil by the universality of the
sacraments).24 As Walker Percy himself sums up the code of “Colonel Sartoris,”
certainly an image of his Uncle Will,
[It] was the nobility of the natural perfection of the Stoics, 
the stem inner summons to man’s full estate, to duty, to 
honor, to generosity towards his fellow men and above all 
to his inferiors— not because they were made in the image 
of God and were therefore lovable in themselves, but 
because to do them an injustice would be to defile the inner 
fortress which was oneself. (SSL, p. 85).
An ethic that draws all its force from regard for self, rather than a genuine 
realization of the transcendent importance of the Other, this Stoic creed must encourage 
isolation in the very best of times. In times of social change and the decay of elites, it 
is a recipe for disaster. One’s universe of moral equals — with whom alone true 
reciprocal love is possible— is limited at the start to the tiny circle of social equals.
The circle shrinks further when one excludes those who have lost honor by failing to 
practice the Code— a growing contingent, in an era of social disruption that 
subordinates honor to profit and undermines every hierarchy. The loneliness we might 
expect to see does pervade Lanterns on the Levee and afflicts each of Walker Percy’s 
Stoic protagonists. These limitations of the Stoic code do much to explain the heavy 
emphasis we see in Lanterns on the Levee on male bonding through college friendship
^Eugene Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), p.
121.
and common military service— melancholy substitutes for a comfortable sense of 
kinship with Creation (the anima) and a personal relationship with the Creator.
When Binx Bolling surveys his past, trying to understand the root of his
“malaise," his gaze turns naturally to the stoiy of the father he barely knew, and the
mother who handed him over to Aunt Emily upon adolescence. Like Binx, his father
felt a distance from the family heritage of heroism, as Binx notes while looking over
some family pictures:
But my father is not one of them.. . .  His eyes are alight 
with an expression I can’t identify; it is not far from what 
his elders might have called smart-alecky. He is 
something of a dude with his round head and tricky tab 
collar. Yet he is, by every right, one of them. He was 
commissioned in the RCAF in 1940 and got himself killed 
before his country entered the war. And in Crete. And in 
the wine dark sea. And by the same Boche. And with a 
copy of The Shropshire Lad in his pocket. Again I search 
the eyes, each eye a stipple or two in a blurred oval.
Beyond a doubt, they are ironical. (Af, p. 27).
The irony was not enough to save him; in the end, the heroic ideal claimed the 
elder Bolling, drawing him inexorably away from his home to die in a fight that was 
not yet his own, an American fighting for the Canadians who were fighting for the 
British to keep the Germans from helping the Italians to conquer Greece. In the eyes 
of Emily and the family, he died to defend the cradle of Western culture from the 
newest wave of barbarians; in fact, his death was a rote fulfillment of aesthetic 
expectations in which he himself put little real faith— as Percy signals with his use of 
conventions, such as “the wine dark sea," Housman, etc. As Binx’s recollections of 
his father make clear, his heroic death was in fact a prestigious form of suicide, an 
honorable escape route from a hellish existence.
What made this existence worth fleeing from? Is there any alternative to flight? 
These are the two questions that motivate Binx’s “search” throughout the novel. 
Having abandoned the “vertical” path of abstraction, and undertaken the “horizontal” 
investigation of the world of other people, Binx makes fitful progress in such moments
of vulnerability as we have already seen— wounded in Korea, entranced by the 
sunlight and “the wonder” during his summer of “research.” But these moments 
provide only “clues,” not answers. For those, he must make the final movement 
inward, into the depths of his past and his psyche; into the realm of childhood 
experience when a sense of union with the mother and with nature was a living reality 
or a recent memory, before the process of masculine identity-building (exaggerated by 
heroic and scientific abstraction) completed its concrete levee between Binx and the 
anima.25
On the very first page of the novel, Binx recalls the day his Aunt Emily started in 
him this process of ossification, when she broke the news of his brother Scott’s death, 
then “comforted” Binx with this injunction:
“Scotty is dead. Now it’s all up to you. It’s going to be 
difficult for you but I know you are going to act like a 
soldier." This was true. I could act like a soldier. Was 
that all I had to do? (A/, p. 11)
That is precisely the question Binx struggles to answer throughout the novel: must he
act like a soldier? Was this the answer to life and death, and the mysterious world of
women, the body, and nature— a stiff upper lip, a rigid sense of boundaries and a
code of self-respect? Aunt Emily, a genuin e femme fatale, comes to a boy whose
father died trying to act like a soldier, admonishing him to do the same. More than
admonish, she predicts, she “knows” that he will live like his father— and
presumably die like him. “Now it is all up to” Binx to cany on the death-dealing
tradition — or to fight his way free of it.
Binx is aware throughout the novel that a distance from the anima is part of his 
problem; recalling the futile attempts of Kate’s fiancee Walter to return to nature, 
through trips to the swamp that ended in drinking-and-poker binges, Binx remarks 
simply,
^Lawson, “The Dream Screen in The M oviegoer in Lawson, ed., p. 14.
I like women better. All I could think about in that swamp 
was how much I'd  like to have my hands on Marcia or 
Linda and be spinning along the Gulf Coast (AS, p. 38).
He knows intuitively what Walter and the other men are looking for, what he himself
has lost Left for him to discover in the course of the action is how he lost the
feminine, and how to regain i t  But first he must imitate Hamlet, must find out what
killed his father. For his mysteiy, as for Hamlet's, the unravelling begins with the
mother.
We begin to learn about Binx’s mother, Anna, from asides he makes while 
relating a discussion with Aunt Emily. Even as he “hardens himself’ against the 
Chopin his aunt is playing, Binx remembers the subtle disdain Emily feels for Anna. 
This passage is sufficiently important to merit quoting it in full:
She asks not about Kate but about my mother. My aunt 
does not really like my mother, yet, considering the 
circumstances, that my father was a doctor and my mother 
was his nurse and married him, she likes her as well as she 
can. She has never said a word against her and in fact 
goes out of her way to be nice to her. She even says that 
my father was “shot with luck” to get such a fine girl, by 
which she means that my father did, in a sense, leave it to 
luck. All she really holds against my mother, and not 
really against her but against my father, is my father's lack 
of imagination in marrying her. Sometimes I have the 
feeling myself that who my mother was and who I am 
depended on the chance selection of a supervisor of nurses 
in Biloxi. When my father returned from medical school 
and his surgical residency in Boston to practice with my 
grandfather in Feliciana Parish, he applied for a nurse.
The next day he waited (and I too waited) to see who 
would come. The door opened and in walked the woman 
who, as it turned out, would, if she were not one-legged 
or downright ugly, would be his wife and my mother. My 
mother is a Catholic, what is called in my aunt’s circle a 
“devout Catholic,” which is to say only that she is a 
practising Catholic since I do not think she is devout This 
accounts for the fact that I am, nominally at least also a 
Catholic.
If we allow that on one level (at least for Binx) Anna is here a symbol of the 
anima, then the range of the other characters’ responses to her becomes extremely 
revealing: Emily is disappointed that Dr. Bolling did not use his “imagination’’ to plan
out his mating behavior, that he did not go out in heroic fashion 26 and win himself a 
wife, but simply took what came. In Emily’s vision, Creation is a prize to be won by 
right of conquest, the body and wilderness tamed by courage and technology. Binx 
too is vaguely disdainful of Anna,27 seeing her almost as a blind, inert force of nature, 
propelled by a randomness that she passes along to him. Agreeing with Emily that 
blind chance— rather than heroic will or divine Providence— decided who his 
mother and what his religion would be, Binx feels threatened by his father’s passivity. 
He determines not to emulate it, but to exert control over his own sexual life— hence 
his wistful desire that he could consider his affairs “conquests.” Of course, what Binx 
in fact does is date, in succession, each of the secretaries who apply to him for work, 
and later many his cousin— which is what Emily has probably planned all along.
It seems that Mr. Bolling always looked upon marriage and nature from a nervous 
distance, feeling that he could neither commune with it nor conquer i t  One of the 
“latter” generations Kreyling describes as “Pierrots,” he moves from a disinterest in 
women to an alienated terror of them, until— like Bayard Sartoris— he flees the 
dangers of womanhood for the relative safety of an “heroic" death.28
What does he fear? What is it about life with the earthy, slightly banal Anna 
Castagne that makes a death in the wine dark sea seem like a honeymoon? We get the 
first clue from Binx as he looks into a land sale. This is no ordinary real estate deal, 
although Binx tries to minimize it*
2(SKreyling explains the importance of this point for the heroic tradition: “Marriage between 
close genetic and caste types will keep the mythic and material resources close to home. The marital 
interest then, becomes as important as the martial interest The hero must not only conquer the foe 
outside the close familial bonds of his group. He must also find and wed the ideal woman inside those 
bounds” (p. 25). Judged by this standard, the union of Bolling and Castagne is a spectacular failure.
27Binx's contempt becomes much clearer to us later in the same conversation, when Emily says 
of his father “‘He was the sweetest old thing. So gay. And did the girls fall over him.. . .  He had
the pick of New Orleans.'” Binx's immediate, devastating thought is “And [he] picked Anna 
Castagne." (A/, p. 50)
It is a matter of no importance. Mr. Sartalamaccia wants 
to buy some land, my patrimony in fact, a worthless parcel 
of swamp in S t Bernard Parish. (M, p. 61)
A little further down, Binx admits his curiosity:
In truth it would be interesting to see how much my father 
paid for i t  Any doings of my father, even his signature, is 
in the nature of a clue in my search. (M, p. 61)
Given the close association in American literature between woman and land, and 
Binx’s already dismissive attitude towards his mother, this “worthless” patrimony of 
swamp land can be seen as a correlative for Anna Smith (nei Bolling). Later on, 
when we finally meet her, it is in such an environment (a feral swamp), where she 
seems perfectly at home. On another level, this parcel of land represents the anima— 
or as much of it as his father was able to take hold of, before his escape and violent 
death. Whatever communion Dr. Bolling achieved with Creation, it is to be found here 
in the swamp; whatever it took out of him (“how much he paid for i f1) can be found 
here too— or so Binx believes. In any case, when Binx goes out to investigate, he 
has no intention of going alone to face the ghosts; he will bring Sharon with him, a 
fine and manageable young woman— a secure bridgehead connecting him to the 
world of the body.
We soon begin to find out just how much Dr. Bolling paid for his careless,
almost disdainful attitude towards marriage. Beginning with a description of his own
insomnia, Binx plunges into one of his “few recollections" of his father, of “his
nighttime prowling.” Having abandoned the marital bed to sleep outdoors with his
children on a porch, Dr. Bolling “tossed like a wounded animal, or slept fitfully. . .
and went back inside before morning, leaving his bed tortured and sour.” (M, pp. 71-
72) Soon he fled further from Anna, camping outside in the rose garden in a sleeping
bag. Finding marriage an ineffective bridge to the anima, he tried to reenter nature by
sleeping in its bosom, instead of his wife’s. The tactic failed:
Just at the hour of dawn I would be awakened by a terrible 
sound: my father crashing through the screen door, sleep-
ing bag under his arm, his eyes crisscrossed by fadgue and 
by the sadness of those glimmering dawns. . . . H e  
dreamed, I  know, o f a place o f quiet breathing and a deep 
sleep under the stars and next to the sweet earth. (M, p.
72; italics mine)
Since Binx was a small boy when his father died, and Binx knows so little about
him, this “knowledge” can only come from empathy or projection. This “dream,” of
union with the feminine, of a return to man’s rightful place in a friendly Creation,
belongs as much to Binx as to Dr. Bolling. Disturbingly, it is precisely a woman who
makes it impossible of fulfillment:
My mother, without meaning to, put a quietus29 on his 
hopes of sleep even more effectively than this forlorn 
hour. She had a way of summing up his doings in a
phrase that took the heart out of him  She agreed
[with him]. “Honey, I’m all for i t  I think we all ought to 
get back to nature and I’d be right out there with you,
Honey, if it wasn't for the chiggers. I’m chigger b a it" . .
. To her it was better to make a joke of it than be defeated 
by these chilly dawns. But after that nothing more was 
said about getting back to nature.. .  I can see him, 
blundering through the patio furniture, the Junior Jets and 
the Lone Ranger pup tents, dragging Ids Saskatechewan 
sleeping bag like the corpse of his dead hope.(Af, p. 72)
Burdened by heroic expectations and Stoic isolation, the senior Bolling turns his 
wife into a femme fatale. If he does still see in her an emblem of nature, then it 
Paglia’s castrating mother. Trained in the dualism of the heroic code, Dr. Bolling 
cannot create a healthy bond with a woman. Since he is unsure of his own masculine 
identity in a world that finds him superfluous, even the slightest resistance on his 
wife’s part threatens his sense of integrity, unmans him with a simple joke. (For 
contrast, try to imagine Jules Cutrer responding this way.) Since he has never been 
trained to take account of a woman’s masculine side or animus— her abstract intellect, 
independence, and capacity for irony— discovering these qualities in a woman simply 
spoils her in his eyes, making her into a virago and a threat Conversely, he does not
29Note the word choice here: “quietus" is a synonym for the coup de grace, an act of euthanasia.
take his own anima into account, and instead views union with Creation as a project to 
be achieved through acdon; eventually, he reverts to type, to the only approved form of 
action for a man of his upbringing. He returns to the earth as a young, heroic corpse.
Soon after Binx recalls this episode, he ventures with Sharon to visit his
patrimony, that patch of maternal swamp he is planning to sell to a developer, Mr.
Sartalamaccia. He describes the place using details that recall a crime scene:
a bushy back lot it is, tunnelled through by hog trails and a 
suspicious car track or two. Eveiy inch of open ground 
sprouts new green shoots and from the black earth there 
seems to arise a green darkness. (M, p. 76)
Given that Binx seems to blame his mother for his father's demise (and perhaps for his
own malaise), it makes sense that as he approaches maternal images and places he is
filled with suspicion. If we apply the equation of mom=swamp even more
rigorously, we can see in the “bushy back lot, tunnelled by hog trails and a mysterious
car track or two” a suggestion of corruption, of a maternal womb befouled and
dishonored by bestial intruders. This suggestion of adulteration (if not literal adultery)
is reinforced by Binx's discovery that it was his uncle Judge Anse, and not his father,
who acquired the land and built this camp, that even this little conquest of the feminine
was not really his own. This reinforces his sense of the elder Bolling's impotence,
diminishing the “heroic” value of Binx’s patrimony almost to nothing.30 The land is
not even a “clue” anymore, just a piece of land.
30If we look (as William Rodney Allen suggests) to All the King's Men as one of the 
important sources for The Moviegoer, we notice an interesting psychological parallel. In that novel, 
Jade Burden discovers too late that his biological lather is in fact Judge Irwin, that the man whose 
name he bears could not hold on to so much of the anima as to keep his own wife and household. 
Jack's very flesh is inherited not from Mr. Burden but from Judge Irwin; similarly, Binx finds that his 
patrimony never really was his lather's, that the only piece of land (of the feminine) he possesses has 
come to him from a Judge Anse, under false pretences designed to hide his father’s impotence. But the 
significance in Percy’s novel is quite different Binx’s discovery does not devastate him, or render the 
land worthless. In fact, it removes the swamp from the heroic universe altogether, turning it quickly 
from a potent symbol of his father’s “doings” to an accidental inheritance, of which he is free to 
dispose at a profit See William Rodney Allen, “Walker Percy’s Allusions to All the King's Men," 
Notes on Mississippi Writers, 15: 1 (1983), p. 7.
And yet the land itself, we discover with Binx, is worth something after all. It is 
valued in fact at $50 per foot, which Mr. Sartalamaccia is willing to pay him. Freed of 
patrimonial associations and the melancholy inwardness that goes with them, Binx is 
able to turn back to business. As he says towards the end of the novel, businessmen 
are “better metaphysicians” than romantics; rather than value the world (as Emily does) 
based on the emotive effect individual experiences exert on the isolated self, they must 
deal directly and constantly with the desires, preferences, and demands of others. By 
their very profession, they must treat the physical world with respect and regard it as 
real; a gnostic businessman would quickly go broke. Once this piece of land is viewed 
under the aspect of business, Binx can see that someone else (Mr. Sartalamaccia) 
values this land for tangible and pragmatic reasons (like that good copper pipe), which 
do not depend upon melancholic romantic associations. What is more, he can share 
this joy with the contractor and with Sharon, thereby achieving a temporary 
communion of shared values with other people— a rare occurrence for Binx — 
however trivial the occasion. Furthermore, here is a comer of the anima that belongs 
to him— which has in fact increased in value. His uneasy trip into the adulterous 
swamp turns into a happy pastoral scene: “Mr. Sartalamaccia is hopping in a sort of 
goat dance and Sharon stands dreaming in the green darkness of glade.. . .  Our name 
is Increase.” (M, p. 79) He has made a first step, however tentative, on the road to 
reconciliation with the feminine. He still has far to go, and the path runs by way of 
confrontation with the woman who gave him birth.31
31In an intriguing but somewhat reductive Freudian reading, Lawson suggests that we view 
Binx’s search for the feminine as a quest for return to the mother, to the Edenic pre-natal (or at best, 
infantile and oral) stage. Lawson argues that the blank white screen of the movie theater may be 
equated in Binx’s mind with the vague, white field of vision experienced by an infant at the breast; the 
critic suggests further that Binx is attracted to movie-going by the passive nature of cinematic 
experience— analogous to the infantile state (Walker Percy's Feminine Characters, p. 7 ff.). While 
the novel does function on this level, the allegorical implications that I have traced here suggest how 
many more layers of intertwined metaphysical and psychological meaning can be found and sustained 
in the novel
Binx blunders into this meeting with his mother in a kind of providential accident
He is out with Sharon on a happy, largely successful swimming date. Intimacy has
already begun to flower, and Binx is optimistic about his prospects with this
“sumptuous e lf’ whose cheek is “downy and spare as a boy’s.” As he watches her go
out into the water, he experiences a complex of emotions that illuminate his dawning
self-awareness:
She wades out ahead of me, turning to and fro, hands 
outstretched to the water and sweeping it before her. Now 
and then she raises her hands to her head as if she were 
placing a crown and combs back her hair with the last two 
fingers. The green water foams at her knees and sucks out 
ankle deep and swirling with sand. Out she goes, thighs 
asuck, turning slowly and sweeping the water before her.
How beautiful she is. She is beautiful and brave and 
chipper as a sparrow. My throat catches with the sadness 
of her beauty. Son of a bitch,32 it is enough to bring tears 
to your eyes. I don’t know what is wrong with me. (Af, 
p. 107)
Here Binx undergoes an epiphany, an insight into his own psyche: for him, sadness is 
associated with women. Their fertility and grandeur threaten to overwhelm him, and 
must be undercut with ironic commentary: after evoking The Birth o f Venus to 
describe Sharon’s swim, Binx ends by comparing her to a sparrow. Their beauty 
itself is a source of sadness— like Aunt Emily’s music, “the sweet sad piping of the 
nineteenth century, good as it can be but not good enough.” Theirs is a beauty against 
which Binx has not “hardened himself," of which he can partake as a connoisseur, but 
which remains alien to him. The “terrible moment of separation" that has lasted most of 
his life— perhaps since that day his aunt commissioned him to act like a soldier— 
drags on and on. Acting according to habit, Binx takes her off to his mother’s fishing 
camp for “the sad little happiness of drinks and kisses, a good little car and a warm 
deep thigh,” for some happy-sad fornication at Bayou des AUemands, an evening visit
32This ironic choice of expletive points towards Binx's profound ambivalence towards 
manifestations of the anima.
to the feminine without luggage or commitment But something intervenes to spoil his 
plans — the presence of his mother.
Immediately, as soon as Binx realizes that Anna is at home, morbid images and 
allusions to death invade his narration. The camp is “ablaze like the Titanic,” ordinary 
crab-shells piled up on the table are “carcasses mounting] toward a naked light bulb,” 
and Binx’s half-brother (significantly named Jean-Paul)33 appears like a monster a 
“big fat yellow baby piled up like a buddha. . .  smeared with crab paste and 
brandishing a scarlet claw.” (M, p. 111) Grotesquely enough, the baby has just eaten 
some lungs. Then we encounter Binx’s crippled brother Lonnie, and leam that the 
summer before another brother, Duval, drowned (probably at this very camp). If we 
had any doubt of Binx’s anxiety about his mother, this catalogue of death which leaps 
into his mind even before he sees her should allay it. With or without (mostly without) 
justice, he associates her with death itself.
Lonnie, the ailing boy of fourteen with whom Binx feels a special bond (“like me, 
he is a moviegoer”), is the only ray of light that penetrates this darkness. As Binx tells 
us, “he has the gift of believing that he can offer his sufferings in reparation for men’s 
indifference to the pierced heart of Jesus Christ.” Binx the nominal Catholic declares, 
“I would not mind so much trading places with him. His life is a serene business.” In 
that offhand comment, Binx points to the central redemptive truth of the novel: by 
identifying his sufferings with those of Christ, Lonnie has given enduring moral 
significance to the realm of the body, has in his own life healed the split between 
materiality and meaning that haunts the heroic cosmos and its heirs. Lonnie’s 
endeavor deserves some analysis.
33Stera connects the loathing of physical existence felt by the dualist with a hostile experience 
of the mother. Recall Karl Stem's analysis of Sartre’s Nausea. (Stem, p. 125 fl). That novel was an 
important influence on Percy, who admired its psychology, while rejecting its Manichaean ontology 
(MB. p. 286).
Lonnie offers his corporal sufferings in reparation for the misdeeds and apathy of 
other men. Such an intention binds him intimately to the whole human community; this 
in contrast to the wintiy, inwardly-directed ethics of Stoicism. The God to Whom he 
offers these sufferings is incarnate, sacramental, and passionately concerned with the 
salvation of each individual soul; the “high gods” to whom Will Percy must answer are 
vague and impersonal, and regard puny humanity with a cool and disinterested gaze, if 
they regard us at alL Crippled, utterly incapable of manly action — deprived even of 
adolescence, much less adulthood— Lonnie does not respond with the melancholy 
resentment of the “latter generation” (e.g, of Bayard Sartoris); rather, he cheerfully 
finds a way to make maximum use of his broken state, scattering spiritual benefits on 
strangers, but most especially on his older brother “I am still offering my communion 
for you,” he tells Binx. Perhaps that is what saves Binx, after all.
Before Binx can find that salvation, he must learn the nature of his despair at the 
source. The extended, interrupted, diffuse confrontation with his mother that takes 
place that night and the next morning tells us much about the complex of emotional 
forces that drove Binx’s father to despair, which condemn Binx to a life of malaise. 
Only by examining his own ambivalent feelings about his mother can he hope to find a 
ground of kinship with the anima, create a loving relationship with a woman, and open 
himself to the Grace that Lonnie incessantly obtains for him— the Grace to eschew the 
deadly hubris of heroic masculinity, and start on the road to Christian faith— a faith 
that culminates in a bridal relationship to Christ.34
^Hauke explicates the development of this idea from its Old Testament roots to the New; 
“Hosea is the first to represent, in an exceedingly bold and previously unheard-of manner, God's 
relation to the people in terms of the image of marriage. According to the biblical text, this 
representation was not invented by the prophet himself but goes back to revelation by God.... 'And I 
will betroth you to me in righteousness and injustice, in steadfast love and in mercy’ [Hos 2:19]." 
This marriage metaphor was personalized— applied to the individual soul — in the Song of Songs, 
whose language flowered in a Christian context into the mystical theological speculations of Sl 
Bernard of Clairvaux.
It becomes clear immediately that Anna can unwittingly deflate Binx’s aspirations 
as swiftly and efficiently as her husband’s. Binx recalls, with resentment, the way she 
reacted to his youthful intellectual interest* “She approved of it as a kind of wondrous 
Rover Boy eccentricity.” This patronizing response recalls Aunt Emily and her 
Wanderjahrs, but it is motivated by the opposite impulse. While Emily in her 
lugubrious way seeks to make every banal little thing tragic and emotionally 
meaningful, Anna “steers clear of all that is exceptional or ’stimulating.’” Even God is 
simply “one of her devices. . .  to be put to work like all the rest” In fact both Emily 
and Anna are up to the same game— using the paraphernalia of culture and faith to 
create purely mundane ways of life. While Emily generates highbrow “merde,” Anna 
produces her own toxic substance, “everydayness,” which for Binx lies at the very 
heart of the malaise.35
Binx traces this habit of Anna’s, her “general belittlement of everything,” to the 
death of Duval, her favorite child. But from what we know of her relationship with 
Binx’s father before that event, we can see that Binx is mistaken. It has been Anna’s 
way all along to deprecate with humor all heroic masculine ambitions, to hobble their 
misguided aspirations towards gnostic transcendence. Perhaps that is why Dr. Bolling 
chose her to marry, as a countervailing force to the grandiosity of his own family. 
Whatever his motives, the maneuver failed, as we learn in greater detail as Binx 
questions Anna to find out more about the syndrome that killed his father.
Binx finally speaks to Anna at length in the early morning, in a “cool milky 
world” reminiscent of infancy, where he is keenly aware of her maternal
35Nixon asserts that this is further evidence that The Moviegoer is a sexist novel — since two 
of the three major women characters serve as barriers to Binx’s thrust for transcendence. I hope that 
this chapter refutes this charge, by demonstrating that it is the very masculine tradition carried on by 
the males of the house of Bolling that poisons their relationship to nature and God, constituting in 
itself a false (gnostic) transcendence that is equally as dangerous as mere immanence. (Lawson, ed., p. 
SS) For comparison, see the analysis of The Last Gentleman in Chapter Three, and compare the 
philosophies of Rita and Sutter.
characteristics, her “large breasts” and “bulky hips.”36 Just as they were in the
nurseiy, they are alone together now in “the great white marsh.” Even as Anna “veers
away from intimacy,” urging Binx to go off with the men to fish, he steers the
conversation back to the subject of their own particular family romance, especially his
father. What begins as a discussion of fishing ends in a story about the failure of
intimacy and communion in Anna’s marriage. We learn of Dr. Bolling's “famous
walk[s]. . .  up the levee. Five miles, ten miles, fifteen miles.” Given the importance
of the Mississippi levee in Lanterns on the Levee as the border line between masculine
and feminine, it is significant that'Dr. Bolling made his walks there— and equally
significant that Anna declined to accompany him:
“I went with him one Christmas morning I remember.
Mile after mile and all of it just the same. Same old brown 
levee in front, brown river on one side, brown fields on 
the other. So when he got about half a mile ahead of me, I 
said, shoot. What am I doing out here humping along for 
all I’m worth when all we going to do is turn around and 
hump on back? I said good-by mister, I’m going home— 
you can walk all the way to Natchez if you want to." (M,
p. 122)
Anna Bolling could not or would not help her husband mediate a healthy relationship 
with the feminine, in either a religious37 or a sexual sense. His depression and 
isolation remained untouched by their marriage, and he set off alone on the long road 
that led at last to a fiery end in the wine dark sea.
Only one moment of intimacy between husband and wife stands out in this story 
— a period of time when Dr. Bolling suffered a severe case of long-term nausea, 
leaving him unable to keep down food. As Anna later diagnoses it, “he thought eating 
was not— important enough.” Provoked to pity, Anna starts reading to him and
36Lawson in Lawson, ed., p. 22.
37As William Rodney Allen points out (p. 34), Dr. Bolling's walks are part of his religious 
quest— hence the Christmas journey. Also note Anna’s word choice; to describe her husband's 
walks, in which she refuses to participate, she uses the word “humping.'' Added to the fact that he 
sleeps apart from her, this perhaps suggests that their sexual relationship is troubled, if not expired.
feeding him. Subject to a particularly deadly form of dualism, which is literally 
starving him to death, Dr. Bolling permits his wife to become his mother.38 Under 
such a regime, he does thrive for a time, like a growing child gaining twenty five 
pounds— as if maternal love were the very thing for which he hungered.
If we follow King's account of the “Southern Family Romance'' that characterized
the heroic ethic, Dr. Bolling's reaction is not so surprising. As King writes:
[a]nother way of understanding the role of the mother in 
the Southern family romance is to observe that sexuality or 
erotic appeal was denied her. In extreme form she was 
stripped of any emotional, nurturing attributes at all.39
But the elder Bolling was unprepared for the psychic cost of re-enacting a lost maternal
relationship with his wife as an adult; trained in a tradition that finally shared the
Manichaean distrust of the anima, he could not for long endure the smothering embrace
of mother or nature. Binx's father retreats to his room again to stare at the ceiling and
starve. Only the beginning of the Second World War wakes him from this spell —
offering as it does the chance for an heroic way out, for an affirmative way to reassert
his masculine identity. Like a pair offemmes fatales, Anna and Emily eagerly send
him off —  his wife impressed with how “cute" he looks in uniform, his aunt “so
proud” that at last he has conformed to the family code. Not long after, he is dead,
having as Binx says “found a w ay. . .  to please them and to please himself. To
leave.” (M, p. 127)
It is unclear from the story whether Anna could have done anything differently, 
anything that would have made their marriage satisfactory to Dr. Bolling, allowed him 
to settle down at peace with Creation (and the feminine), even to forge a relationship to 
its Creator. Perhaps his heroic inheritance was too strong, his curse as a member of
38Signi(icantiy, this took place around the time Dr. Wills, imagining an epidemic of 
endometritis, "took out just about every uterus in Feliciana Parish.” (M, p. 123) Clearly, the 
feminine was in retreat and under attack — all over the parish, at least.
39King, p. 35.
the latter generations forbidding him the love of women, demanding (as it did of 
Bayard Sartoris and Quentin Compson) a young and tragic death. However we 
interpret it, it is clear how Binx understands this event— as a warning. Return to the 
feminine may not mean a literal return to the nursery; he must look elsewhere. Binx 
takes the hint, and ends his visit to the camp with another visit with Lonnie.
As important as the intercessory prayer Lonnie promises is the example he sets. 
He himself is a model of a man who has assimilated the theological truths to be found 
in the anima— in his openness to God’s will, his self-giving, the anguish he endures 
in his body and “offers up’’ so that other men may have life. Deprived of adolescence 
by his illness, never himself to become a physical father, Lonnie becomes a spiritual 
mother to others, especially Binx.40 He gives Binx the critical model he needs — of 
love grounded in the body, moving through self-sacrifice, to work the transcendent 
good of another. By emulating Lonnie, Binx will be able to love Kate as she needs to 
be loved. But first he must die to himself, surrender the barriers to which he has 
clung, dynamite honor’s levee and dive at last into the flux of creation.
This “death” takes place in stages, during his and Kate’s fateful renegade trip to 
Chicago. It is prefigured, ominously enough, as the train pulls out; “Our roomettes
turn out to be little coffins The cemeteries look like cities. . .  [W]e ride at a
witch’s level above the gravelly roofs.” (M, pp. 148— 149) Binx’s “passion” begins 
with a prophetic dream, in that state of “fitful twilight which has come over me of late, 
a twilight where waking dreams are dreamed and sleep never comes.” He undergoes a 
nightmare about Dr. and Mrs. Bob Dean, two aging sex therapists who advocate 
“tender regard” for the partner and gentle manipulation— two skills Binx has 
developed in his years of seduction. After this dream he experiences “a wave of 
prickling. . .  such as I have never experienced before” — a heightened version of the
40For theological background, see Henri de Lubac, The Motherhood of the Church (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982), p. 81.
“eschatological prickling” that preceded Binx’s first encounter with Aunt Emily at the 
opening of the novel. Like a trumpet announcing Judgment, this prickling heralds a 
radical change in his life. The visceral disgust that Binx feels at the Deans is also 
directed at himself; perhaps only intuitively at first, he begins to understand how much 
he has cheapened his Lindas and Sharons with their feckless sexual play, reducing 
them to the realm of the Deans, of “sensitive zones, pigmented aureoles, out-of-the- 
way mucous glands, [and] dormant vascular nexuses.” (M, p. 152) Having long 
envisioned sexual love from a godlike perspective, as a transaction in which he (purely 
masculine, pure spirit) inhabited for a while a being who was pure flesh, Binx is now 
ready to surrender this safely unsatisfying role. He must move towards a relation with 
a moral equal, a fellow searcher, whom he cannot evacuate of spirit; further, he must 
learn to identify with his own body, to see himself, too, as a union of spirit and flesh. 
As we will see, he begins to make this identification after his fitful attempt at making 
love to Kate.
The next thing to go— the next limb of the old man that has to die— is Binx’s
lingering faith in science and secular progress, in the power of abstraction to free men
from their entailment in Creation. Watching a man from St. Louis clip out a story,
Binx confesses:
The search has spoiled the pleasure of my tidy and 
ingenious life in Gentilly. As late as a week ago, such a 
phrase as “hopefully awaiting the gradual convergence of 
the physical sciences and the social sciences” would have 
provoked no more than an ironic tingle or two at the back 
of my neck. Now it howls through Ponchatoula Swamp, 
the very sound and soul of despair. (M, pp. 152—153.)
This realization Binx makes is important; he has surrendered the defense of irony,
which has long masked from him the truth about “scientific humanism” and similar
attempts to engineer a perfect (uncreated) existence on earth. Instead of just smirking
over the rhetoric or hubris of such gnostic endeavors, Binx at last sees them as they
are, “the very sound and soul of despair."
Almost in desperation, Binx reaches out to Kate, and makes an unexpected 
marriage proposal. In response, Kate points to another aspect of himself we will have 
to shed, if he wants to share her life— his “ingenious little researches," his “death- 
house pranks." For the first time, and from now on, Binx must take Kate seriously: 
instead of analyzing her suffering from an abstracted distance, he must empathize with 
it and take responsibility for her. He must honor her strivings for moral seriousness 
and metaphysical truth as Emily never has — and never dismiss them as the symptoms 
of her illness, or “schoolgirl socialism," or the light-hearted quesdngs of her 
“Studentage." He will begin to accept Kate as a fellow searcher, a moral equal whose 
own experience of “the malaise" is as real and significant as his own. (This is what 
Binx should have been doing all along, of course, even as her friend. Note that except 
for Lonnie, Binx has no real friends throughout the novel— only business contacts, 
family connections, and dates. His dismissive attitude towards other people and their 
aspirations makes empathy and intimacy virtually impossible.)
Kate asks for more than this— which is only fair, since Binx has not asked
merely to become her friend, or advisor, or fellow-pilgrim on the road, but her
husband— a role that includes all these duties and more. The “more" that is entailed is
theological in substance, as Kate makes clear when she asks for it:
“What I want is to believe in someone completely and then 
do what he wants me to d o . . .  Will you tell me what to 
do?. . .  You can do it because you are not religious. God 
is not religious. You are the unmoved mover. You don't 
need God or anyone else— no credit to you, unless it is a 
credit to be the most self-centered person alive. I don't 
know whether I love you, but I believe in you and I will 
do what you tell me.” (M, p. 157.)
Whether or not Kate realizes it, what she demands of Binx is the very service 
prescribed by St. Paul in Ephesians 5 as the duty of a Christian husband — that he 
represent God to his wife, that he show forth in his charitable exercise of authority
some trace of the divine Masculine.41 All her life, Kate has been thwarted in ho- quest
for Transcendence— by Jules* unseriousness, Emily’s patronizing encouragement,
and Binx’s analytical irony. She cannot pull out of her despair until someone takes it
with requisite seriousness, and sees in it not a psychological symptom but a
metaphysical clue. Kate is looking not merely for someone decisive to guide and
reassure her— although, on a purely emotional level, she certainly needs such a
person for a while— but for an emblem of divine certainty and meaning that can give
form to her life. By agreeing to take on this role, Binx agrees to leave his exile
forever, return to the world of other people, and unite his fate to another’s. Lest it
seem grandiose, just another piece of his egotism, for Binx to agree to “play God” for
Kate, instructing her what to do and where to go, let us recall what else St. Paul
demands of a husband:
Husbands, love your wives, as Christ loved the Church.
He gave Himself up for her to make her holy, purifying 
her in the bath of water by the power of the word, to 
present to Himself a glorious Church, holy and 
immaculate, without stain or wrinkle or anything of that 
sortHusbands should love their wives as they do their 
own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself.
Observe that no one ever hates his own flesh; no, he 
nourishes it and takes care of it as Christ cares for the 
Church— for we are members of His body.” (Ephesians 
5,24-28)
41Louis Bouyer explains this Christian mystery as follows: “the male, insofar as he is such, is 
defined by the following paradox: he essentially represents that which goes beyond him, which he is 
incapable of being in and of himself, in which he cannot even take part except by his participation 
through grace in the sonship of the eternal Son, who himself represents the Father from whom he 
proceeds and from whom all things proceed: God in the inexhaustible vitality of his absolute 
transcendence.. . .  Woman, on the contrary, simply represents the creature in its highest vocation, by 
which it is conjoined with God himself in his creation and even in his fatherhood. She is potentially, 
in her virginity, all that she represents, and she becomes it effectively in her motherhood when she 
gives it reality within herself." (Woman in the Church, pp. 48—49). See also Hans Urs von 
Balthasar “In love, as in fidelity, the woman has an easier time of it. As we have said, she is 
creatureliness itself with regard to God, and with regard to Christ she is the very image of the Church. 
The woman is not called upon to represent anything which she herself is not, while the man has to 
represent the very source of life, which he can never be,” “Meditations on Ephesians 5." Christian 
Married Love. Raymond Dennehy, ed., (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1981), p. 68.
This text suggests that a husband represents God to his wife only as Christ
represents the Father— under the form of a suffering servant He is called to mirror
the profound charity that binds Christ indissolubly to His bride, the Church —  which
is also called His mystical body. As von Balthasar explains, in this way he may
participate in the mysteries of the Trinity itself:
[I]n the sexual act, the man does give from what is his 
and, if he is to stand under the norm of Christ, he ought 
not only to give something of what is his, but must rather 
surrender his very self, just as the eternal Father 
surrenders his very self and everything which he is in 
order to beget the Son. If the husband does this, he will 
come all the closer to Christ, who by his self-surrender 
fashions his Mystical Body for himself.. .  On the Cross 
and in the Eucharist [Christ] gives of his Flesh and his 
Blood so unreservedly that in what results from this self- 
surrender— that is, in the Church as a separate being 
outside himself— Christ finds himself again. This 
rediscovery of himself in the Church would not be 
possible if Christ had only half-given himself and half-kept 
himself back. If we reflect from this perspective on the 
husband’s part in the sexual act, we will see that he can do 
justice to the commandment to love his wife as his own 
body only if he hands himself over to her unconditionally, 
so that from now on he can recognize in her all that he has 
surrendered; that is, his entire self.42
Recognizing that the analogy here is imperfect— that a husband in no way 
creates his wife as Christ did the Church— we still find here a profound solution to 
the dualism that has haunted Binx throughout the novel. On this theological 
interpretation, the marital act overcomes the breach between soul and body, the 
“terrible moment of separation” from the feminine that Binx so dreads, reiterating the 
inextricable union of body to soul, husband to wife, and Church to Christ Marriage is 
offered explicitly as the remedy for dualism; far from being a realm of meaningless 
decay or the destruction of “spiritual” values, the flesh is the theater wherein divine 
realities are represented, and marital love-play is a reflection of the mutual indwelling
42von Balthasar, p. 67.
love of each member of the Trinity. True marital love overcomes the egoism of fallen 
humanity by teaching the married person to identify with his (or her) spouse. It 
counters the Manichaeanism of a masculinized heroic or scientific culture with an 
insistence on the sacramental importance of matter, the centrality of the feminine to the 
mystery of salvation. Certainly the isolate, grandiose pessimism of a William 
Alexander Percy would have little appeal to a man who sees his body as inextricable 
from his soul, his wife as inseparable from his own body, and his body and soul 
together as the ultimate objects of salvation and resurrection. Nevertheless, this role 
does preserve certain essential elements of the heroic masculine tradition— arguably, 
those which that tradition originally borrowed from the figure of Christ .43 Indeed, if 
their relationship promised him no trace of heroic validation, Binx would have to find 
it incomprehensible and unsatisfying. Rather than abolish Binx’s nature— which is 
formed by the heroic tradition— the Grace that touches his life transforms that nature, 
purifying the heroic impulse and restoring it to health.44
If this is indeed the consummation to which Kate calls Binx on that fateful train- 
ride to Chicago, that fact is only implied and then quickly obscured. If he has made 
such a commitment, he has done so casually, even thoughtlessly. In response to 
Kate’s feverish plea that he direct her life, he answers simply, “Sure." As if to cement 
this fragile bond with some action of consequence, perhaps the only one left— Kate 
leads him off to bed. Before they make love, she is careful to delineate exactly what 
they are doing. This is not to be a “mature and tender relation between adults etcetera 
etcetera —” but rather “some plain old monkey business.” To make the point even 
more clearly, she equates what they are undertaking to what she saw in her maid’s 
pornographic comic book. Knowing the nature of his previous relations with women
43Kreyling, p. 4
^Kreyling sums up Percy’s achievement with regard to this aspect of his literary heritage: 
“Walker Percy’s fiction seeks to reimplant the hero at the center of a world order, revoke the feeling of 
being extraneous that has hampered him, and assert his necessity once again” (p. 16S).
— mutual sexual exploitation, covered over by a thin veneer of “mature and tender” 
emotions— Kate insists that it be different this time, that Binx acknowledge in 
advance what it is they are about to commit— a sin. Partly because it gives her 
courage, partly to distinguish herself from all Binx’s other women, Kate wants clarity 
right up front In the event this bracing honesty renders Binx almost impotent, as he 
admits:
We did very badly and almost did not do at all. Flesh poor 
flesh failed us. The burden was too great and flesh poor 
flesh, neither hallowed by sacrament nor despised by spirit 
(for despising is not the worst fate to overtake the flesh), 
but until this moment seen through and canceled, rendered 
null by the cold and fishy eye of the malaise — flesh poor 
flesh at this moment summoned to be all and everything, 
end all and be all, the last and only hope— quails and fails 
. . .  Christians talk about the horror of sin, but they have 
overlooked something. They keep talking as if everyone 
were a great sinner, when the truth is that nowadays one is 
hardly up to i t  There is very little sin in the depths of the 
malaise. The highest moment of a malaisian’s life can be 
that moment when he manages to sin like a proper human.
(Af, pp. 159-160)
We see from Binx’s tortured reflections on the event that Kate’s insistence on 
honesty has borne fruit; at last Binx has realized why his encounters with Sharon and 
Linda and the like were always framed by despair, long silences, and loneliness. His 
previous attitude towards the “flesh” has been neither pagan nor Christian but post- 
Christian — deprived by science and rationalism of the sacramental sense, yet still 
haunted by the ghost of Christ that invites the soul to look for meaning in the flesh, in 
the act of love at least45 The body has been banished from the realm of moral
45As Percy points out elsewhere, this is merely a reflection of the broader confusion caused by 
the slow, uneven displacement of Christian values by post-Christian ones: “One might even speak of 
a consensus anthropology which is implicit in the culture itself, part of the air we breathe. There is 
such a thing and it is something of a mishmash and does not necessarily make sense. It might be 
called the Western democratic technological humanist view of man as higher organism invested in 
certain traditional trappings of a more or less nominal Judaeo-Christianity. One still hears, and no one 
makes much objection to it, that 'man is made in the image of God.’ Even more often, one hears 
such expressions as 'the freedom and sacredness of the individual.' This anthropology is familiar 
enough. It is in fact the standard intellectual baggage of most of us. Most of the time, it doesn't 
matter that this anthropology is a mishmash, disjecta membra. Do you really believe God made man
significance, that its desires may be satisfied all the better, this could only be 
accomplished by dividing it permanently from the soul, declaring that “inward’' 
dispositions alone (such as sincerity and tenderness) are of moral import46 But cut 
adrift from their anchor in the body, such dispositions are nothing more than emotions, 
passing moods incapable of ultimate meaning and impermeable to criticism.
For instance, while riding in his Dodge on one of his innumerable daytime 
outings with Marcia, Binx reports that at the time he felt that either of them “would 
have died for the other.” (M, p. 100) This suggests that they partook of Christian 
agape, the highest form of charity — when, in fact, neither of them gave the other 
very much of himself at all. When they rode together it was into the very depths of the 
“malaise,” and their relationship went nowhere; the malaise divided them, making even 
slight gestures of intimacy the occasion for “fearful politeness.” Rather than 
investigate the moral nature of his bond with Marcia, Binx (perhaps flippantly) put the 
blame on his Dodge, and replaced it with his current MG; up to his encounter on the
in His image? Well, hm, it is a manner of speaking. If He didn’t and man is in fact an organism in 
an environment with certain needs and drives which he satisfies from the environment, then what do 
you mean by talking about 'the freedom and sacredness of the individual’? What is so sacred about the 
life of one individual, especially if he is hungry, sick, suffering, and useless? Well, hm, we are 
speaking of 'values’; we mean that man has a sacred right and is free to choose his own life or, failing 
that, a creative death. And suppose he is incompetent to do so, may we choose it for him? Well—" 
SSL, pp. 228-229.
46We find this gnostic disdain for the flesh depicted poetically by W A  Percy. Cf. Enzio's 
Kingdom and Other Poems (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1924), where the philosophy 
underpinning the character of Aunt Emily found its noblest expression. See this passage:
J  am damned as heretic,
And worse— and irony for Kamel— lecher!
I am not chaste, and so I spoil for hell!
These priests that never do the deed, but dream of it 
Till their minds are porous — foetid— maggot’s meat—
They grieve for me, who feed the monster I 
Am caged in decently, I hope, and keep 
My mind robust and cold as mountain wind.. . .
They do not even see the pity of it.. . .
How mockingly are our sweet bodies made 
In that the very pang and leap of love 
Is circumstanced in filth and sorry loathing!
And how wit-cursed the incarnating force..." (p. 113).
train with Kate, he has treated each encounter with “the malaise" as a situation to be 
engineered, rather than a clue to be followed. Indeed, until this moment he has in fact 
been “missing it” completely — just as Kate suggested days before: “It is possible, 
you know, that you are overlooking something, the most obvious thing of all. And 
you would not know it if you fell over i t ” (M, p. 70) Here in the roomette, the scene 
of his masculine failure, Binx does indeed fall over it; he meets the wounded feminine 
in the person of a fellow pilgrim, his intellectual and moral equal.47 He does give of 
himself, imperfectly to be sure— as symbolized by the shaky consummation of the act 
— but to a greater degree than he ever had before. As he admits later, “I never worked 
so hard in my life." For a man who up to now has treated sexuality as a realm of 
amusement and emotional distraction, this admission constitutes progress. For once 
he does not watch Kate’s suffering from an analytical distance— but shares i t  Apart 
from the time he spends with Lonnie, this is the first occasion in the story when Binx 
experiences empathy.
A little later on, Binx pronounces a post-mortem on his previous sexual habits 
and the ideology that underlay them. “Wrassled out” sated by his experience of the 
night before, he admits, “What a sickness it i s . . .  this latter-day post-Christian sex.” 
An unhappy compromise between a pagan “easement” and Christian fornication, the 
new model of sex is a kind of religion, “the cult of the naughty nice.” In that sect 
sentimentality replaces morality, tenderness dislodges charity, and sex is neither sacred 
nor profane, but simply obscene; acts that somehow still feel sacred are treated as 
profane, while profane acts are approached with sublime expectations or decorated 
with the trappings of a sacrament (Percy concludes elsewhere, citing Kierkegaard, 
that post-Christian man is a natural pomographer.)48 Binx knows he cannot go on
47Even her sexual behavior is "bolder” than he is used to, with his "blushing little Lindas from 
Gentilly.” Though he dismisses her assertiveness as “theorish,” something Kate has picked up from 
Sex and the Single Girl or some such book, at the time it “frightened [him] half to death.”
48See LC, pp. 175-191.
living in this way- station between Christianity and paganism; he must choose one or 
the other. With this realization, Binx admits that “post-Christian sex’* has been at the 
heart of his own despair— and yet another part of the “old man" lies mortally 
wounded, languishing in the tangled sheets of failed passion: Here lies Binx the 
sentimental seducer.
The morning after their night together, Kate and Binx plunge into the “wrenching
rinsing sadness" of Chicago, where Binx is overwhelmed by feelings of alienation and
anonymity that he (characteristically) blames on the geography: “The Lake is the North
itself, a perilous place from which the spirit winds come pouring forth all roused up
and crying out alarm." (M. p. 161) Soon enough, however, Binx admits that there is
more at work here than the abstraction of the “cities of the North"; in fact, it was on a
trip to Chicago that his death-haunted father turned to Binx for solace:
[W]e came my father and I to the Held Museum, a long 
dismal peristyle dwindling away into the howling distance, 
and inside stood before a tableau of Stone Age Man, father 
mother and child crouched around an artificial ember in 
postures of minatory quiet— until, feeling my father’s eye 
on me, I turned and saw what he required of me— very 
special father and son we were that summer, he staking his 
everything this time on a perfect comradeship— and I, 
seeing in his eyes the terrible request, requiring from me 
his very life (M, p. 162)
Significantly, the elder Bolling makes this silent appeal to his son before an icon
of the distant past, an ancient family gathered at its hearth; trapped as he is by family
and tradition, Binx’s father knows no other way to cement a bond with his son, save
through a shared contemplation of the mythic past His attempt fails, as perhaps he
knew it must Binx confesses:
I, through a child’s cool perversity or some atavistic recoil 
from an intimacy too intimate, turned him down, turned 
away, refused him what I knew I could not give. (M, p.
162)
The terrible coldness and isolation that Binx associates with Chicago were Dr. 
Bolling’s curse, which young Binx had been able to sense, but first understands
completely during this terrible epiphany. This time, the sadness bears no relation to 
his mother, in the Field Museum it is Binx who rejects this lonely man’s hesitant 
attempts to find a kind of love. This guilt is Binx’s: he, too, has played a part in 
driving his father off to die. That he could not do otherwise does not entirely mitigate 
the feeling; the setting here is mythic and so are the morals. Like Oedipus, Binx has 
sinned against his father without meaning to, and stands self-condemned. But the 
sentence is neither final nor fatal; by the veiy act of remembering his guilt, Binx begins 
to be liberated from i t  (We see here a trace of Percy’s experience with Freudian 
analysis.) Having recollected and interpreted this scene, Binx feels better “[pjrepared 
. . .  for the genie-soul of Chicago.”
Binx does not remain in the world of myth and hazy memory, nebulous guilt-
clouds and free-floating angst; he quickly plunges back into history and human
interaction, led half against his will by Sidney Gross, the Jewish businessman he met
on the train.49 Binx has already told us of his “Jewish vibrations,” declaring:
[W]hen a man awakes to the possibility of a search and 
when such a man passes a Jew in the street for first time, 
he is like Robinson Crusoe seeing the footprint on the 
beach. (M, p. 75)
According to Catholic theology, Jews are a footprint of the Divine Masculine— a 
trace He has left in history, a standing lesson, challenge, and rebuke to the Church that 
took up their role, taking as a title (among others) the New Israel. It is especially 
appropriate that a Jew leads him back from myth into history— just as Jewish 
messianism conquered the cyclical Hellenism of the Roman Imperium. The “vertical 
meaning” of Sidney’s Jewishness shines forth even in the utterly mundane atmosphere 
of the Hot Stove League, where he appears "princely-looking. . .  not like the others,”
49References to Jews as proof of Divine intervention in history recur throughout Percy’s novels 
and non-fiction— particularly The Thanatos Syndrome and Lost in the Cosmos (where he asks the 
pertinent question, “Where are the Hittites?”). He also views the Jewish experience of exile as a better 
paradigm of the human condition than the apparent comfort of old Christendom. See Chapter Five for 
a fuller exploration of this question.
with his wife, “ a fine-looking woman, yellow-haired and bigger than Sharon, lips
curling like a rose petal, head thrown back like a queen." (Af, pp. 162— 163) On the
next leg of their trip, Binx looks at Kate anew, and again there is a Jewish connection:
I see her plain, see plain for the first time since I lay 
wounded in a ditch. . .  a quiet little body she is, a tough 
little city Celt; no, more of a Rachel, really, a dark little 
Rachel. (M, p. 164)
If Binx means this, and equally meant it when he said that he was spiritually a Jew, an 
exile, (A/, p. 75) then this declaration about Kate can mean only one thing: that he has 
at last accepted her as a fellow pilgrim, a wayfarer whose search is the moral equal of 
his own.
Although he has ostensibly spent his life denying the heroic expectations imposed 
by Aunt Emily and the tradition of his fathers, Binx has in fact never fought free of 
them. Displacing them instead onto the heroes of films, Binx has found his “arch- 
reality” in movie theaters and on romantic excursions that recapitulate the romantic 
exploits of screen Casanovas; nevertheless, his very quest for moments of arch-reality, 
his felt need for icons of masculine excellence and constant reference to them, are 
symptomatic of his ongoing preoccupation with heroic expectations. Why else would 
he approach Harold with such heavy baggage, and decide that this happily married 
successful man somehow “squanders his heroism," making “his own experiences 
sound disappointing"?
Binx makes two more stops in Chicago. Both seem perfunctory at first, but in 
fact, each visit becomes the occasion for Binx to confront and put to rest one of the 
major self-contradictions in his character that underlie his malaise. First he visits 
Harold Graebner, the war hero who saved his life back in Korea. Unlike Binx’s dead 
father, or the faded memory of his imperious ancestors, here stands a living hero in the 
flesh — a success in war and peace, who came home triumphant to a grateful country 
and manied a “madonna." Binx is profoundly ambivalent about Harold and his
success, as we see from his complex oveneacdon when Harold asks him to stand 
godfather to his newborn — and he refuses, out of a mixed sense of unworthiness and 
quiet envy. (Here after all was a man who had it all, who would have satisfied both 
Aunt Emily and his mother, while Binx has satisfied neither and possesses almost 
nothing.)
But now, when he sees Harold at home with wife and child, Binx is 
overwhelmed by the ordinariness of the family; this new life, he realizes, must appear 
a pale shadow beside the “arch-reality” of combat By bringing back the memoiy of 
that “terrible and splendid” time, Binx has in fact impoverished Harold’s present life 
—  filled him with the same uneasiness that troubled Bolling heroes in peacetime. 
Harold dimly realizes this, and turns hostile, getting rid of Binx and Kate as quickly as 
possible. This whole experience lays to rest Binx’s final remaining respect for the 
fetishes of the Stoic code— his old reverence for moments of heroic “arch-reality.” 
While visiting Harold, he sees clearly that such moments are not the purpose of 
everyday life— in fact, they bear no relation to it at all. Warlike, heroic deeds are 
sometimes necessary, and always admirable, but they are not the focus of life; they are 
subordinate to it. Venerating them, rather than the simple decencies of work, love and 
prayer, is simply a form of self-dramatization. Binx looks at last on the juggernaut 
fetish that crushed his father, and turns away from it to face a new world of love and 
risk.
On his last stop in Chicago, Binx takes Kate to the movies; since this is the last 
time we read of him indulging his old love for cinema, the imagery he uses to describe 
the theater comes down like a definitive judgment on movie-going as he has practiced it 
up to now:
the mother and Urwomb of all moviehouses— an Aztec 
mortuary of funeral urns and glyphs, thronged with the 
spirit-presences of another day, William Powell and 
George Brett and Patsy Kelly and Charley Chase, the best 
friends of my childhood. (M, pp. 166—167)
The artificial womb of the moviehouse— the venue where Binx was able to watch
masculine heroes strut, swagger, and quip their way through life— is at last revealed
as a tomb, a reliquary of old illusions and recycled plot lines, not essentially different
from the endlessly recited tales of ancestral achievement that Aunt Emily so loves.
Binx recites the plot of The Young Philadelphians with none of his usual relish,
leaving it in its bare banality. As Binx and Kate emerge from the movie together, they
sense that “a new note has crept into the wind, a black williwaw sound straight from
the terrible wastes to the north." Their sense of apocalypse is justified; the lives each
of them have been living up to that moment are at last falling into ruin, while the
hoped-for renewal that will follow is anything but certain. The last trumpet blows in
the form of a call from Aunt Emily, now the avenging angel of family honor.
If we return to the metaphor of a passion that Binx must undergo, the action
culminates in his excruciating final interview with Aunt Emily, back in New Orleans.
Here he endures the final death of the old man, his very identity as a male Bolling in
the eyes of the woman who formed him in manhood. Binx listens to her in silence, as
Jesus listened to Pilate, allowing her to slash away at his self-respect:
“I did my best for you, son. I gave you all I had. More 
than anything I wanted to pass on to you the one heritage 
of the men of our family . .  .the only good things the 
South ever had and the only things that really matter in this 
life. Ah well Still you can tell me one thing. I know 
you’re not a bad boy— I wish you were. But how did it 
happen that none of this ever meant anything to you?
Clearly it did not Would you please tell me? Iam 
genuinely curious.” (Af, pp. 177-178)
As she asks this devastating question, Aunt Emily toys with a tiny sword letter opener,
which Binx had damaged some years before opening a drawer, eyeing it suspiciously.
Here we have a clue as to why Binx’s objections to her version of the heroic “cannot
be expressed in the usual way,’’ why in fact he “cannot express them at all.”
There is the obvious phallic reference— to a small, limp, useless thing that Binx
has damaged, and which Emily inspects with disapproval; in the light of Binx’s less
than triumphant performance with Kate on the train, he might be particularly pained by 
this allusion. On a less carnal level, the sword represents the heroic tradition and the 
masculinity of the family— which Binx has rendered null and limp. Half phallic 
mother, half sword madchen, Emily stands before him and accuses him of failing in 
his manhood, of rutting like one of the demos, of the “common” folk who are 
“common as hell.”
Binx could defend himself, could offer that he was in love with Kate, that they 
are getting married, could claim that Kate told him Emily knew about the trip, or any 
number of other rationalizations. He could even admit his wrong and apologize, 
thereby reentering her moral universe. But Binx does none of these things, and 
instead offers up the last of his masculine identity, allowing her to strip him bare and 
shatter his honor— an occurrence that for a man of the old code was equivalent to 
death— then turn him out of the ancestral home. The old man is dead; the question is 
whether anything will be raised.
In the desolation that follows, Binx descends into a kind of hell, wandering the 
city on Ash Wednesday, his perambulations recalling the tortuous internal pilgrimage 
of Eliot’s narrator in the poem of that name. On the verge of despair, searching 
frantically for Sharon or a reasonable Sharon-substitute, Binx approaches the end of 
his strength. For the first time, we see him in the grip of tangible desperation, as he 
clutches at the rags of the old life that is ending. As usual, the natural world seems to 
echo back Binx’s mood:
A watery sunlight breaks through the smoke of the Chef 
and turns the sky yellow. Elysian Fields glistens like a vat 
of sulfur, the playground looks as if it alone had survived 
the end of the world. (Af, pp. 182—3)
Then, like a harbinger of grace, Kate appears just in time. Suddenly the ruins he 
has seen in his imagination become “viny," fertile with possibility. Nature and the 
world are redeemed for him by a woman’s grace. His reconciliation with the feminine
has begun in earnest; the most telling detail that points to this is Binx's description of
Kate and her can
it is easy to believe that the light stiff little car has become 
gradually transformed by its owner until it is hers herself 
in its every nut and bolt When it comes fresh from the 
service station its narrow tires still black and wet, the veiy 
grease itself seems not the usual muck but the thrifty amber 
sap of the slender axle tree. (Af, pp. 183 — 184)
Up to now, Binx has allowed his malaise to masculinize women and turn them into
machines— recall the “splendid Amazon” (M, pp. 17— 19), whom Binx sees as a
complex of cellophane, helmet, and gunmetal. Now, in the presence of Grace, Binx
sees Kate humanizing a machine. Binx has at last come to the point where he can see a
woman whole, neither as a threat to his very life nor a short-term fleshly diversion
from the malaise, but as a living, thinking bridge to the world outside the mind.
In return, Kate expects certain services of Binx. Again she requests what she 
asked of him on the train: Will he tell her “the simplest things” and promise “never, 
never [to] laugh" at her? This time, Binx is ready to say yes and mean it, and they ride 
off together to an Easter that is promised— if not guaranteed— by the image of 
Lonnie, the image of Christ, risen from the dead at the end of time, healed of his 
wounds — and wonder of wonders, on skis.
Chapter Three: The Last Gentleman — And the Flight from Woman 
In Percy’s second novel, The Last Gentleman, we see a continuation of his 
preoccupation with metaphysics, gnosticism, and their connection to sex and 
psychology. His hero, Will Barrett, is a young man subject to mental debilities that 
render him virtually helpless: a persistent sense of dislocation and isolation, an inability 
to relate to others, an alienation from every social group in which he might find a 
place, a recurrence of “fugue states" in which he abandons all social ties to wander the 
earth in an amnesiac fog, and a complex of persistent apocalyptic suspicions about 
“ravening particles" and other malign influences that have drained his world of 
meaning.
The detached, third-person narrator who presents Will Barrett speculates 
repeatedly that Barrett’s condition might be simply the result of psychological factors, 
(and therefore) subject to treatment by the right doctor with the right method; but the 
narrative itself argues against this possibility, presenting as a representative of 
psychology only the ludicrous sophist Dr. Gamow. The one representative of science 
in this novel who carries some credibility, Sutter Vaught, derives his authority from 
his own agonistic experience of despair and his reluctant reflection upon it, not from 
his neglected practice of the scientific method. In many of Percy’s works— from The 
Last Gentleman up through The Second Coming — we encounter subtle digs at 
psychoanalysis, parodic instances of what Percy saw as the arbitrariness and 
reductionism of Freudian theory; nevertheless, Percy makes rich use of certain insights 
of psychoanalysis in his construction of Will Barrett and his presentation of the 
character’s internal plight, as Lewis Lawson argues:
The older Will Barrett who narrates the adventures of 
his younger self is obviously a student of psychoanalysis.
Thus the case history of his younger self that he presents 
contains apparently disparate symptoms that fundamentally 
correlate: Will’s existence has been shattered by the loss
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of his father and mother. The loss of the mother causes 
the worse trauma, so painful that Will cannot even 
personify her, but thinks symbolically of her as Eden, the 
South, a golf course, a park: thus he haunts Central Park.
But his attempt to regain that lost object is impeded by the 
fact that when he is in the paik, he hallucinates the image 
of that other lost object, the faUier, who confuses Will with 
his absolute distinction between ladies and whores.1
Lawson’s rigorously Freudian reading of The Last Gentleman is powerful, tying
together details in the novel that have previously seemed disparate or arbitrary. I will
draw upon and supplement it, with the insights that can be drawn from Karl Stem, the
follower of Freud who employed that skeptic’s methods in the service of the Catholic
faith, rejecting the reductionist motives of Freud’s psychologism, while adapting the
concept of overdetermination to the medieval tradition of analogical reading. Stem
explains his project in the following analysis of Freud’s speculations on the origin of
the idea of God:
Between the ‘‘real” something (father) and the “phantasy”
(God) exists a nexus which one might call the analogical 
link. The entire theory [Freud] outlined is only justified 
because the two images— father and God— have 
common features. lUe entire psychoanalytic method of 
Deutung (interpretation) is based on such kinship.
Moreover, while the genetic part of the argument is shaky 
(even if the psychological observation is true it does not, 
of course, disprove the existence of God) the kinship is an 
unshakeable fact We call God “father,” He has paternal 
qualities.
This particular aspect of the argument— the analogical 
link between things immediate and things transcendental 
— is essential to the Hellenic and the Jewish-Christian 
tradition. We can follow it through centuries. Saint Paul 
claims that all fatherhood on earth is named after God.
Goethe says that “all that is passing is merely a parable”
(of the eternal).
For Deutung, exegesis as a method by which we point 
out links between different levels of occurrences, is 
nothing new. The fact that a stoiy is relevant on different 
planes is the basis of all inteipretation. All Scriptural 
exegesis is based on this method.
This kinship by analogy, this parallel of significances 
has been re-introduced into the method of Deutung by
1 Lewis Lawson, “Will Barrett and the Rosy Temple of Juno," The Southern Literary Journal, 
26: 2 (Spring 1994), p. 60.
Freud, in his concept of overdetennination. A dream can 
be interpreted not only in one way but in a number of 
ways, all of them being perfectly valid, the various 
interpretations refer to various layers of personal 
evolution.2
The contribution I hope to make here is to peel away the various layers of Will 
Barrett’s psyche, exploring the levels of motivation that Percy has created for the 
character, and how they work together in a synergy— linking the (seemingly) abstract 
questions of metaphysics inextricably with the most tangible, primal experience of the 
world, that of the infant at the breast. The key to this synergy, the nexus at which they 
meet, is the feminine or anima— as defined in Chapter One.
I hope further to show that Will Barrett’s abortive search for psychological
resolution and a healthy romantic relationship is an allegory of his larger quest for
religious meaning, a fact that will become even more powerfully important in The
Second Coming. Percy has stated that he practices this type of allegory:
I take pleasure in turning Freud upside down. Instead of 
something being a symbol for sex in the Freudian style, I 
use sex as a symbol for something else.3
Of course, no reader of the Song of Songs will find this surprising; from the Jewish
Kabbalists to St. Bernard of Clairvaux and beyond, images of marriage and sexuality
have been employed by writers seeking to express incorporeal, eternal realities.
What is especially intriguing in Percy’s work is his attempt to appropriate and 
make use of the insights of psychoanalysis in the service of Catholic allegory. Herein 
lies Percy’s deep kinship to Karl Stem, who affirms that the traditional hermeneutics 
expounded by Dante and Aquinas contain a deep psychological validity— since, as 
Freud observed, most events do have significance on multiple levels. By rejecting 
Freud’s own unexamined materialism, Stem and Percy opened the interpretative 
process to transcendence, inviting readers to seek within the viper’s tangle of the
“family romance” and the arid expanses of clinical depression for evidence of a 
Providential order. It is important to remember in this connection that Stem's critique 
of modem philosophy never lapses into a counter-reductionism directed at unbelievers; 
nor does Percy's theological motivation evacuate its earthly content, becoming a “pure” 
allegory after the manner of Pilgrim’s Progress or The Romance o f the Rose. Rather, 
he exerts his considerable powers to incarnate the struggle for religious meaning his 
characters undertake, grounding it solidly in the deep roots of primal childhood 
experience.
To accomplish this, Percy employs the Freudian device of overdetermination in 
precisely the sense that Stem understands it, as he tells Will Barrett’s story, 
constructing the picaresque narrative of his life to resemble a deeply significant dream. 
While on the surface the events seem arbitrary, on reflection they are revealed as 
virtually inevitable, the necessary exfoliation and resolution of the multi-layered 
conflicts that formed Will’s psyche. They also serve double duty, as the playing out of 
the various metaphysical positions that interest the mature character (and the author).
To the extent that Percy has succeeded in this effort, his protagonist’s personal 
development will appear susceptible of a strict Freudian reading such as Lawson’s; 
equally, it will yield to a ‘humanistic’ interpretation such as William Rodney Allen 
offers, exploring Will’s psyche in light of the hereditary depression that afflicted the 
Barretts (and the Pencys); Will’s tale will work nicely on the level of philosophical 
drama, where Martin Luschei places it in The Sovereign Wayfarer; 4 the sociological 
interpretation proposed by Michael Kreyling will find support, as will the anagogical 
reading I propose. Presumably, more layers could be added to this interpretative Troy, 
proportionate to the novel’s inner complexity and aesthetic resonance— the only limits 
being plausibility and continued scholarly interest. (Perhaps one mark of enduringly
4Martin Luschei, Walker Percy: The Sovereign Wayfarer (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1972).
important literature is its density of overdetermination — the vast array of useful and 
enlightening readings which a text will accommodate.)
In accordance with his hybrid (or inverse) Freudianism, Percy does indeed 
investigate Will Barrett’s stunted and thwarted sexual nature to illuminate the 
“something else” that more deeply interests him. And quite a curious cipher that nature 
turns out to be. As Lawson indicates, Will is “confused” by the world of female 
sexuality that his father has sliced neady into “ladies” and “whores,” leaving him 
unable to imagine a wholesome relationship with either type of woman. This dilemma 
is not unique to Will Barrett; as Richard King argues, the “Southern Family Romance” 
pervaded letters and life, perpetrating a psychological Manichaeanism.5 This rigid split 
between the life of the body and that of the spirit appears not only in the deep 
psychology that motivates Will Barrett, but in the icons of Western intellectual history 
to which Barrett cleaves— most obviously, in the figure of Rend Descartes.
Descartes and the philosophical tendency named for him are important for Will
Barrett, as Lawson points out:
Deprived of the psychological objects that he needs — his 
father is dead and his mother is literally unimaginable—
Will has accepted Cartesianism as his savior and embraced 
the material world as his object. He thinks of himself as 
an engineer and has recendy bought an expensive telescope 
as an act of faith that technology will reconcile him to the 
objects that comprise his object6
Because his primal experience of the feminine is “unimaginable,” Will has no 
immediate certainty of the benevolence of the physical world, or of where his place in 
it could be— whether there is indeed any bridge between his mind and the world of 
creatures. This may be why he suffers amnesia; fugue states, and other dissociative 
disorders: his link with concrete reality is so tenuous that it frequendy breaks down
^King, pp. 35-39. Also Allen, p. 59.
6Lawson, “Will Barrett," p. 59.
altogether, and off he flies into an “orbit of transcendence.” Furthermore, the nature of
that reality— of the creaturely world of immediacy, sensory experience, and
particularity — is untrustworthy, full of danger.7 The feminine, far from its natural
role as an assimilated aspect of a fully mature human psyche, is an alien and inchoate
force, prone to abandonment or worse. The following account of the relations
between men and women in the House of Banett suggests the darker possibilities:
[I]n this particular family the men died young, after short 
tense honorable lives, and the women lived another fifty 
years, lived a brand new life complete with a second 
girlhood, outings with other girls, 35,000 hearty meals, 
and a long quarrelsome senescence. (LG, p. 21)
The Barrett women are heartier than the men, it seems— and perhaps poisonous
to them. At one point, after living with his stepmother and elderly female relations for
only few months, events begin to bear this possibility out The old women were
all but one over seventy and each as hale as a Turk. He 
alone ailed, suffering not only from hay fever but having 
fallen also into a long fit of melancholy and vacancy 
amounting almost to amnesia. It was at this time that he 
came near to joining the ranks of the town recluses who sit 
dreaming behind their shutters thirty or forty years while 
the yard goes to jungle and the bugs drone away the long 
summer days. (LG, p. 21)
Surrounded by sterile but powerful women who offer him no nurturance— 
indeed, whom he perceives as a threat— Will comes close to psychological death, to a 
complete self-immurement in childhood, in an environment that is a brutal parody of 
the nursery, surrounded not by a friendly garden but by a “jungle.” Only the military 
draft rescues him from this fate, offering him the same escape it offered William 
Alexander Percy in real life, a ticket to an all-male world where action is “easy” 
because it is thrust upon the actor, relieving him of the burden of decision. Because of 
his amnesia, Will fails at this too, but his escape from the steamy, suffocating
7Tolson (p. 332) suggests the likely autobiographical element in Percy's depiction of Will, 
focusing on the author's troubled feelings towards his mother— who died when he was a boy in what 
was widely suspected a suicide. Walker's younger brother was nearly killed in the incident, as well.
greenhouse of the past is complete: he does not return home, but travels to the relative 
safety of New York. There, he can avoid the past and its inheritance, the forced 
associations and concrete limitations that as a creature he is subject to, and dwell 
instead in pure expectancy, in the illusion that through technique and scientific 
knowledge he can “engineer” his life. He can “embrace the physical world as his 
object,” as Lawson suggests —  but only by deluding himself into a kind of angelism, 
the notion that he is not a part of that world, but stands above it as a purely 
transcendent spirit By partaking of that illusion, we will see, Will renders his own 
alienation complete.
Returning to the figure of Descartes, the philosopher most often accused of
angelism (see Chapter l),8 we find the same curious congruence of psyche and theory
that dominates his pupil, Will Barrett In his chapter analyzing Descartes' personal
history and its relation to his mechanistic, dualist account of the world, Stem suggests
that one likely contributing source of the “prostitute-madonna complex” is “early
maternal deprivation,” which results in “the breaking up of the image of Woman into
two.” 9 He argues that such a factor was decisive in the psychic development of
Descartes— who was only one year old when his mother died in childbirth. The
implications of this loss are important, on Stem’s reading, for Descartes’ philosophical
method. Stem places Descartes’ fundamental principle of methodical doubt firmly in
a world which is all too familiar from clinical experience: 
the world of those to whom the certainty of being has early 
been shattered by maternal bereavement For to all of us, 
the core and meaning of reality was at one time, before all 
cogitation, the certainty of carnal presence. Descartes, the 
adult and philosopher, postulates to “doubt sensible things 
because they have deceived us," and it is in this connection 
noteworthy that in French the word digu has the double 
meaning of “deceived” and “disappointed.” The certainty 
of the flesh which is the foundation of all certainty had to 
be conjured away— because it was here where the terror
8See also Lawson, Following Percy, pp. 154-155, and Maritain, p. 184 ff.
9Stem, p. 96.
and pain of abandonment lurked...Reality, perceived 
primarily through the flesh, meant dread, and therefore 
ratiocination, the pure cogito, became an impenetrable 
armor.
[T]he ideal of the cogito, of the mathesis universalis, 
means denial, a defence against the flesh because the flesh 
is synonymous with anguish; and the clean fissure 
between mind and body is an isolation, a setting-apart and 
rendering innocuous of that which spells dread.10
In light of Stem’s analysis, the neatly surgical division that Descartes undertook 
upon the world— dissecting body from spirit for the sake of advancing knowledge 
and making man the “master and possessor of nature” — appears as another species of 
the gnostic hostility towards the flesh that was identified in Chapter One as a symptom 
of metaphysical ambition. That such ambition might frequently (or of necessity) be 
tied to such psychological symptoms as depression, dissociation, and the inability to 
love another, is hardly a surprising notion. Without suggesting (reductionistically) that 
gnostic world-views are merely side-effects of childhood traumas, we can assert safely 
that in Will’s case the two are intertwined and mutually supporting.
Will Barrett’s loss of his mother at a formative age has gravely affected his ability 
to believe that the material world is a friendly or welcoming place, one in which he can 
take root, as an organically related part of the whole. Instead, the universe appears to 
him as a cold laboratory of experience, where familiarity breeds terror— the fact that 
his forefathers attended Princeton makes it impossible for him to stay there— in which 
he cannot accept his role as a man among men, and a creature among the creaturely. 
Instead, he must “know everything before he can do anything." Taken literally, this 
suggests metaphysical ambition: Will needs omniscience to escape from helplessness. 
The abandoned child looks for safety in the illusion of divine knowledge and control; 
only self-divinization can address the deep-seated suspicion of the material universe he
10Stem, pp. 100-101.
acquired as an infant from bitter disappointment at the breast, the source of biological 
life.11
Union with the feminine seems impossible; Will has no primal memory of it, and 
only abstract, anxious notions about what such a union would entail. At best, he 
imagines that the simple act of intercourse, ratified by the conventions of “romantic 
love,” would do the job. As Sutter Vaught recognizes, this “mode of re-entry” does 
not last very long. Impatient with hypocrisy, Sutter strips away those sentimental 
conventions and reduces the act to simple pornography.
Will’s attempts at knowledge by union (intellects) fail— as dramatized by his 
impotence. Frustrated, he falls back on the abstract mode of knowing (ratio) with 
which he is comfortable. He resorts to different masculine modes of investigation, 
turning variously to technique (psychoanalysis), device (telescope), and shaman 
(Sutter), in search of the information or invocation that will open the world up to him 
again, render it friendly and habitable, a place where he can bear uninterrupted 
consciousness, memory, and even the prospect of action.
Toward the end of the novel, Sutter will intuit the deep connection between Will’s
vagrant, celibate life, and his relentless metaphysical and scientific questions:
You know something, Barrett? There’s one thing I’ve 
never been able to get the straight of, and that is what it is 
you want of me. I suspect it is one of two things. You 
either want me to tell you to fornicate or not fornicate, but 
for the life of me I can’t figure out which it is. (LG, pp.
297-298)
Here Sutter misinterprets Will’s intent Will does look to him for direction on the 
issue of sexuality— but only as a function of a much deeper need, the need to 
establish for himself a vital link to the anima. Will senses that Sutter has— like his
1 lSee LG, p. 136, where the morning after a failed romantic encounter with Kitty, Will 
eavesdrops on her conversation with Rita: “It had come over him again, the old itch for omniscience. 
One day it was longing for carnal knowledge, the next for perfect angelic knowledge. Tonight he was
not American and homy but English and eavesdropper. He had to know without being known." 
Perhaps that last sentence also explains Will's romantic difficulties.
father, Ed Barrett— seen down into the abyss of loneliness and exile. Unlike Ed 
Barrett, Sutter has lived to tell about it, emerging like Lazarus from the land of death. 
What secrets must he hold, Will imagines— perhaps even the counter-spell that will 
release him from his father's curse. Will is looking for more than permission to escape 
from the terrible dilemma in which the “last gentleman*' finds himself in an era when 
women have begun to elude the old categories.12 He wants an account of sexuality 
(and thus, of the physical universe) that is not a function of alienation and gnosticism, 
but a genuine path to permanent “re-entry.”
But Sutter does not have the answer— although he understands the question, as 
the clues Will finds in his notebooks suggest. He sees the connection between 
sexuality, psychic wholeness, alienation, and gnosticism— but he has no more notion 
what to do with this information than Will. Presented abstractly, as a piece of secret 
knowledge, these insights are of no more value than religious slogans or psychological 
jargon. Sutter does not have any such “knowledge carried to the heart” (to quote Allen 
Tate), as is evident by his stark conception of the sexual alternatives: blatant, 
unapologetic fornication, and a purely negative celibacy. Note that marriage and love 
are not an option for Sutter— as they were not options for Ed Barrett, who reduced 
women to ladies and whores.
It is possible to “fornicate,” to sully oneself through trafficking in the soiled flesh 
of unworthy women, cushioned from involvement by a categorical control over them. 
They are only whores, and so lack the social and metaphysical importance to weigh 
down the spirit of an incipient gnostic. Since their disappearance is not to be feared, 
but desired, a child of trauma may consort with them safely, without fear that they 
might reenact the primal trauma that the mother inflicted with her abandonment They 
offer a few of the comforts of “home,” with none of the dangers.
12Panthea Reid Broughton, "Gentlemen and Fornicators,” in Broughton, ed„ p. 100.
It is also possible to deny the flesh, holding oneself aloof from sources of 
temptation, refusing the possibility of love in order to avoid the danger of 
contamination.13 Like the Manichaeans before them, gnostic modems such as Sutter 
discover that a purely negative celibacy is the flip-side of pornography— and the 
logical resting place of a discouraged pomographer. This course is the one Sutter has 
chosen by the end of the novel, as a prelude to the suicide he contemplates.
Will's own attitude toward sexuality at the novel's beginning, and its implications
for his metaphysical quest, are illuminated by his encounter with “Kerrell,” the
“attractive and healthy brunette" from Ohio with whom he spends a weekend at a ski
lodge, along with a cadre of other well-adjusted Ohioans:
[A]nd though he had reason to believe she liked him and 
would not repel his advances, the fact was that he could 
think of nothing to say to her. She was long of leg and 
deep of thigh and he liked having his head in her lap, but 
he experienced a sense of giddiness when she spoke to 
him. Once he took her for a long walk in the park. She 
picked up a cat “Hello, cat," she said, looking into the 
cat’s eyes. “I can see your name is Mehitabel. I’m Kerrell 
and this is Billy. Billy, say hello to MehitabeL" Try as he 
might, he could not bring himself to speak to the cat 
Now at Bear Mountain he lay with his head on her thigh 
and she leaned over him and said: “I’m a peqple-liker and I 
think you’re my kind of people. Are you a people-liker?”
“Yes," he said, his cheek going stiff, and thought what 
a pity it was he might not have sport with her without 
talking to her. (LG, p. 25)
There is more to this incident than meets the eye. While at first we notice, and 
chuckle at, “KeircU’s" ludicrous behavior—  her willful confusion of animal with 
human, and her baby-talk manifesto of humanitarianism— we ought not to miss 
Will’s reaction. Although he refuses to conflate human and animal life, or to treat 
Kenell as a pure sexual cipher, he wishes he could. Unable to make a real connection 
with a woman (or the feminine), he wistfully considers the Cartesian option, which
13This course of action is the one pursued, for many years, by Lance Lamar in Lancelot. It is 
the defining characteristic of such Faulkner characters as Bayard Sartoris, Quentin Compson, and Gail 
Hightower, as Kreyling argues (p. 142).
would entail reducing Kerrell to the condition of nature— silent, wordless14 — and
then becoming her “master and possessor.*'
Should he take that option, Will realizes, he would be acting in the American
spirit, partaking in the gnostic project of creating a utopian realm without natural limits,
which had partly motivated the conquest and exploitation of the American continent:
He muttered to himself: “Barrett, you poor fellow, you 
must be very bad off, worse than you imagined, to have 
gotten things so mixed up. Here you are lying in a 
brierpatch when you could be lounging with young people 
like yourself, people against whom no objection could be 
raised, your head pillowed in the lap of a handsome girl 
Is it not true that the American Revolution has succeeded 
beyond the wildest dreams of [Mad Anthony] Wayne and 
all his friends, so that practically everyone in the United 
States is free to sit around a cozy fire in ski pants? (LG, p.
25)15
This humorous reduction of the American project to its most banal, hedonistic level 
takes on a deeper meaning if we rigorously apply the sexual metaphor. Thus, the 
mastery and possession of nature (in the form of Kerrell) is equated with the conquest 
of a continent of virgin land— all of which Will can claim as his rightful heritage, 
insofar as he partakes in the gnostic, American revolutionary spirit
As we discover later in the novel, another masculinizing posture is possible, one 
with the higher moral sanction of Stoicism and the heroic tradition— the role of master 
and protector. Throughout the narrative, Will’s father, Ed Barren, is repeatedly 
characterized as a “protector of the Negroes"— a title he earns in much the same way 
the Percys earned it (as recounted in Lanterns on the Levee), by vigorous action taken 
to defend his racial “inferiors" (blacks) from his social “inferiors” (the poor white 
racists).
14Given Percy’s preoccupation, in Lost in the Cosmos and throughout his work, with the 
importance of language as a mark of man’s uniqueness and his transcendent vocation, Will's wish to 
“have sport with her without talking to her” takes on a very specific meaning. See also, of course, 
Allie in The Second Coming.
^See again Lewis Simpson’s remarks in The Dispossessed Garden on the gnostic nature of the 
American project, cited on pp. 7-8 above.
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Will's attitude towards blacks is formed by this pattern. Recalling Richard 
King's thesis, that the Southern Family Romance created a perception of blacks among 
whites that alternated between the bestial and the passively maternal,16 we can draw 
some important connections. Remaining consistent in our application of the sexual 
metaphor, we can say that the Southern heroic code feminized most elements o f society 
and the world, in service of the ravening spirit of “pure" masculine ambition: women, 
along with blacks and helpless whites, were assimilated to a condition of pure nature.
Nature, in the post-Cartesian West, frequently appears as a hostile force that must be 
subdued, reduced to a condition of pure passivity. Only then can it be seen as 
beneficent (This element in the Southern code, whose aggressive nature is only 
implicit in W.A. Percy’s writings and his nephew's early novels, is exposed and 
savagely critiqued in Lancelot.)
If in Will Barrett’s South blacks have been reduced to failed mother figures,
“feminized" by political and cultural poweriessness, then we can also look to his
feelings towards that race for a clue to his relationship towards the feminine:
He knew very little about them, in fact nothing. Ever 
since he was a child and had a nurse, he had been wary of 
them and they of him...No doubt these peculiar attitudes 
were a consequence of his nervous condition. (LG, p.
156)
What quality is it of blacks that makes Will uncomfortable around them? Quoting Val
Vaught Will calls it their
fearful vulnerability to invite violation and to be violated 
twenty times a day, day in and day out our lives long, like 
a young girl. Who would not? And so the best of us,
Jamie said she said, is only good the way a rapist is good 
later, for a rapist can be good later and even especially 
good and especially happy. (LG, p.158)
The resentment that underlies these observations is obvious; the sheer burden of 
striving for the superhuman stature of the Southern hero weighs Will down, makes
16King, p. 33.
him impatient with those who would cooperate in making that stature accessible. 
Knowing at some level how unsatisfactory was the relationship his father developed 
toward the world of the flesh and of other people, Will resists the temptation to 
cultivate it —  refusing the opportunity to become a patronizing white liberal, a 
paternalist white aristocrat, or even a fornicating Ohioan.17
Will turns away from the Southern/Cartesian tradition to an older Western 
heritage— that of the medieval Church, whose attitude towards the flesh was so 
respectful as to entail its occasional mortification. That Will chooses this option, 
throwing himself “into a brierpatch like a saint of old,” speaks of his fundamental 
decency, and of his own awareness that his need for union with the feminine runs 
much deeper even than KerrelTs thigh.
Recall, too, the position in which Will finds himself during the key exchanges: 
with his head in KerrcU's lap, like a child newly escaped from the womb. The 
proximate opportunity for intimacy here may be less powerful for Will than the 
proximity of maternal images. In the psyche of a man who experienced the tenor of 
abandonment at the hands of his mother, the chance to reenter the womb may be more 
of a threat than a lure— especially when the woman making the offer also displays 
reductionist metaphysical tendencies (such as humanism and naturalism) that cut off 
the transcendent (or masculine) dimension of life. As we saw in our analysis of Aunt 
Emily in Chapter 2, Percy's male characters consider such attitudes psychologically 
castrating; not surprisingly, they consequently experience real and figurative impotence 
in the presence of women who promote these positions. Until the hero has resolved 
his metaphysical questions— by coming to accept the true model of his masculinity as
17Later on in the novel, aroused by the flirtations of Muzh, the loose and easy daughter of 
sexual liberal Fomey Aiken, Will only finds release from desire when he re-fraracs her as “a horsy, 
good-natured, sisterly sort And so it was permitted to leave her alone and to excuse himself. Wlutt a 
relief.” (LG, p. 117) Her “sisterly” quality is her share in their common humanity, something which 
Will lost sight of in his close attention to the sexual main chance. This realization pulls him down 
from his transcendent perch and removes his strange obligation to master and possess her.
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God the Father, and the real nature of his masculine vocation as a man with an 
immortal soul — he cannot relate to the feminine without a sense of terror or a desire 
for domination. By attaining such a resolution, when it occurs, a Percy hero finds that 
union with the anima is returned to him like a gift— as Kierkegaard writes of the 
“aesthetic” realm falling into the Knight of Faith’s lap.
Beyond these philosophical considerations, the figure of Ed Barrett, Will’s father, 
recurs throughout the novel whenever Will comes close to a healthy contact with the 
feminine, warding him off and menacing him. The sexual taboos Ed transmits to his 
son— rendered untenable by social change— are an emblem of his rejection of life.
Ed partakes of the Southern hero's gnostic desire to shed the limitations of the flesh, to 
freeze the flux of history, and become god-like in his ability to manipulate nature 
without being entailed in or weighed down by i t 18 Ed wishes to exert control over his 
home town; he yearns for the heroic power of his grandfather, who restored order to 
the post-bellum chaos that engulfed his community. But his ambition goes further: he 
feels the need to impose his version of chastity on the individuals in that community, to 
force them to respect the old “decent" distinctions without which orderly society— 
and white supremacy— cannot be maintained. Since real historical existence resists 
his utopian ambitions, Ed prefers death to a life of impotence. Just before he goes off 
to commit suicide and shatter his son’s life, Ed reflects on the failure of the old mores, 
suggesting that between the races, a blend will come of the worst possible qualities 
drawn from each: “One will learn to fornicate in public, and the other will end by 
pissing in the street” (LG, p. 85).
The memoty of his father's suicide and the events that surrounded it haunts Will 
throughout The Last Gentleman and The Second Coming. Central to both novels is 
the function of Ed Barrett as an emblem of the gnostic view of life that in practice
18Kreyling, p. 5.
amounts to a love of death, a fact that Will comprehends fully only in the latter novel 
The figure of his suicidal (and potentially murderous) father stands in Will’s mind as a 
fierce guardian outside the garden of life, forbidding him re-entry, emptying the 
physical universe and the flesh of meaning, sentencing him to exile and eventual 
suicide. Only by conquering this figure in his own mind, by wrestling with this dark 
angel in the form of Sutter Vaught and his other avatars internal and external, can Will 
Barrett regain psychic wholeness and accept a benign interpretation of carnal existence 
— and therefore of sexuality.
My interpretation complements Lawson’s remarks about The Last Gentleman in
the essay already cited, which strives to interpret the puzzling, ubiquitous references to
Will experiencing dijd vus. Lawson points to a key passage in the novel, where Will
characterizes his “spells’’ of dijd vu as
nameless and not to be thought of, let alone mentioned, 
and which he therefore thought of as lying at the secret and 
somehow shameful heart of childhood itself. (LG, p. 11)
Lawson suggests that we interpret the phenomenon of deja vu as an instance of
maternal awe, a distorted memory of the overwhelming power and immediacy of being
that the infant experiences at the breast Ideally, such associations should be
reassuring, the basis of a healthy sense of the benevolence of the physical world,
which will endure even as the infant discovers his individual existence; however, when
a trauma distorts the maturation process, the infant begins to regard experiences of
plenitude and intimacy with an admixture of fear, a sense of engulfment by a hostile or
blind omnipotence. Will Barrett is a victim of the latter syndrome, which is
compounded and raised to conscious awareness by the second trauma of his father’s
suicide. If his infant yearnings for protection and physical union with the feminine
have been bitterly disappointed, his budding adolescent desires were similarly
poisoned by his father’s renunciation of life, associated as it was with a jeremiad 
against sexuality.19
Lawson argues that Will's directionless journey through life is motivated almost
entirely by such subconscious motivations, as he tries ineffectually to work through
his conflicts with maternal and paternal figures, discover an acceptable code of sexual
conduct, and find his place in the chain of being. This quest for resolution, in
Lawson's reading, will not end until he has plumbed the depths of his traumatized
childhood and its implications for his philosophical beliefs. For the time being
Will will continue to be in awe of golf courses and 
shotguns (and Lugers), until he achieves through 
conversion a restitution of the original unity: then his 
experience of awe will be replaced by a sense of 
blessedness.20
This experience of blessedness, of the self situated within creation looking upward to 
its Creator, is the end result of a successful reconciliation of the animus and anima 
within a single psyche. In Percy's fiction, which always strives to subvert or invert 
reductionism, the primal, infantile experience of negative awe or positive blessedness 
serves as the symbol— and not the deterministic cause— of the corresponding 
philosophical stance struck by a given character. In Will Barrett, as in all of Percy’s 
masculine protagonists, the psychological wholeness that he attains is dependent upon 
the progress he makes away from gnostic metaphysics and towards incamational 
orthodoxy. The battle between these two interpretative systems— and the emotional 
forces that give each of them impetus and resonance— decides Will Barrett's fate.
The nature of this conflict can be seen early on in the novel, at the culmination of 
a series of events that begin to point Will towards making a truce with the anima. Even 
as Will makes the first steps in his amiably daft pursuit of Kitty (resolving, based on
19Lawson, “Will BarreU,” pp. 62-64.
20Lawson, “Will Barrett," p. 75.
the advice he reads in Living, to court her properly and chastely with a view to 
marriage), he is frustrated again and again. The very attempt to establish a relationship 
increases his confusion and disorientation, sending him finally on a long train trip to 
the sea (another traditional maternal image). He emerges from the train, still reeling 
from a nightmare notion that Rita— his rival for Kitty’s affection and a hostile, sterile 
mother-figure— is watching him. When he arrives at last at the seaside station, this is 
how he experiences it:
It was dark. He found himself in a long street which 
was nearly black between the yellow street lights at the 
comers. The sea was somehow close. There was a hint 
of an uproar abroad in the night, a teeming in the air and 
sense of coming closer with each step to a primal 
openness. (LG, 77)
As Will passes down “the long street,”21 he moves closer in his imagination to the
oceanic experience of the feminine. In the event, he is disappointed by what he finds:
(T]here it was. But it was nothing like Wrightsville or 
Myrtle Beach or Nag’s Head, lonesome and wide and 
knelling. It was domesticated (LG, pp. 77-78)
The forces of technology and human cultivation have rendered the awesome merely
picturesque. Will has not yet encountered the experience that will trigger recollection
of the past and the reconciliation he seeks. Exhausted by the experience, he lays down
“in the warm black sand of a vacant lot” and sleeps.
The next day, as Will jogs around the reservoir— a thoroughly domesticated 
body of water—  he meets Rita herself. Instead of confronting Will, Rita attempts to 
coopt him, to enlist him in a technological/mystical scheme to treat Jamie Vaught’s 
terminal disease with an Indian herbal remedy, and deflect his interest in Kitty by 
appealing to his sense of male heroism. (In a maneuver worthy of Aunt Emily Cutrer, 
Rita compares Will to Achilles, and offers him a vehicle called Ulysses.) She pleads
21Donald Davidson’s emblem for the deadened world of modernity, in his long poem of that 
title, which Percy certainly knew.
with Will to back away from Kitty, to let her accompany Rita to Europe on a 
Wanderjahr. As an adherent of secular humanitarianism — and an older, childless 
woman with unspecified designs on the woman Will desires — Rita embodies a self­
reflexive femininity. (In the novel’s broad allegorical scheme, she stands as an 
emblem of pure immanence, closed to transcendence.) She is both unsatisfying as a 
mother-figure and unattractive to him sexually. Her dabbling in pagan religions 
throughout the novel is a reflection of her worldly faith, her possible Lesbianism a 
practical expression of her rejection of men and the transcendent masculine alike. Like 
Kerrell’s blithe materialism, Rita’s earnest humanism strikes Will as a spiritual and 
psychic threat
The field of feminine associations grows denser in the next scene, as Will enters a 
Central Park that “swarmfs] with old deja vus of summertime,” and sensations like a 
“close privy darkness’’ and “the smell of Alabama girls (no Mississippi) who bathe and 
put on cotton dresses and walk uptown on a summer night” (LG, p. 84). After 
encountering a gentleman bearing a homosexual proposition— put, humorously 
enough, in the form of an inquiry about Plato22 —Will walks into the green darkness, 
as if to follow his deja vu to its source. In what becomes a pattern, even as Will enters 
the world of the feminine, a memory of his father intrudes. In this case, Will rinds one 
of Rita’s little notes to Kitty; but its content recalls Ed Barrett to his mind:
Man is certainly stark mad. He can’t make a worm, but he
makes gods by the dozens. (LG, p. 81)
This quote from Montaigne, in Rita’s hand, seems merely pretentious. But put in the 
mouth of Ed Barrett, who “quoted Montaigne on a summer night, but in a greener,
^This allusion may have deeper significance, in connection with the homoerotic images which 
pervaded William Alexander Percy's writing. Remembering that misogyny underlay the theory of 
Greek homosexuality—it was proposed that women were animals, so that heterosexual intercourse 
constituted bestiality—we might interpret the young “Platonist's" intervention as another 
manifestation of gnosticism, blocking the path towards the feminine.
denser, more privy darkness than this," it takes on a deep philosophical significance.
In fact, it asserts the central precept of modem gnostic metaphysics.
Interpreted at face value, Montaigne's aphorism denies the whole supernatural 
order, suggesting that it is an ineffectual human artifact, a mere by-product of hubris or 
fantasy. Here, in ovo, is the atheist reductionism of Feuerbach, Nietzsche, and Marx 
— including the implication that man, as inveterate god-smith, might well succeed at 
deifying himself someday.23 It is no accident that this quotation calls to mind Ed 
Barrett's fierce explication of a life-denying sexual code, pronounced ex cathedra from 
the porch to the pseudo-sacred strains of Brahms, just before Ed walks off and (we 
find out later) murders himself. In this economical scene, Percy suggests powerfully 
the mortal price of denying the rightful claims of either the earthly feminine or the 
transcendent masculine— and also the deep interconnection between unbelief, 
Manichaean attitudes towards the body, and this century’s "love affair with death," of 
which he makes so much in The Thanatos Syndrome.
Will, thoroughly confused by his inconclusive memory— he is not yet prepared 
to face the fact of his father's suicide— flees the park in search of Kitty's company. 
Reflexively, he tries again to make contact with the world of the flesh, this time 
through the flesh of a lover.24 When he finds Kitty at her apartment with Rita,
^See Eric Voegelin’s comments in “Reason: The Classic Experience:” “If man exists in the 
metaxy, in the tension ‘between god and man,’ any construction of man as a world-immanent entity 
will destroy the specific meaning of existence, because it deprives man of his specific humanity.” 
Voegelin makes his warning more specific, pointing out that gnostic interpretations of man “misuse 
man’s bodily existence for the purpose of reducing the metaleptic tension, through causal explanation, 
to the organic and inorganic strata of being in which it is founded. Or, since the discovery of the nous 
and its symbolization of the metaxy are facts in the history of humanity, they can psychologize the 
symbols engendered by the tension into projections of an immanent psyche.” Voegelin characterizes 
such accounts of human nature as “psychopathologicaL" This essay appears in Eric Voegelin, 
Anamnesis, p. 104.
^S ee Broughton, p. 100: “Percy’s other protagonists try out a variety of methods for putting 
themselves back in touch with the physical world. But because he sees the malaise chiefly in terms of 
sexual deprivation, Will imagines that he may regain the world only by losing his virginity.” 
Broughton’s comments here and throughout her essay are useful, as far as they go. They become far 
more intriguing if one applies the sexual allegory I have suggested here throughout, replacing “the 
feminine” for “the world." Then the dualism of which she accuses Percy becomes less of a 
psychological tendency which the author has failed to confront, than an intellectual tendency with
partaking half-seriously in a manufactured religious ritual in which neither of them 
troubles either to believe or disbelieve,25 he draws her away to Central Park for a night 
of presumed passion, defended by Sutter's pistol (with which Kitty has equipped him) 
against the faraway doom that thunders down from Harlem and reddens the sky.
In the course of his indirect and awkward advances to Kitty, Will makes an
important realization, whose implications are hidden from him until later in the novel:
He was thinking about the reciprocal ratio of love: was it 
ever so with the love of women that they held out until the 
defeat of one’s first fine fervor, not merely until one 
feigned defeat, but rather until one was in truth defeated, 
had shrugged and turned away and thought of other 
matters— and now here they came, all melts and sighs, 
breathing like a furnace. (LG, p. 89)
Whether or not this observation is correct concerning the intricacies of the female
sexual response, it is an accurate presentation of the feminine mode of knowledge
(intellectus), of which we spoke in Chapter One, in the course of which one gives up
all attempts to divide and analyze the object of thought— rather surrendering to it,
absorbing it as a whole, seeking to know it by union, empathy, and connaturality.26
Will has made similar observations earlier in the novel, though without the explicit
connection to sexuality: for instance, when he describes (p. 30) how a collapse of a
glass ceiling in an art museum makes it possible for the first time actually to see a
painting —which before had been evacuated of meaning or obscured by '‘ravening
psychological effects, against which he is struggling with relative but imperfect success. If the answer 
to Percy's dualist dilemma is not (as Broughton suggests) a Dionysian mandala, but rather an emblem 
of the Incarnate God, then his difficulties become at once more comprehensible and more interesting. 
He is struggling to articulate a theological mystery that is at bottom impenetrable to reason.
25The way KiUy is talking, from the side-effects of the Huichol tea and ceremony, bodes ill for 
any prospects for reentering the solid, physical world through her mediation: “The Huichol believe that
things change forms, that one thing can become another thing. An hour ago, it sounded like 
nonsense...The hikuli plant is the deer. The deer is the corn." Rita has been introducing Kitty to a 
pantheist, neo-pagan mysticism, in the course of what seems to me like a seduction attempt—aborted 
only by Will’s timely arrival.
particles. In each case, the object of knowledge will not yield to direct, forceful 
approach— such as the scientific method or systematic art appreciation would 
commend— but only becomes attainable once the imperial self has been humbled by 
frustration or near-catastrophe. This device recurs throughout Percy’s fiction—  
finding perhaps its crowning moment in The Second Coming, when Will falls, half­
dead, into Allie’s garden, in the bosom of which he will begin to discover the object of 
Faith.
Returning to the lovers in the park, we find them in a place of ill-omen — a 
womb-like ravine in the woods, which looked by day “very like the sniper’s den on 
Little Round Top that Brady photographed six weeks after the battle: the sniper was 
still there! A skeleton in butternut, his rifle propped peaceably against the rocks.” It is 
significant that as Will approaches the womb (both literally and figuratively), he 
imagines the place to be inhabited by a young southerner with a gun (like him), who 
happens also to be dead. Will lays down his pistol — in more than one sense, as he 
suffers a spell of impotence.
What brings on this impotence? A number of factors, each of them revealing in 
its implications for Will’s personal development On the conscious level, Will is 
confused about the ethics of sexuality. He still feels subject to his father’s prohibitions 
against treating a lady like a whore or vice versa; yet here Kitty is, acting like both at 
once and yet neither, violating the rigid social categories on which Ed Barrett relied. 
While he is not driven to despair by the collapse of these barriers, Will is enough of his 
father’s son to feel anxiety in their absence. With no clear sense of the Christian 
incamational ethic, Will is tom between two competing post-Christian codes of sexual 
conduct— each one a severed piece of the Christian synthesis, surviving unnaturally 
on its own:
1) The mechanistic-reductionist ethic that speaks of “the fine fervor of a summer 
night, in a jolly dark wood, wherein one has a bit o’ fun.” As a lord of creation, a
spirit that transcends the body and its laws, the Self is free to seek out pleasure 
wherever it may be found Lovers are like virgin territories, to be mastered and 
enjoyed without undue guilt This masculinizing heresy is the “angelism” in 
“angelism/bestialism” of which Percy so often speaks, which Will Barrett will see best 
embodied in the lifestyle of Sutter Vaught
2) This “dread tenderness of hers," the pantheistic sexual mysticism that Kitty has 
learned from Rita to dabble in. Symbolized by the odd, pagan religious practices in 
which she took part, this inchoate sexual vitalism27 recurs later in the novel in the 
writings of Mort Prince and his crew of liberal intellectuals and dilettantes. While 
employing the rhetoric of Christianity— Kitty assures him that “Love is everything” 
— this tradition in fact claims intellectual descent from the Troubadour love-poets, and 
their ciypto-Albigensian elevation of passion and desire at the expense of procreation 
and marriage.28 This inchoate, feminine29 mysticism is the bestialism to which 
angelists sometimes revert (as when, in Lost in the Cosmos, an astrophysicist visits 
Taos, New Mexico, chasing the ghost of D.H. Lawrence.) While its followers invest 
sexuality with all the trappings of religious importance, their metaphysics evacuates 
those trappings of meaning —rendering sex every bit as trivial as it appears in the
27The finest elaboration of this concept I have found is that of Fr. Seraphim Rose, who writes 
in Nihilism: “In Vitalism.. & quite understandable lament over the loss of spiritual values becomes 
father, on the one hand to subjective fantasies and (sometimes) to actual Satanism, which the 
undiscriminating take as revelations of the 'spiritual' world, and on the other hand to a rootless 
eclecticism that draws ideas from every civilization and every age and finds a totally arbitrary 
connection between these misunderstood fragments and its own debased conceptions. Pseudo- 
spirituality and pseudo-traditionalism, one or both, are integral elements of many Vitalist systems,” 
(Forestville, CA: The Fr. Seraphim Rose Foundation, 1994), p. 43.
^Denis de Rougemont, Love in the Western World (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1957), pp. 
76-86. Percy makes an unmistakable reference to this book later in the same scene, asking, “Was this 
it at last, the august secret of the Western World?” (p. 93.)
29This is meant in the sense which Bouyer uses in Woman in the Church, where he 
distinguishes the masculine and feminine contributions to orthodox spirituality: “All the false 
mystical experiences, all the doubtful ecstasies which are ultimately only egoistic ecstasies, make 
women their favorite prey and find in them all the fertile soil they need to prosper and proliferate. On 
the other hand, one might ask oneself whether the true mystical experiences which owe to man (recall 
St. John of the Cross) the unbending critical verification of their authenticity, would ever have retained 
his attention, or even have become part of his experience, without the intervention of women.” (p. 66)
angelist code. Hence, these seemingly opposed creeds are merely two faces of the 
same debased, gnostic coin.30
On a less conscious level, at the stratum of poorly-integrated memories and half-
articulated desires, Will is also frightened by the prospect of physical intimacy with a
woman. The suppressed trauma of maternal loss that affected Will in his youth returns
to trouble him when Kitty appears to
envel[op] him in turn by the warm epithelial smell of her 
nakedness. What a treasure, he thought, his heart beating 
as rapidly and shallowly as a child’s. What suppleness.
“Hold me,” whispered Kitty with her dismaying 
tenderness. “My precious.”
“Right" Now holding her charms in his arms at last he 
wondered if he had ever really calculated the teirific 
immediacy of i t  (LG, p. 91)
Regaining at this moment the heart of a child— and a troubled child at that— 
Will experiences “maternal awe” in the sense Lawson uses i t  While intimacy with 
another person is troubling enough for him, it is the immediacy of the anima, of the 
physical world experienced in the most carnal way, which threatens Will’s very 
identity. Although he has inherited Ed Barrett’s gnostic tendency to see the flesh as 
alien and devoid of meaning, he lacks the courage of his father’s convictions— as he 
later admits, “I’ve never really got the straight of this lady and whore business.” (LG, 
p. 144) He cannot accept the pantheist-feminine gospel that Kitty parrots from Rita, 
since he experiences its denial of the masculine as a form of spiritual castration. Nor 
has he yet discovered the orthodox, sacramental doctrine of sexuality,31 which could
30Kilty’s own words confirm this complementary relationship between the sexual codes of 
science and superstition; she follows her mystical musings about “love" with a declaration that this 
sexual encounter is also “a little experiment by Kitty for the benefit of Kitty." (LG, p. 92) She sees 
no contradiction there, and indeed there is none. If American megalopolises of the 21st century ever 
boast sex-cults complete with temple prostitutes, we can rest assured that they will be vaccinated, 
classified as “sex-workers” by the stale, and equipped with the latest FDA-approved contraceptives.
31He has had some exposure to this doctrine, through the unlikely agency of Perlmutter, his 
colleague at Macy’s who uses the theologically apt expression “like being in heaven,” to describe 
making love to his wife. (Aptly Will misinterprets this phrase as a simple euphemism for orgasm, 
and it recurs a little later as Will struggles to “sustain the two of them, her in passing her test, him 
lest he be demoralized by Perlmutter's heaven, too much heaven too soon.") Being a Perlmutter of
explain how he might relate to the physical world without either loathing or 
superstitious awe. He therefore stands defenseless in the presence of the anima, 
unready to make the connection that he has sought, listening to his sinuses swell up 
and close.
That physical affliction is the only thing that saves Will from sexual “failure."
His own biological debilities pull him back down into the human condition, providing 
the same temporary “re-entry” as he experienced earlier when the glass ceiling 
collapsed around him, and when he was trapped in the hurricane with Midge 
Auchincloss. Having been thus restored to earth, he feels “just bad enough...so it [is] 
just possible” for him to make love.
At just this point Kitty’s nausea kicks in, rendering her unable to continue. From 
one point of view, this deus ex machirta that saves the “honor” of hero and heroine fits 
perfectly well into the ironical/Providential pattern of seemingly arbitrary events that 
structures this picaresque novel. When we look again to the philosophical allegory that 
motivates the narrative, we find something else. Kitty’s vomiting is brought on by the 
hikuli tea she drank during Rita’s mildly pagan ritual. Would it be stretching a point to 
suggest that Percy here intends to suggest that pantheist spirituality poisons the very 
fleshly life it purports to consecrate? Or further, to argue that the dualistic “nausea” 
that the likes of Sartre feel for matter is motivated by horror at the sheer power of 
materiality (in the absence of God) to snuff out the spirit— again demonstrating the 
complementary nature of the masculinizing and feminizing heresies? Given the degree
Brooklyn, it seems that this young man is Jewish—which is appropriate, given Percy's ongoing 
preoccupation with the Jewish people as an historical sign of Providence. (This theme arises in The 
Moviegoer with Sidney Gross, and will recur in Love in the Runs, The Second Coming, and most 
powerfully in The Thanatos Syndrome.) See Chapter One, n. 68. Remember also that the Song of 
Songs and the tradition that flows from it— into the Middle Ages and modem Catholic piety— are 
of Jewish provenance.
of overdetermination and implicit philosophical controversy we find in Percy’s work, 
these interpretations seem plausible.
As they recover from this failed encounter, Will and Kitty talk at cioss-puiposes
about the trappings and conventions of sexuality, making explicit the different codes
that motivate their behavior. Will speaks of the siege of Petersburg, and the almost
miraculous chastity of his soldier ancestor, who refrained from violating the sexual
honor code even in the face of death. He is entranced by the consistency that was
possible in those days, when the social mores mirrored and supported those of the
Southern hero. He thinks wistfully of the dispensation those mores provided from the
thorny problems raised by sexual congress with women:
“But what is curious is that..[my ancestor] did not feel 
himself under the necessity, almost moral, of making 
love...in order that later things be easy and justified 
between him and Miss Trumbull that..that even under the 
conditions of siege he did not feel himself under the 
necessity, or was it because it was under the conditions of 
siege.” (LG, p. 94)
In that old dispensation, he imagines, the problem of masculine/feminine relations 
was entirely resolved by a strict social and sexual regime, the Southern heroic code 
elaborated by his father. With the collapse of that regime, the meaning of sexuality 
was radically unhinged and allowed to pose a direct challenge to the integrity of the 
masculine self— undermining the neat dualism on which the Southern hero, as much 
as the Faustian scientist, had come to rely.32
Meanwhile, Kitty becomes interested in the sentimental trappings of the Southern 
past, which colors her own very modem, bourgeois dreams of romance. If Will is still 
trapped in the deadly transcendence of the masculine honor code, Kitty is plunged deep 
within immanence — the vitalist immanence of Rita’s/oux-paganism, and the banal 
immanence of modem consumerism (where her heart and her treasure really dwell).
32Broughton, p. 99.
At the end of their conversation, Will proposes marriage to Kitty, less out of love than 
out of a sense of propriety and noblesse oblige. He determines (thanks to Kitty’s 
sickness) that the violation of the honor code has been his, and he must make good by 
marrying her. While on one level this seems ludicrous in the Central Park of the late 
1960’s, in fact this offer on Will’s part marks the first significant commitment he 
makes in his life to anyone, and the first of his failed attempts to find some mode of 
connection to the anima.
This scene and its sequel together constitute the pivot of the novel, marking the 
beginning of Will’s personal development— which will take place in fits and starts, in 
the course of a dialectical movement that escalates throughout the episodic narrative, 
pitting Will’s deepening involvement with Kitty’s form of immanence against the 
existential and scientific transcendence that he expects to receive from her brother 
Sutter. In fact, one could plot Will’s quest for a “normal life” along two axes— his 
romantic interludes with Kitty, and his conversations with Sutter. Will careens 
between the two, lurching toward carnal knowledge at one moment, toward secret 
knowledge of himself and the world at the next. His quest is inconclusive— within 
the bounds of this novel —because at bottom he cannot see how everyday sexuality 
and ordinary life in a democratic order can be reconciled with the spiritual and martial 
heroism that his father (and in a different way, Sutter) exemplify.
Yet it is this latter urge towards transcendence that fascinates and compels him, 
which provides an alternative to the unreflective despair33 of consumerist immanence
33In “The Man on the Train,” Percy makes remarks which explain the crucial role played in his 
fiction by such articulately Manichaean characters as Sutter Vaught: “There is a great deal of difference 
between an alienated commuter riding a train and this same commuter reading a book about an 
alienated commuter riding a train...The nonreading commuter exists in true alienation, which is 
unspeakable; the reading commuter rejoices in the speakability of his alienation and in the new triple 
alliance of himself, the alienated character, and the author.” (MB, p. 83) Despite his reluctance to 
answer Will’s questions, and his conviction that his insights will do the young man no good, Sutter 
does make it possible for Will to lace the memory of his lather’s suicide and the persistent doubts he 
feels about the immanent life he is contemplating with Kitty.
— of glum car salesmen in Confederate colonel’s hats, and the “horsy conjugal
way[s]” and “sad poilu love" of Kitty as their projected marriage approaches. This
latter phrase is important, as it contains a direct allusion to Lanterns on the Levee,
whose author, William Alexander Percy, was the source of Percy’s own acquaintance
with the heroic code, as we saw in Chapter Two. Note the following passage from the
elder Percy’s work, recalling his experience in France during World War I:
I listened to the ominous dull thunder from the front I 
was tired. Then I heard upstairs above me a couple in bed 
making loud love. It should have seemed ribald and 
amusing; it seemed only obscene and pitiful That poor 
poilu home on two days’ leave and his shapeless, hard­
working wife! This was love, this animal-sounding thing.
I remembered that love had once seemed tender and 
beautiful. It wasn’t anymore. The sounds died down. I 
hoped they had enjoyed themselves and wondered if they 
were crying now, clinging to each other whimpering. I 
closed my eyes and the sleepless hours began. (LoL, pp.
214-215)
At the very least, the lines above display an aversion to marital sexuality— one
that fits in well with a dualist world-view, which regards earthly life as bleak and
degrading, redeemable only through heroism and renunciation. Broughton attributes
this attitude to Walker Percy himself, suggesting that he
assumes that marriage in itself is an accommodation to the 
ways of the world. For Will Barrett marriage offers a sort 
of both/and possibility: an option both to remain a 
gentleman and to satisfy his “coarse" desires. For Percy it 
exemplifies Kierkegaard’s ethical stage as an acceptance of 
responsibility in the human community. And a normal 
married life may also offer the religious man a sort of 
“cover" so that he may pass incognito through the world.
But marriage in itself, to Percy, cannot be transcendent.
And that is why Will Barrett still needs Sutter Vaught..to 
remind him that this world is not sufficient unto itself.34
Broughton’s judgment of Percy is too harsh. I would argue, rather, that Percy 
explicitly rejects the moral dualism of his uncle, but has not yet (as of this novel) found
34Broughton, p. 112.
the proper artistic means of depicting an alternative that takes account of sexuality. 
Indeed, Love in the Ruins and Lancelot are both novels about the vast difficulty of 
imagining and cleaving to the old sacramental, incamadonal vision of man in a post- 
Cartesian world whose scientific dualism is reinforced by an Albigensian ethic of love. 
It is only with The Second Coming— and at the end of a harrowing struggle— that 
Percy achieves his one persuasive emblem of sacramental sexuality as a means of 
grace. But it is an emblem that has been implicit in his work all along, at least in ovo 
— in the form of a male protagonist who manages to break free of his masculinizing 
world-view and make contact with the feminine in his own soul.
However, Broughton's point is well-taken insofar as she demonstrates that, in 
The Last Gentleman at least, marriage is not presented as a means of this reconciliation 
between transcendence and immanence.35 Rather, the aftermath of Will’s 
confrontation with his past, as he stands before his father’s house and recalls at last the 
details of Ed Barrett’s suicide, is a vision of immanence and transcendence reconciled 
— but through the curious symbol of a hitching post that has been enveloped by “an 
elephant lip” of an oak. This image suggests the compatibility of opposites— of 
artifact and environment, organic life with inanimate matter, man’s will with nature’s 
way, the animus with the anima— without their collapse into meaningless conflation. 
Distinctions between the two are not blurred, but the oppositions are overcome — as 
they are in the classic Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, key to which is the 
affirmation that human and divine natures co-exist in Christ without conflict or 
confusion, in what the Church calls a “hypostatic union.”36
The image of oak and hitching post is an advance on that employed at the 
conclusion of The Moviegoer (a car that seems to come alive as an organic creature,
35Broughton, p. 109.
36Archbishop Emile Guerry, In The Whole Christ (London: St. Paul Publications, 1957), pp. 
67-68.
thanks to the presence of Kate Cutrer), because it maintains the polarity of difference
while affirming an essential union between the elements. Broughton reports, based on
a conversation with the author, that “Percy designed the passage as an answer to the
epiphany of matter Sartre presents in La Nausie,”37 If that is true, as it seems likely,
then it is interesting to note that the oak in this scene has an antecedent in the work of
another existentialist philosopher with whom Percy was familiar, Martin Heidegger.
In the short piece entitled The Country Path, Heidegger speaks of a rural lane that leads
past a tall oak, beneath which sits a wooden bench, on which he used to sit while
studying the great masters of philosophy in his youth. He goes into great detail about
the oak and what it signifies:
The hardness and smell of the oakwood began to speak 
clearly of the slow and lasting way in which the tree grew.
The oak itself proclaimed that all that lasts and bears fruit is 
founded on such growth alone; that growth means to lie 
open to the span of the heavens and, at the same time, to 
have roots in the dark earth; that everything real and true 
only prospers if mankind fulfills at the same time the two 
conditions of being ready for the demands of highest 
heaven and of being safe in the shelter of the fruitful earth.
The oak continually repeats this to the country lane, whose 
track runs past it.. The kingdom of all living things which 
grow around the country lane offers a whole world in 
microcosm. The very ineffability of their language 
proclaims, as Meister Eckhart, that old master of life, says,
God, first God.38
If we interpret Percy’s key image with Heidegger’s insight in mind, the image 
suggests a fruitful play between the polarities of feminine and masculine, immanence 
and transcendence, a play which alone can maintain the integrity and relevance of either 
principle.39 Throughout the novel, Will Barrett has scorned the vague sacrality Rita 
treasures. Now he must turn around and critique the dualist insistence that opposites
37Broughton, p. 110.
38Cited in John Macquarrie, Heidegger and Christianity (New York: Continuum, 1994), pp. 13-
14.
39It is hard to know which unbalanced vision of God, is more meaningless to man— the 
inchoate, immanent Ground of Being intuited by the pantheist, or the disincamate, inattentive 
Watchmaker posited by the deist.
are irreconcilable, that the exercise of spiritual freedom is finally impossible to man in 
his embodied state. On this interpretation (to which Ed Barrett cleaved), the only 
choices open are the numbness savored by the anesthetized consumer— in Cap'n 
Andy’s house with Kitty40— or the spiritual desolation savored by purely masculine 
spirits, occasionally salved by forays into the immanent, either through heroic action or 
sexual conquest Will has a glimmering of the desolation wreaked by this dualism 
after reading most of Sutter’s notebooks:
Where he probably goes wrong, mused the engineer 
sleepily, is in the extremity of his alternatives: God and 
not-God, getting under women’s dresses and blowing 
your brains out Whereas, and in fact my problem is how 
to live from one ordinary minute to the next on a 
Wednesday afternoon.
Has not this been the case with all “religious” people?
(LG, p. 277).
Will tries repeatedly to reject Sutter’s critique of ordinary, worldly life, 
throughout his acquaintance with the morbid figure of the self-consuming doctor-cum- 
pathologist41 He senses (correctly) that Sutter’s creed is finally as poisonous as Ed 
Barrett’s, and tries in consequence to resolve his own internal conflicts on the level of 
psychology— as manifestations of sexual frustration, or social isolation, or even the 
trauma he suffered at his father’s suicide. Turning away from his own intuitive desire 
for re-connection with creation,42 or misinterpreting it as sexual desire pure and 
simple, Will manages to miss Sutter’s genuine insights almost entirely, and to seek a 
secular salvation in the profoundly compromised life that a marriage to Kitty promises.
40WiIl can sense the void that lies at the heart of this lifestyle, and seeks to understand its nature 
through repeated demands of Sutter “Why was that man screaming that you told me about? ...What 
was wrong with him?” (LG, p. 214) Sutter cannot answer the question, because he regards the 
ordinary life and spiritual honesty as irreconcilable.
41Percy regularly refers to the function of a novelist as like that of a pathologist (SSL, p.204 
fl) In giving Sutter this profession, he is conferring upon him a certain symbolic authority.
42“Creation" serves better here than “nature," since (as Will recognizes dimly in his first 
conversation with Fbroey Aiken) the opposition of nature to culture implicitly suggests that human 
life is an endeavor to transcend the immanence of nature—when, in fact, man is both a co-creator and a 
creature under God; a partaker in the anima, as much as the master and possessor of nature. (LG, p. 
104)
simple, Will manages to miss Sutter's genuine insights almost entirely, and to seek a 
secular salvation in the profoundly compromised life that a marriage to Kitty promises.
Will seeks to escape firom Sutter's polarities, not by accepting the need for a 
sacramental, hypostatic union of opposing principles, in a vision of human life and his 
own identity that takes full account of the irreducible mystery of human existence 
under God. Rather, he seeks to impose an existential and intellectual compromise— a 
metaphysical androgyny— in the course of which he hopes to keep Kitty as a means 
of sexual love and connection to the world, and Sutter as a shaman figure who 
provides insights into the “something more" for which he yearns. He cannot imagine a 
romantic union that would provide spiritual fulfillment, but instead relies on division of 
labor to allow him to patch together a life— rather in the mode of Dr. Frankenstein.
The result, if Will achieved it, would indeed be monstrous, as Sutter intuits. 
Reluctant as he is to have any truck with Will towards the end of the novel— partly 
out of frustration with his obtuseness, mostly out of a refusal to become his brother's 
keeper— Sutter cannot hide his contempt for the botched-up job of a life that Will 
envisions for himself:
The engineer frowned, thinking of the buzzards circling 
the doleful plain and Cap’n Andy striding the “bridge.”
But he quickly brightened. “We’ve even agreed on the 
same denomination.”
“The same what?”
“Denomination. Church. Kitty has become quite 
religious. She is convinced of the wisdom of our having 
the same church home, to use her expression.” The 
engineer laughed tolerantly, shaking his head at the ways 
of women, and wiped a merry tolerant little tear from his 
eye.
“Jesus,” muttered Sutter.
“Eh?” The other cocked his good ear.
“Nothing.”
“You don’t fool me, Dr. Vaught Don’t forget that I’ve 
read your casebook. Though I do not pretend to 
understand everything, that part didn’t escape me.”
“What part?”
“Your awareness of the primary importance of the 
religious dimension of life."
What Sutter sees, and Will cannot, is that the very words the younger man uses to
denote God's presence in the world vitiate it; by reducing a transcendent mystery to a
"dimension of life," another consumable product designed for the satisfaction of
human needs, Will renders the notion of salvation meaningless. Sutter had warned
that Will might do precisely such a thing, when he wrote in his notebook: “[H]e will
receive the news [of salvation] from his high seat of transcendence as one more item of
psychology, throw it into his immanent meat-grinder, and wait to see if he feels
better.” (LG, p. 276)
What sort of salvation can Sutter himself envision? He can see none. He cannot
accept the Christian mysteries for the solid, gnostic reasons that he details in his
casebook in a letter to Val:
I could never accept the propositions (1) that my salvation 
comes from the Jews, (2) that my salvation depends upon 
hearing news rather than figuring it out, (3) that I must 
spend eternity with Southern Baptists. (LG, p. 241)
Sutter rejects the possibility of an historic, incamational faith— especially one that is
based upon revelation rather than speculation, and which is open to all, even the most
uneducated. (This trio of objections to Christianity bears a remarkable resemblance to
those raised by William Alexander Percy in Lanterns on the Levee, as detailed in
Chapter Two.) Sutter is trapped in orbit, he himself admits, in the “transcendence of
abstraction," from which orgasms are only a temporary and futile means of 4<re-entiy"
into the sphere of the feminine. At one point in his chilling casebook, Sutter draws the
conclusion that lies implicit in his provocative aphorisms and poisoned life, that for
him, 'There is no re-entry from the orbit o f transcendence." From here it is only one
logical step to the final entry in his casebook: “Next time I won’t miss.”
The figure of Sutter stands before the reader as a mystery, a haunting prophet and
antichrist who offers Percy’s most persuasive apologetic for Christianity, but who
himself can only engage in the lowest form of sexual misconduct and self-destructive
The figure of Sutter stands before the reader as a mystery, a haunting prophet and 
antichrist who offers Percy's most persuasive apologetic for Christianity, but who 
himself can only engage in the lowest form of sexual misconduct and self-destructive 
violence; the man who alone can proffer Will a hand along out of the puiple fog of 
memory and desire that has swathed his life until the present, but who will not offer 
that hand, apparently out of sheer ill-temper. What is one to make of Sutter? Is he 
simply a literary cipher, a purposely puzzling figure whose oddities have been 
constructed by a rhetorically crafty author to offer maximum camouflage to the 
doctrinal message that lies hidden within this novel?
No. While Sutter does serve such a function, much as Dostoevsky’s unattractive 
characters frequently serve as the conduits (even the mouthpieces) for the author’s own 
most treasured insights, there is more to Sutter— and it is this more, this residuum of 
mystery, which makes him a character who has the power to compel Will Barrett and 
the reader. To discover the nature of that residuum, we must examine Sutter’s own 
peculiar mysticism, the search he himself undertakes for a more substantial union with 
the feminine than is possible in the soiled sheets of motel rooms or hospital beds. His 
search is religious, but in the gnostic rather than the Christian sense of the word.
Much like Wise Blood?s hero Hazel Motes, Sutter regards the human condition of
embodied spirituality as a nightmare dreamt in a prisonhouse. As Motes proclaims in
one of his ineffectual recruitment speeches:
“No truth behind all truths is what I and this church 
preach! Where you come from is gone, where you thought 
you were going to never was there, and where you are is 
no good unless you can get away from it. Where is there a 
place for you to be? No place.’’43
43Flannery O’Connor,Wise Blood (New York: Signet, 1983), p. 84. Motes offers the answers 
promised by classical gnostic speculation (as paraphrased by St. Clement of Alexandria), proclaiming 
“the knowledge of who we were and what we became, of where we were and whereinto we have been 
flung, of whereto we are hastening and wherefiom we are redeemed, of what birth is and what rebirth.” 
(Cited in Voegelin, Science, Politics, and Gnosticism, p. 10.)
Like Ed Barrett and most of Percy's male protagonists, Sutter is keenly aware that the 
human condition is inadequate to human aspirations, that— absent a mysterious 
irruption of grace into the world— the desire for transcendence is incompatible with 
the immanent condition of man. Like the other devotees of the “demonic masculine" of 
whom we spoke in Chapter One, from Sade and Schopenhauer to Sartre and Paglia, 
Sutter experiences the anima (immanence, creatureliness, femininity) intrinsic to the 
human psyche as a threat He ends by rejecting the anima in virtually all its 
embodiments— only to seek out communion with it finally in death.
We may sympathize with Sutter when he rejects the self-satisfied worldliness of
Rita even if we are shocked by the terms in which the exchange is presented:
“I do not desire death, mine, yours, or Jamie’s. I do not 
desire your version of fun and games. I desire for Jamie 
that he achieve as much self-fulfillment as he can in the 
little time he has. I desire for him beauty and joy, not 
death."
“That is death,” said Sutter. (LG, p. 194)
In this scene, and throughout the novel, Rita is the evangelical voice of closed, 
immanent existence, of the feminine immunized against true transcendence, stripped by 
scientism even of its own natural mystique, domesticated and rendered null. Like the 
technologized sexuality that she cultivates in their marriage, Rita's studiedly 
reductionist metaphysics affects Sutter as a form of suffocation or castration. (As the 
narrative continues, Kitty begins to have the same impact on Will, who reenacts 
Sutter’s flight into the desert.44)
44At this point in the novel, it is immanence, rather than transcendence, which poses the 
greatest threat to Will’s sense of well-being. Even his awareness of connaturality with women, those 
fraternal feelings which guarded him against fornication with Muzk Aiken, become a source of 
temptation here: “These beautiful little flatfooted girls greeted you like your own sister! What do you 
do about that? He had forgotten. It made him blush to think of laying hands on them. Then he 
remembered: that was how you did lay hands on them!—through a kind of sisterly-brotherly joshing, 
messing around it was called.” (LG, p. 163) This easy intimacy, he notes a few lines down, goes 
along with a thoroughly dismissive attitude towards the spirit, which empties life of meaning: “And 
poof! out the window went the whole intellectual business, kit and caboodle, cancelled out, polished 
off, even when you made straight A’s...Naturally in such an intersubjective paradise as this, he soon 
got the proper honors,” (LG, p. 164)
purposeful destruction of the only important aspect of human nature — its vertical 
dimension, its transcendence, its animus. It is here that we may with precision locate 
the genesis of Sutter’s heresy. Because of his a priori rejection of the incamational 
solution to the duality of transcendence and immanence, Sutter cannot envision the 
world of physical creation as friendly to the spirit In fact he behaves as if the spirit 
itself, the human psyche, were an uncreated mysteiy that can exist best independently 
of the fleshly dross that impinges upon it the demands of banality and sociability. In 
contrast Christian doctrine regards body and spirit to be equally of the essence of 
man, whose being is incomplete (even in heaven) without the flesh.
Sutter is disgusted by any compromise with the spirit of worldliness, which 
thwarts the transcendence of man in order to satisfy his immanent needs. In his 
asceticism, he bears a deceptive resemblance to a Christian saint The difference is that 
Sutter finds no point of convergence with the Subject of transcendence, the divine 
masculine for Whose sake one might cultivate an attitude of contemptus murtdi. Recall 
the exchange (cited above) between Sutter and Will on the “religious dimension of 
life”:
“Jesus,” muttered Sutter.
“Eh?” The other cocked his good ear.
“Nothing." (LG, p. 299)
“Jesus” and “Nothing”: this is precisely the choice Sutter faces, and he has decided 
upon the latter. By accepting a real Subject toward Whom transcendence might draw 
him, Sutter would be compelled to admit his own immanence, his moral equality with 
the banal, the worldly, the cowardly souls who surround him. Just as Ed Barrett 
preferred to die rather than allow his identity to be dissolved by social levelling, so 
Sutter prefers emptiness and destruction to existential levelling.
But Sutter has not completely surrendered the desire for contact with the 
feminine. He recognizes the impoverishment of the self-transcending condition, the 
isolation and emptiness it implies; why else would he be troubled by the need to seek
But Sutter has not completely surrendered the desire for contact with the 
feminine. He recognizes the impoverishment of the self-transcending condition, the 
isolation and emptiness it implies; why else would he be troubled by the need to seek 
“re-entry” from the orbit of transcendence? Intuitively, he recognizes that the source of 
nearly every human satisfaction —except for the thrill of obtaining abstract knowledge 
— comes from the realm of the anima. The role of the hero or the scientific magus is a 
lonely one indeed, perhaps impossible to maintain forever. Further, Sutter is too self- 
aware to be deluded entirely by the notion that his intellectual attainments exempt him 
from the human condition. He knows that there is a wisdom entailed in immanent 
existence, especially when it is viewed within the context of the eternal realities of true, 
divine transcendence— hence his willingness to grant Val the majority of her points of 
doctrine.
How, then, does he reach out for contact with the anima? Through violence.
Just as, earlier in the novel, Will found himself able to view the paintings in an art
gallery only after a collapse of the ceiling nearly killed a workman, and could attempt
to make love to Kitty only after his allergy has acted up, so Sutter finds in violence and
distress the means for recovery of his place in the human condition. Unlike Will, who
simply undergoes these experiences, Sutter seeks them out, courting opportunities for
a violent assault upon his own well-being, in order to re-establish himself as a creature
among creatures. As he writes in his casebook:
the certain availability of death is the very condition of 
recovering oneself. But death is outlawed now as sin used 
to be. Only one’s own suicide remains to one. My 
“suicide” followed the breakdown of the sexual as a mode 
of reentry from the posture of transcendence....
I saw something clearly while I had no cheek and grinned 
like a skeleton. But I got well and forgot what it was. I 
won’t miss next time. (LG, pp. 291-292)
Having decided, based on his masculinizing creed, that nature is a murderous 
mother, Sutter has chosen to meet her on her own terms, to embrace danger and even
death (in the desert with no water, or at the point of gun) in order to see clearly his 
own place in the world of creatures. Like Paglia’s Sade, Sutter has glimpsed nature 
red in tooth and claw, and chosen to accept that vision, to find mother earth in the 
grave.45
Here is precisely the point of his confluence with Will, and the conflict between 
them. For the reasons detailed at the beginning of this chapter, Will nurses a profound 
distrust of the anim a. His inability to cling firmly to his own place and time and 
identity within the order of creation —and his virtual amnesia regarding his biological 
mother— powerfully symbolize his exile from all that is motherly upon the earth. (If 
Stephen Dedalus chooses this exile at the end of Portrait o f the Artist, in this novel Will 
has it thrust upon him.46) Will’s profound ambivalence plays itself out in his 
relationship with Jamie, who in many ways serves as a projection of the decisive 
elements of Will’s own character. It is not surprising that Will finds himself well- 
equipped to serve as companion and mentor to lonely, Jewish adolescent boys— since 
he partakes also in their sexual immaturity, their isolation/transcendence, and their 
exile. Insofar as Jamie is a projection of key elements of Will’s character, it is fitting 
that the boy’s Wanderlust serves as the justification for Will as he flees from Kitty and 
their prospective marriage. If the word “projection” applies to the relationship between 
these characters, then one might say that Jamie is the screen upon which M il’s critical 
conflicts play themselves out: the tension between a yearning for home and a desire for 
rotation, between abstract delight in knowledge of the world and the simple desire for 
fellowship and love, between the need for nurturance and the need for escape.
Upon the screen that is Jamie, Will witnesses the spectacle of eternal salvation in 
the form of the sacrament of baptism. (It remains opaque to him, at least within the 
bounds of the novel.) If we take Catholic doctrine at its word, as Percy surely did,
45Paglia, p. 461.
46Sullivan, pp. 104-106.
then baptism is a visible means of grace, a necessary material form of incoiporation 
into the Mystical Body of Christ, Mother Church, the Bride of Christ, the Body of 
redeemed Creation raised from the dead in Christ— the first and most critical emblem 
and means of reconciliation between immanence and transcendence, the beginning of 
the divinization of a human being. But for a conscious adult, who like Will must live 
on and encounter the temptations of the world, the flesh, and the devil, baptism is only 
the first step. It is no accident that the sacrament Percy chose to embody the salvation 
that Will is offered is baptism rather than marriage— depicting the redemption of a 
sickly adolescent who has not yet faced the challenges of sexuality through a sacrament 
generally associated with infancy. It is the infant in Will that must be addressed, for 
that is the site of the schism that haunts his life; his traumatic division from the anima is 
not the result of some sexual experience, although he seeks its resolution there, 
without success.
No, it is at the most profound level that Will’s deprivation lies; as a pre­
adolescent, he lost his mother and with her the material world. When he reached 
adolescence, his father ratified that loss and strove to make it permanent, giving his 
childhood anguish the supports of reason and tradition, sealing them in amber. The 
waters of baptism could wash them away, but we do not see this happen. Will 
“misses” the miracle that takes place before his eyes, but it is indeed a miracle, one 
providentially designed to be appropriate to his level of psychic development. Because 
he has not yet grasped the key that has fallen into his hands, with which he could 
unlock the gate of his exile, Will’s story remains open-ended. At the novel’s end, he 
still treasures illusions about returning to many Kitty, but also clutches at the contact 
with spiritual honesty that he has briefly made through Sutter. He has not understood 
the miracle he witnessed— and knows i t  He will continue to question Sutter, we 
imagine, for some time to come.
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Meanwhile, the reader has been presented with an image of grace that is
purposely unlovely, which Percy has designed to avoid the sentimentality that ruins so
much “Christian literature” (as Flannery O’Connor observed). Does this mean that we
are left with nothing, save the stark alternatives of Kitty’s banality and Sutter’s
blasphemy? Not quite. Percy has given us a glimpse of what salvation, on Will’s
terms, would feel like. Not surprisingly, he puts the answer in Jamie's mouth, and
buries it within a literary allusion; nevertheless, given all we have said about the search
for that blessedness that can only come to a creature when he has found his place in
Creation, we can recognize this single anecdote as a glimmer of the beatitude
appropriate to Will’s state of psychic development:
“[T]his novel...was about this young man who was a 
refugee or a prisoner, I forget which. He was travelling 
the whole length of Russia in a cattle car, along with 
hundreds of others. He was sick with brain fever, 
whatever that is, I have only come across brain fever in 
Russian novels. It was summer and they were crossing 
Siberia, day after day, weeks even. The car was crowded 
and he had one tiny comer and a bit of straw and that was 
all. And though he was quite ill and even delirious at 
times, the strange thing about it was that it wasn’t so bad.
Through the slats of the car he could see the fields, which 
were covered by a little blue flower. And of course the 
sky. The train stopped often and peasant women would 
bring him bowls of blueberries and fresh warm milk— 
that was the peculiar thing about it, that even though he 
knew no one and the train only stopped for a few minutes 
at a time, somehow news of this young man traveled ahead 
of the train and they expected him. And though everybody 
else on die train became exhausted by the hardships of the 
trip, he actually got better. It was really good. I think it’s 
the best novel I ever read.” (LG, p. 199)
That beautiful image, of man as a wounded child of the earth, in exile yet free, 
alone yet tended by warm emissaries of maternal nature who offer milk and the fruits 
of the earth, bound to the straw and muck of life but able to see the beauty of the sky 
and even the transcendent stars, is the most compelling picture we have yet seen— in 
either of Percy’s first two novels— of how salvation enacted upon this earth would 
look, had we but eyes to see it.
Chapter Four: Lancelot — A Blood Wedding with the Feminine 
In Walker Percy’s fourth novel, Lancelot, we encounter a narrator whose psychic 
divisions are more clearly defined and more rigorously explored than in any of Percy’s 
other work. In this book, Percy directly addresses the questions that troubled his 
earlier narratives, turning subtext into text, mining the subterranean fault lines that 
rumbled beneath Binx Bolling and Will Barrett, to lay them bare in an explosion of 
speculation, rhetoric, and profound psychological observation. Concerns that gnawed 
at these earlier, meeker protagonists— chiefly, whether the spiritual aspirations of 
man can be reconciled with his mortal, physical existence— Lance Lamar attacks head 
on, coming upon an answer that his creator finds profoundly wrong but spectacularly 
tempting, a darkly beautiful synthesis of Stoic disdain, Southern honor, Cartesian 
angelism, Sartrean freedom, and Luciferian pride. According to Percy, more than one 
reader’s initial response to Lance’s call for a Third Revolution was to write the author 
with the inquiry: “Where do I sign up?”
In his biography of the Percy family, Bertram Wyatt-Brown offers this estimation 
of the book:
Because of the agony that accompanied its writing,
Lancelot was [Percy’s] most sophisticated and 
accomplished work of fiction.... Honor remains in his 
novels and essays a tempting way towards certitude and 
self-acclaim, but its mandates must be resisted and 
Christian affirmation asserted. Out of the tension that a 
rich but troubled legacy created in Walker Percy’s mind, 
he found the strength to slay the crouching beast— 
through the medium of art Lancelot was his masterpiece.1
I agree with Wyatt-Brown’s assessment.
I hope to explore this work with a view towards understanding the psychic
divisions of its narrator and anti-hero, Lance Lamar, particularly with regard to sex,
1 Wyatt-Brown, House o f Percy, pp. 328-331.
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indicating their roots in metaphysical and spiritual issues of ongoing interest to Percy, 
and demonstrating how Lance fits into the overall pattern of his work.
If the central spiritual and psychic affliction of the male protagonists in The 
Moviegoer and The Last Gentleman is the result (as I argued in previous chapters) of 
their alienation from the feminine, this theme repeats itself in magnified form in the 
dark soul of Lance Lamar, a man whose false notion of the nature of femininity leads 
him to:
• misunderstand or mistreat each of the women in his life;
• neglect the development of virtues necessary to adulthood;
• contract an unhealthy and mutually exploitative marriage;
• lapse into an almost infantile state of lethargic, alcoholic impotence;
• embark upon a plan of redemption that destroys the woman he desires;
• commit his future to building a Utopian realm based on the sexual subjugation 
of women;
• concoct a gnostic metaphysic and ethic based on the rejection of the feminine in 
all its forms;
• reject, finally, the offer of divine grace which alone could work his salvation.
Each of these perversions of the intellect and will— in fact, the whole
phenomenon of Lance's spiritual reprobation— can be traced back to his distorted 
conception of the nature, function, and proper dignity of the feminine, an error of 
sufficient gravity and religious import that we might better call it a heresy. While it 
will not be possible to decide to a reader’s satisfaction which came first, the psychic 
disturbance or the heresy — since even Lance’s childhood memories may well be 
distorted to suit his rhetorical project, the argument he makes to Percival— it will be 
possible to show the profound consistency that unites Lance’s morbid psychology and 
his unique version of gnostic theology. In this chapter I will investigate Lance’s
psychology, ideology, and rhetorical strategies, and reveal the reciprocal connections 
between his intellectual position and his intense emotions of misogyny.
Elzbieta Oleksy recounts these emotions incisively,2 attributing them to the 
masculinizing tradition of which existentialism is a part; I will follow the implications 
of her argument, and offer several key corrections. Drawing on the work of Qeanth 
Brooks,3 Lewis Lawson,4 and others, I will explore the gnostic elements in Lance's 
world-view, to suggest that his psychic apocalypse is a consequence of his rejection of 
the theological implications of the feminine. To locate the nexus where philosophical 
theme, character psychology, and literary style meet, I will follow Lawson's 5 
suggestion that Lance's affinity for Raymond Chandler novels and film  noir betrays a 
profound sense of maternal corruption, and a subsequent yearning for a utopian place 
that can replace the tainted womb; finally, I will tie these lines of argument back into 
the Southern hero as depicted by Kreyling,6 a figure whose quest is to stand beyond 
history and time. This doomed quest finally expires, as Lewis Simpson7 points out, 
in California, where the frontier runs out
Elzbieta Oleksy accurately locates the intellectual paternity of Lance’s philosophic 
misogyny in the tradition of European existentialism, pointing to the work of Sartre 
and de Beauvoir, which feminists and others (including Karl Stem) have criticized for 
perpetuating and expanding the traditional equation of women with wordless, 
subhuman immanence, and men with articulate, superhuman subjectivity. I suggested 
in Chapter One, following Stem’s argument, that the masculinizing tendency that 
culminates in existentialist thought finds its origins in the modem philosophical project
2EIzbieta Olesky, "From Silence and Madness to the Exchange That Multiplies," Southern 
Quarterly, 31:3 (Spring 1993), p. 58 fF.
3Cleanth Brooks,"Walker Percy and Modem Gnosticism,” in Broughton, ed., p. 260 ff.
4Lawson, Following Percy, p. 216 ft. Cf. also LawsonAnother Generation, p. 122 ff.
^Lawson, "Spiritually in Los Angeles” Southern Review, 24:4 (Autumn 1989), p. 744 ff.
6Kreyling, p. 4.
7“Home by Way of California,” in Southern Literature in Transition, Philip Castille and 
William Osborne, ed. (Memphis: Memphis State University Press, 1983), p. 55 ff.
initiated by Descartes, the quest to liberate knowledge from the senses, the spirit from 
the flesh, Sartre's pour-soi from the en-soi. 8 Oleksy goes further to suggest that 
Percy's own work has been flawed by this equation of subjectivity with masculinity. 
This equation is the reason, she argues, why he never until The Second Coming 
attempts to adopt a female point of view, and why he is virtually unable to create 
meaningful relationships between men and women. Not only is his portrayal of 
womanhood distorted in the novels prior to The Second Coming, but also his male 
characters' inability to forge and develop meaningful relationships results from these 
distortions."
Curiously, this does not constitute for Oleksy a sufficient reason “to ban Percy’s 
works from the feminist syllabus on grounds of sexism," since she locates in the early 
novels a strong implicit critique of the isolationist and “sexist" attributes of 
existentialism. Indeed, as other critics have noted,9 existentialism serves Percy as 
both an ally and an antagonist; while he relies upon this tradition for his ongoing 
critique of scientism and reductionism, he also must struggle against it in order 
ultimately to affirm belief in a sacramental, communal, dogmatic Faith.
While Oleksy is right to point out how ambivalently Percy makes use of 
existentialism, she goes astray in her overall intepretation of his novels, precisely 
because her understanding of the sexual symbolism that pervades the Western tradition 
is formed by Derrida, who suggests that for women, in the face of the masculinized 
language of the West, “both to remain silent and to speak (write) is to conform to the 
tradition of the phallocentric logos, one through repression, the other through
8 Stem sums up this movement as follows: “It is only today, in the era of Sartre, that the 
estrangement from matter and the maternal has reached a point of no return. At first sight this seems 
paradoxical, because in Samian philosophy existence itself is equated with the archaic experience. In 
thousands of metaphors nature is indeed conceived as maternal, with a beast—but with a breast from 
which one turns in disgust.” (pp. 140-141)
9Kathleen Scullin, “Lancelot and Walker Percy’s Dispute with Sartre over Ontology,” in
GretlundandNoiby, p. I l l  ff.
contradiction.”10 Oleksy traces to this notion— advanced by a critic Percy held in 
open contempt11 — the origin of the silent female characters who appear throughout 
the novels. Seemingly, Percy could not (until The Second Coming) think his way 
free of the univocal, “phallogocentric” Western tradition that dooms women to silence 
or madness. Further, Oleksy follows Cixous and other feminists in positing the 
existence of a virtually omnipotent conspiracy of mysterious provenance, whose 
power lurks in the veiy structure of language and thought, and whose purpose is the 
repression of women. Whether this conspiracy is an epiphenomenon of anthropology, 
a biological vestige, a social construct consciously or unconsciously maintained, or a 
blight laid upon the world by a malevolent Demiurge, she and her mentors do not 
specify.
Thus in Oleksy's reading, the cumulative meaning of Percy’s corpus is turned on 
its head; instead of a progressive working out of the difficulties entailed in representing 
the creaturely nature of man to a world of men-who-would-be-gods in the light of 
Catholic revelation and tradition, Percy’s works become an unevenly exfoliated 
critique of “the language and culture of patriarchy,”12 in which Christianity (and 
especially Catholicism) is a central culprit
It seems to me that Cixous and her followers— who rage against the very 
structure of language, culture and Being, because those metaphysical and moral 
realities resist their will-to-power— are closer to the mindset of Lance Lamar than they 
are to any of Percy’s female characters. Like him, they encounter obstacles to their 
ego gratification and metaphysical ambition in the realities of human culture as it exists 
and Divine Law as it has been revealed; like him, they make a response based not on 
reason but on sheer will, saying with Lance:
l°01eksy, p. 62.
USee footnote LC, p. 87: “I do not feel obliged to speak of the deconstructionists."
1201eksy, p. 62.
I couldn't stand i t  I still can't stand i t  I can’t stand the 
way things are. I cannot tolerate this age. What is more, I 
w on't (L, p. 154)
Oleksy and other feminists are right to reject the Cartesian mindset and its system 
of sexual symbolism— as men are right to reject them, and for the same reason: not 
because they are offensive or politically inconvenient but because they are false. By 
creating a radical alienation between reason and the senses, modem philosophy 
transforms the binary distinctions that pervade Western thought into radical 
oppositions, irreconcilable polarities that can only finally be overcome with the 
suppression of one of the two terms, as Cixous and Clement recognize during a lucid 
moment:
The paradox of otherness is that, of course, at no moment 
in History is it tolerated or possible as such. The other is 
there only to be reappropriated, recaptured, and destroyed 
as other.13
This statement, intended by its authors to score the whole of Western thought (and 
perhaps the whole of human thought as well), ought really to be directed at modem 
philosophy and the cultural movements that have been infused by i t
By isolating the self in the consciousness, cutting the Thomist interdependence of 
reason and the senses, and rejecting the sacramental universe envisioned in the 
medieval synthesis, seminal modem thinkers implicitly devalued those aspects of the 
self that had traditionally been designated as feminine— emotions, sensibility, 
intuitive knowledge (intellectus), faith, immanence, and the body— while identifying 
the traditionally masculine attributes of reasoning (ratio) and subjectivity as the proper 
locus of selfhood.13 In this grand simplification, all that is human became identified 
with all that is masculine and with the male of the species, while all that is feminine 
was assimilated to the level of nature— and declared subject not to divine teleology
13H61fcne Cixous and Catherine Cldment, The Newly Born Woman (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 71
14Stem, p. 77.
but to mechanistic entropy. Reactions against this masculinizing intellectual tendency 
took the form of {nationalist movements such as romanticism— which accepted the 
irreconcilable split between anima and animus, and acceded to the new (degraded) 
definition of anima, but chose to elevate it over animus nevertheless. The futility of 
such a rebellion against the (perceived) order of things is apparent to those who 
undertake it, and fuels the romantic agony that ends in decadence and despair. The 
mournful tone of so much Victorian writing— from Arnold to Adams, and arguably 
William Alexander Percy— can be traced to this self-defeating strategy of 
psychological (rather than philosophical) resistance to modernity.15
Modem Western thought has removed the theological dimension which alone
could provide an upward limit to the expansion of human animus (ego) and dethroned
that divine masculine (God), Who resists the will to power with unlimited power.16 It
has demoted faith and prayer (each identified with the anima) from the highest acts of
the soul to the level of subrational, sentimental or even bestial behavior. In so doing,
the West has unwittingly worked itself into a new form of Manichaeanism. This fact is
recognized and celebrated by Camille Paglia, the most eloquent and straightforward
defender of modem dualism:
The Apollonian and Dionysian, two great western 
principles, govern sexual personae in life and art My 
theory is this: Dionysius is identification, Apollo 
objectification. Dionysius is die empathic, the sympathetic 
emotion transporting us into other people, other things, 
other times. Apollo is the hard, cold separatism of western 
personality and categorical thought Dionysius is energy, 
ecstasy, hysteria, promiscuity, emotionalism— heedless 
indiscriminateness of idea or practice. Apollo is 
obsessiveness, voyeurism, idolatry, fascism— frigidity 
and aggression of the eye, petrification of objects. Human 
imagination rolls through the world seeking cathexis.
Here, there, everywhere, it invests itself in perishable 
things of flesh, silk, marble, and metal, materializations of 
desire. Words themselves die west makes into objects.
15Rose, p. 43 ff.
16Cf. Poteat, “Pilgrim’s Progress," p. 214, and Finlay, p. 119.
Complete harmony is impossible. Our brains are split, and 
brain itself is split from body. The quarrel between Apollo 
and Dionysius is the quarrel between the higher cortex and 
the older limbic and reptilian brains. Art reflects on and 
resolves the eternal human dilemma of order versus 
energy. In the west, Apollo and Dionysius strive for 
victory. Apollo makes the boundary lines that are 
civilization but that lead to convention, constraint, 
oppression. Dionysius is energy unbound, mad, callous, 
destructive, wasteful. Apollo is law, history, tradition, the 
dignity and safety of custom and form. Dionysius is the 
new, exhilarating but rude, sweeping all away to begin 
again. Apollo is a tyrant, Dionysius a vandal. Every 
excess bnngs its counterreaction. So western culture 
swings from point to point on its complex cycle, pouring 
forth its lavish tributes of art, word, and deed. We have 
Uttered the world with grandiose achievements. Our story 
is vast, lurid, and unending.17
Throughout her work, PagUa identifies the Dionysian principle with the feminine 
(especially the maternal) and the Apollonian with the rational, masculine subject Thus 
far, she follows the traditional Western usage, which suffuses Catholic thought as 
well. Where she errs, and errs in a specifically modem fashion, is by asserting a priori 
the irreconcilabitity of the two principles, except in the realm of art That this is her 
prior assumption rather than her rigorously argued conclusion can be seen by attending 
to her treatment of Catholic liturgy and theology; wherever she comes across a 
balanced admixture of Apollo and Dionysius— for instance, in the scholasticaUy 
articulated doctrine attending and limiting the ecstatic sacrament of the Eucharist — she 
describes the result as impure, a hodge-podge, an anomalous “pagan” survival in the 
Jewish-Christian milieu. Her reaction is easy to explain: Paglia’s notion of “true” 
Christianity is Protestant,18 and whatever evidence does not fit that notion is excluded 
as a '‘remnant” of the pagan past
17Paglia, pp. 96-97.
18Thus far Paglia: “Christian saints are reborn pagan personae. Martin Luther correctly 
diagnosed a toss of aboriginal Christianity in the Italian Church. The Romanism in Catholicism is 
splendidly, enduringly pagan, spilling out in Renaissance, Counter-Reformation, and beyond,” (p. 
139). This quaintly 19th-century vision of Christian history flails to account for the persistence of the 
cult of the saints, the veneration of Mary, and the doctrine of the Eucharist in such disparate, non- 
Roman locales as Syria, Armenia and India, each of whose churches date from the time of the apostles.
However, when Paglia discovers an artist who creates an aesthetic resolution of 
the tension between masculine identity and feminine nature, she delights in the 
complexities and perversities that result— particularly when the effect is sufficiently 
lurid and titillating. (Hence her preference for decadent literature, particularly the 
emetic summas of de Sade, the erotic rhapsodies of Swinburne.) We should not be 
fooled by this particular eccentricity of taste into thinking Paglia a perverted crank; far 
from it, she has expressed more clearly and cleanly than any critic since Yvor 
Winters19 the destructive dualism that invaded Western thought after the decline of the 
medieval synthesis. The difference is that the lady prefers the chaos— displaying 
thereby a fine consistency. If man is indeed a demented centaur, a god yoked to a 
beast, then he may well be doomed to reel drunkenly from one heresy to the opposite 
and back again, until he drowns in blood. Certainly that is Lance Lamar’s view, as we 
will see confirmed in an analysis of the story he narrates.
One psychological implication of the thesis that the masculine and feminine 
elements in the human soul are irreparably in conflict is the univocal equation of 
individual women with the feminine and individual men with the masculine. If the 
level of religious allegory is removed that would attribute pure masculinity only to the 
transcendent God, and some measure of femininity to every created being,20 and then 
the sexual principles are declared to be irreconcilable (rather than complementary), it 
becomes all too easy to identify woman with immanence, materiality, and even death 
(as Schopenhauer21 did, and the Decadents who followed him).22 The intellectual 
misogyny that Oleksy rightly diagnoses at the heart of existentialist thought is part of 
its Cartesian, not its Christian, inheritance.
19 Winters, pp. 7-14.
20For an exhaustive exploration of this allegorical tradition, from the Old Testament up to the 
present, see Hauke, pp. 216-296.
2 lStem, p. 107 ff.
22Paglia, p. 408 ff.
Recalling Martin D’Arcy’s analysis of sexual difference and its implications for 
human psychology and spirituality (elaborated in Chapter One above), one can indeed 
identify a realm of the feminine (or anima) where the self can be destroyed or 
dissipated, as Paglia fears. Indeed, the Western tradition is rife with warnings, which 
D’Arcy echoes, of the dangers contained within the lower reaches of the anima. If the 
anima is capable of leading man to the superhuman through faith, followed wrongly it 
can equally lead him into the subhuman realm, excluding reason in favor of 
imagination, even descending to “the irrational, the vital centre whence come the dark 
passions and impulses and instincts.”23 This Dionysiac descent, in which rationality 
and personhood are extinguished, is the aspect of the feminine that misogynist thinkers 
feared.
Ironically enough, it is to this abysmal level of the anima that Lance Lamar 
descends through his marriage to Margot, a woman with whom he can relate only 
upon the most instinctual basis. Whenever Lance recalls to Fr. Percival the positive 
aspects of their doomed relationship, inevitably his attention goes back to sex— sex 
undertaken in public places, impetuously, passionately, without reference to 
procreation, mutual love, or chaste fidelity (the three goods of marriage, according to 
S t Augustine). Indeed, the carnal relationship that develops between this husband and 
wife perfectly illustrates Augustine’s warning that— in the absence of charity— lust 
can corrupt even the marital bed.24 But lust is not the operative motive in Lance’s 
desperate attachment to Margot; as he freely confesses, he had been virtually impotent 
for some years, and “moderately content’’ in the ensuing celibacy. The true nature of 
Lance’s spiritual state before his “awakening” is hinted at in the following passage:
Do you know what it is like to be a self>centered not 
unhappy man who leads a tolerable life, works, eats, 
drinks, hunts, sleeps, then one fine day discovers that the
^ D ’Arcy, p. 186.
^Buike, p. 548 ff.
great starry heavens have opened to him and that his heart 
is bursting with it? She. Her. Woman. Not a category, 
not a sex, not one of the two sexes, a human female 
creature, but an infinity.... What else is infinity but a 
woman become meat and drink to you, life and your 
heart's own music, the air you breathe? Just to be near her 
is to live and have your soul's own self. Just to open your 
mouth on the skin of her back. (L, p. 129)
The pleasure Lance expresses here is pre-adolescent, oral, infantile. In some 
ways, it recalls the vision of beatitude that Jamie Vaught confides to Will Barrett (see 
p. 140, above), of a gentle, maternal love that grants the restless male pilgrim a place 
of refuge upon the earth. But motherhood carries very different connotations in this 
novel than it did in The Last Gentleman, and for good reason: unlike Will Barrett, 
Lance was not deprived of his mother at an early age. Rather, Lily Lamar dominated 
Belle Isle, stronger than Lance’s father, adulterous — or so he asserts, without 
offering us conclusive evidence— a flirtatious and aggressive figure who exercises a 
powerful influence on her adult son’s psyche. It is she who arises from his 
subconscious at the crucial moment in his apocalyptic plans, urging him forward 
(downward) into the Dionysian farrago of destruction. Lance looks backward to his 
memories of Lily Lamar as his guide to evaluating the material world and the feminine, 
and in so doing lays the foundations of Manichaeanism within his soul.
As William Rodney Allen has pointed out, Lily Lamar has an important literary
antecedent in Warren's most famous novel:
In both Lancelot and All the King's Men, the protagonist, 
whose life has fallen into a dream-like state, discovers his 
father had been involved in corruption and that out of 
weakness and sexual timidity the father drove his wife to 
another man.25
Whatever we are meant to see as the true sequence of events, in Lance's mind at 
least (and perhaps in Jack Burden's), the son blames his father’s weakness, 
impotence, and ruin on his mother, whom he perceives as castrating. (Lily was forever
^W illiam Rodney Allen, “Walker Percy’s Allusions," p. 7.
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coming at Lance with “boring fists.*’) Lance recalls her shamelessly and openly 
betraying her husband, himself so emasculated and abstracted that he seemed not to 
mind She happily leaves the cuckold to his guilty conscience and aesthetic reveries, 
as Margot later leaves Lance to his drinking and napping. Margot takes Lily’s place as 
a mother-figure, functioning also as his emblem for material existence itself (“meat, 
drink, life and air”), and his tangible connection to the feminine in all its lower 
manifestations. Lily and Margot— each a domineering, sensual woman with an air of 
corruption, a cheerfully amoral dweller in the immanent world of consumerism— are 
in some ways the perfect match for Lamar men haunted by the honor of their family, a 
heritage of heroism utterly irrelevant in this latter age.26 Certainly, each woman allows 
her man to slough off the responsibilities that he finds so intolerable, and sink into the 
constant exercise of his lower faculties; even better (at least in Lance’s mind), they take 
most of the blame for the man’s decline. Since Lance, an heir of the modem tradition, 
sees animus and anima as irreconcilable, it is an easy matter for him to equate the 
women in his life with the darkly-feminine movement of his soul toward passivity, 
sensualism, and dissolution. He does not recognize these as possibilities that inhere 
within his own soul, but rather objectifies them in the persons of Lily and Margot, 
upon each of whom in turn he lays the responsibility for his spiritual state.
Before he married Margot, Lance lived in amiable abstraction, still engaging in 
paternalist politics under the guise of civil rights law and other vestigial elements of the 
heroic ideal. Under Margot’s care, he virtually regresses from adulthood through a 
compulsive adolescent sexuality back into an almost infantile state, wherein his main 
pleasures come from a bottle and from frequent naps. While Fr. Percival (and we) can 
clearly see that Margot is not responsible for this decline, Lance is unable to make such 
fine distinctions. He equates Margot’s renovation of Belle Isle with her attempts to
26King, p. 86.
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26King, p. 86.
mysticism of matter that rejects all “masculine’' elements in religion, including the
transcendence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the governing role of reason
over the appetites. It is particularly appropriate that Lance’s “sacramental" image for
this neo-primitive religion suggests a desire to crawl back into the womb, a willingness
to be engulfed and obliterated in matter— to embrace the fate so dreaded by other
modem southern heirs to the heroic tradition, a dread to which Kreyling calls attention:
The...repulsion felt towards women is sanctioned by the 
myth that woman is not a conscious being, is in fact 
inimical to the conscious (logic, reason, will, art) by virtue 
of the involuntary ebbs and flows that control her life.
Man pursues the antithesis of woman in art or science or 
the angelic fraternity of war and is denied fulfillment by 
her intrusion.27
Given Lance’s modem account of the feminine (that excludes from its definition
faith, the cognitive faculty of intellectus, and the sacramental significance of matter),
the inevitable result of such a descent is a kind of death in life. Indeed, the longer he
remains a votary of this religion the more he literally decays, until he assumes the
following appearance, which he notes with alarm after his “awakening":
[Sjomething moved in the comer of my eye. It was a man 
at the far end of the room. He was watching me. He did 
not look familiar. There was something wary and poised 
about the way he stood, shoulders angled, knees slightly 
bent as if he were prepared for anything. He was mostly 
silhouette but white on black like a reversed negative. His 
arms were long, one hanging lower and lemur-Hke from 
dropped shoulder...
Then I realized it was myself reflected in the dim pier 
mirror.
What did I see? It is hard to say, but it appeared to be a 
man gone to seed. Do you remember the picture of 
Lancelot disgraced, discovered in adultery with the queen, 
banished, living in the woods, stretched out on a rock, 
chin cupped in both hands, bloodshot eyes staring straight 
ahead, yellow hair growing down over his brows? But 
it’s a bad comparison...not so much a case of my screwing 
the queen as the queen being screwed by somebody else.
(L, 63-64)
27Kreyling, p. 142.
In the passage that introduces this description, Lance admits that his “life routine”
had been “worn bare and deep as a cowpath.” The choice of simile is apt; in Lance’s
mind women and their world are simply an extension of unreasoning nature, the dark
anim a. By succumbing to their bovine charms, he has begun even to move backward
in evolution, towards the lemur. That Lance does equate women with nature is clear
from the way he pictures Margot, in comparison to his first wife, Lucy:
Lucy I loved too, but Lucy was a dream, a slim brown 
dancer in a bell jar spinning round and round in the 
“Limelight” music of old gone Carolina long ago. Margot 
was life itself as if all Louisiana, its fecund oil-rich dark 
greens and haunted twilights, its very fakery and money- 
loving and comicalness, had all been gathered and fleshed 
out in one creature. It meant having her and not being 
haunted, holding all of goldgreen Louisiana in my arms.
She was a big girl. (L, p. 119).
If this relationship starts out with Lance holding the whole fecundity of the earth 
in his arms, as it continues he shrinks and withers, as if Margot simply contained too 
much of the life force for him to stand; like his father before him, in the presence of the 
dark feminine, he does not master himself and contend with the situation, but rather 
sinks into reverie and unconsciousness. (He will atone for this later, not by self- 
mastery, but by his insane political ambition to master others, especially women.) He 
has defined the anima as subhuman, then submitted himself to its cult, thereby putting 
his own animus (and even his existence) in danger.
This danger is one that was sensed, vaguely, by earlier Percy heroes. In The 
Moviegoer and The Last Gentleman, whenever someone proposes to the hero that he 
accept an immanentist creed— as Aunt Emily does to Binx, and Rita to Will— he 
perceives it as a threat, as if a spiritual castration were in the offing.28 It does not help
^T o  give Percy due credit, at least one female character before Allie in The Second Coining 
experiences that anxiety, and for the same reasons as the male protagonists. As we saw in Chapter 
Two, Kate Cutrer chafes at Aunt Emily's patronizing dismissal of her search for transcendent meaning, 
reacting more vehemently than Binx. Creating a vision of the feminine which adequately portrays its 
power and importance, without conveying the dread it inspires in modem Manichaeans, has been a task 
with which Percy struggled throughout his career, succeeding best in The Second Coming.
matters when such a proposal comes from a powerful woman to a man who feels 
dependent upon her; in moments like that, Percy’s heroes undergo a psycho-spiritual 
panic (“strange, eschatological pricklings”). However lofty and overtly masculinized 
these immanentist systems appear (Aunt Emily quotes Marcus Aurelius, Rita compares 
Will to a series of classical heroes), each asserts the final futility of transcendence, the 
evanescence of the self, and the triumph of all-devouring mother nature. And in the 
presence of each, Percy’s heroes experience the very anxiety towards the mother of 
which Paglia writes so eloquently.
Lance’s literal impotence, a mirror of his father’s fate as an addled cuckold, is a
fine emblem of the state of his soul: deprived of any transcendent referent, he has
regressed ever more closely to the condition of vegetable matter, over whose operation
Jack Burden’s “Great Twitch’’ holds final sway. Indeed, at one point he tries to
comfort himself with a mechanist theory of sexuality:
Why is it such an unspeakable thing for one creature to 
obtrude a small portion of its body into the body of another 
creature? Is it not in fact a trivial matter when one puts it 
this way? (L, p. 16)
Very likely, it was reflections of this nature that comforted Maury Lamar as he
watched Lily go off on trips with Uncle Harry, then turned back to working on his
romantic histories of rural Episcopal churches in the Feliciana parishes. But neither
nostalgia nor materialist speculations on the power of Twitch are sufficient to salve
Lance’s “secret wound,’’ as he makes clear:
But suppose I put it another way. Isn’t it unspeakable to 
me to imagine Margot lying under another man, her head 
turning to and fro in a way I knew only too well, her lips 
stretched, a little mew-cry escaping her lips? Isn’t that 
unspeakable? Yes. But why? When I imagined other 
things happening to Margot, even the worst things, they 
were painful but not intolerable...The thought of Margot 
dead was painful but not intolerable. But Margot under 
another man... (L, p. 16)
Lance recognizes the disproportion here between his cosmology and his ethics; 
the Dionysian cult that he has embraced does not proscribe adultery— indeed, the loss 
of individuality entailed in the submergence of ego within anima ought to render moot 
the identity of either partner. Where there is no personhood, there are no personal 
relations, only physical interchanges of energy. Then what motivates Lance’s rage, 
the mighty force that drives the action to its grim conclusion? It is the last trace of 
animus that remains in Lance, devoid not only of faith but of reason, a shrunken core 
of ego that fits D’Arcy’s cautionary description cited above; “[W]hen the reason is 
forced to abdicate or is tempted to lower its dignity, it descends to the level of brutal 
mastery or cold selfishness or becomes a mere prejudice, a rationalization, a judgement 
which is swayed by passion.” 29
What elements of masculine identity do survive in Lance’s degenerate psyche are 
determined by the heroic code of which I spoke length in Chapters One and Two. If 
Lance’s sense of selfhood is threatened by his descent into the depths of instinct and 
mechanism, it is also salved by a sense of possession and control; this comer of the 
feminine —  even as it has engulfed him — has been his, has borne his name, 
submitted to his sexual mastery. He, and no one else, evoked that “mew-cry,” those 
ecstasies of pleasure. If Lance has indeed been indeed searching in Margot’s womb 
for the ’‘paradisiacal state” of which Erich Fromm speaks as the real object of Oedipal 
desire,30 key to that search is an unquestioned, public title of ownership. So long as 
that title is maintained, Lance can continue to delude himself that he has not lost his 
very soul, but has gained the whole world— or at least “all of goldgreen 
Louisiana.”31 Once he learns that he has lost even this hold on selfhood, thanks to
29D’Arcy, pp. 185-186.
30Cited in Lawson, ‘“Spiritually in Los Angeles,"* p. 750.
31In Honor and Violence in the Old South, Wyatt-Brown points out the social implications of 
Lance’s position as a cuckold: “What was at stake in the promiscuity of a dependent woman was her 
protector’s status, without which he could not remain an effective member of society. The unchaste 
wife or daughter did not betray herself alone. She exposed her male family members to public
Margot’s adultery, Lance becomes aware of his true condition, and his apocalyptic
forebodings and images begin. To describe his emotion upon discovering the medical
evidence of Margot’s infidelity, he employs an elaborate scientific metaphor:
I can only compare it, my reaction, to that of a scientist, an 
astronomer.... [F]rom the most insignificant observation 
the astronomer calculates with absolute certainty and 
finality that a comet is on collision course with the earth 
and will arrive in two and a half months. In eight weeks 
the dot [in the sky] will have grown to the size of the sun, 
the oceans risen forty feet, New York will be under water, 
skyscrapers toppling. (L, p. 19)
The imagery Lance chooses here is particularly appropriate: the complete loss of
masculine ego in the mighty, unruly anima is symbolized by engulfment in liquid and
falling towers. The impotent drinker awakens to the truth about himself, and the
experience is eschatological; under the blazing light of revelation, Lance begins to plot
his own apocalypse and rebirth, which he will engineer and control.32
Lewis Lawson suggests that Lance’s search for a “paradisiacal state’’ mirrors that 
of Chandler’s detective Philip Marlowe; Lance is exploring all the nooks and crannies 
of the “Great Wrong Place’’ that Margot's body (and by extension, Belle Isle) has 
become, in search of the “Great Good Place,’’ the pre-Oedipal paradise that he 
remembers enjoying with his mother.33 But here is a profound flaw in Lance's plan 
—  and a weakness in Lawson’s reading. Lance's conscious memories of his mother 
are profoundly ambivalent, and largely negative. He rarely defends her, and even 
seems to revel in the idea that she committed adultery (as he does in the memory of 
discovering his father’s corruption). On a semi-conscious level, where associations
censure.... Since there was little recognition of a morality apart from community custom, the erring 
woman had to be condemned along with the husband, father, or brother who was unable or unwilling 
to control her or to avenge the seducer or rapist” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 37.
32Gary Ciuba, Walker Percy: Books o f Revelation (Athens: University of Geoigia Press, 1991), 
p. 171 ff.
33Lawson, “‘Spiritually in Los Angeles,’" pp. 749-754.
are more persuasive than causal links, Lance seems to equate his father’s corruption
with Lily's sexuality, as the following key passages suggest:
I opened the sock drawer and found not ten dollars but ten 
thousand dollars stuck carelessly under some argyle socks.
What I can still remember is the sight of the money and 
the fact that my eye could not get enough of i t  There was 
a secret savoring of it as if the eye were exploring it with 
its tongue. When there is something to see, some thing, a 
new thing, there is no end to the seeing...There is no end 
to the feast
At the sight of the money, a new world opened up for 
me. The old world fell to pieces— not necessarily a bad 
thing. (L, pp. 41-42)
The tongue imagery Lance chooses to describe this discovery finds its mirror later in
the novel— in Margot’s bed, as he undertakes his “sacramental” exploration of the
“ark of her covenant" (L, p. 117) The close association between these pleasurable
discoveries— of evil and of the womb— becomes much clearer late in the novel,
when Lance again describes the moment when he uncovered his father’s corruption:
There it was, the ten thousand dollars, dusky new green 
bills in a powdered rubber band neat and squared away 
like a book, and there it was, the sweet heart pang of 
horror. I counted i t  The bills fe lt like stiff petals, not like 
paper, like leaves covered by pollen. My heart beat slowly 
and strongly. Strange: I was aware that my eyes were 
doing more than seeing, that they were unblinking and 
staring and slightly bulging. They were “taking it in,” that 
is, devouring. For here was the sweet shameful heart of 
something, the secret For minutes there was an 
awareness of my eyes devouring the money under the 
socks, making little scanning motions to and fro, the way 
the eye takes in a great painting. Dishonor is sweeter and 
more mysterious than honor. It holds a secret. There is no 
secret in honor. If one could but discover the secret at the 
heart of dishonor. (L, p. 213, italics mine)
The money has become a flower, which has become a vagina. The “Lady of the 
Camellias” — whose flower is so prominent in Lance’s mind, since she wears it out of 
season, perhaps as an emblem of the eternal feminine— has finally given Lance 
“proof’ of his mother’s infidelity, the tale of which follows hard upon the appearance 
of the money/flower. Soon thereafter, the Lady is transformed into (or revealed as)
Lance's mother, Lily. The flower of purity and resurrection has transformed itself into 
an emblem of sensuality, which brings corruption and decay in its path. So swallowed 
up is Lance in his visual love-feast, that his very subjectivity disappears: “there was an 
awareness of my eyes" replaces “I was aware," as Lance regresses into that union with 
the feminine (and especially his mother) that ultimately fills him with Manichaean 
dread.
Percy's use of flower imagery to depict ambivalent feelings towards women and
the feminine has precedents in modem and southern literature, as a Hart Crane
translation of one of Laforgue's Pierrot poems demonstrates:
True, I nibble at despondencies 
Among the flowers of her domain 
To the whole end of discovering 
What is her unique propensity!^
Camille Paglia points to a far more powerful passage employing flower imagery
for this purpose in Huysmans' Against Nature. This passage crowns a chapter in the
course of which the misogynist, Decadent hero Des Esseintes has catalogued dozens of
the most grotesque, hideous flowers that he could collect, in bitter scorn of nature.
After examining each of his monstrous orchids, Des Esseintes falls asleep, and dreams
that he is being drawn inexorably into the arms of an archetypal harlot:
He made a superhuman effort to free himself from her 
embrace, but with an inesistable movement she clutched 
him and held him, and pale with horror, he saw the savage 
Nidularium blossoming between her uplifted thighs, with
34Cited by Kreyling, who goes on to make comments relevant to our understanding of Lance 
Lamar and his literary precursors: “The Pierrot of Crane's translations of Laforgue stands, or 
sometimes sits, in murky awe and repressed hatred of woman. The personal T  is reserved for the male, 
while the female is a type (Eve, Giocanda, Delilah) denied subjective ego...[P]oets who invested in 
pierrotic estrangement from the much too solid world of Columbine simultaneously acquired a pained 
ambivalence toward woman and more than a cursory fascination with death—usually suicide. Their 
adulation of Eve, Giocanda, Delilah, and Cynthia, goddess of the moon and ail sublunary creatures, is 
dyed with darker emotion; they welcome the woman's death, deny her subjective life, and view her 
sexual nature as, at best, a sort of involuntary spasm and, at worst, a weapon of torture." (pp. 133- 
135)
its swordblades gaping open to expose the bloody 
depths.35
Paglia goes on to explain the passage’s significance, in the light of the modem sexual 
dichotomy which she expounds:
Thus Chapter Eight ends, with Des Esseintes having 
escaped, like Poe’s hero in the maelstrom, from a forcible 
return to female origins, sucked into the womb of the 
rapacious all-mother.36
Repeatedly, Lance expresses the profound anxiety he feels regarding female sexuality,
in terms strikingly similar to Paglia’s. Here is only the most earthy instance:
Christ what a country! A nation of 100 million voracious 
cunts. I will not have my son or daughter grow up in such 
a world.... My son is a homosexual now and I can 
understand why. He told me he was terrified of all the 
pussy after him. (L, p. 177)
Lance’s sexual anxiety can be partly attributed to his recent impotence— but not 
entirely. As we established earlier, there is a deeper level at which feminine power 
assails his identity. The next vision he receives that night betrays the radical imbalance 
of power between masculine and feminine principles that he feels the need to redress. 
He remembers Uncle Harry, mostly naked except for a ludicrous Mardi Gras get-up. 
“His genital was retracted,” Lance notes, “a large button over a great veined ball.” (L, 
p. 213) Compared to the mighty camellia that so fascinated him and the world- 
shattering money/flower he discovered, this organ appears as pitiable, even vestigial.
It also serves as a metonymy for Harry’s condition: a sad old man, drained and 
inarticulate, he yearns for some form of communion with Lance that he cannot express 
in words. We are not told enough to fathom what Harry actually wanted, even if he 
knew. But in Lance’s mounting delirium, the memory of Harry serves a very specific 
purpose: he is the emblem of the male principle in defeat, its substance wasted by too 
promiscuous contact with the enemy (not unlike Lance’s condition, before his
35Huysmans, p. 106.
36Paglia, p. 433.
“awakening”). When the Lady returns, this time revealed as Lily Lamar, she equips 
Lance with a new, improved phallic symbol, a Bowie knife. Lance understands the 
significance of this transformation: the masculine can survive traffic with the feminine, 
but only on terms of violent domination, not the melting surrender that once engulfed 
him, turning him into a “runny babbit” (L, p. 53) — that is, a stem, honorable 
aristocrat no more, but rather an impotent hypocrite and a weakling, a man with no 
boundaries and no definition.
Woman can be approached, but only once she has been wounded, tamed, 
silenced by masculine violence until she is no longer a threat to his subjectivity, but 
serves humbly as a repository of male honor and a safely domesticated link to the 
natural. With that possibility in mind, Lance considers rescuing Margot from the 
apocalypse he has planned, should she seem amenable to this transformation. In the 
event, she refuses and is lost; given the prophetic determinism that Lance has 
adopted37 to justify his action, this means for him that she was reprobate, beyond 
redemption. A replacement must be found, and (for a time) Anna seems a likely 
candidate.
It is only in the spectral environment of Belle Isle on the night of its destruction 
that Lance, now drugged into a visionary condition, can finally confront his memories, 
interpret them, and take decisive action to resolve them in a final conflagration. In 
previous moments of his “awakening,” Lance has seen glimpses of the '‘Great Secret 
of Life” that this night he grasps in its theological fullness: the supremacy of dishonor 
over honor (anima over animus, body over spirit), the fact that all is indeed 
“buggery,”38 at least in the botched world as God has created it, centered on a sexual
37Lawson, “‘Spiritually in Los Angeles,’” p. 761.
38It is no accident, of course, that Percy chose this archaic word, with all its doctrinal 
connotations. As John Noonan writes, in medieval Europe the practice of sodomy became associated 
with the Manichaean heretics from Bulgaria, who allegedly practiced this vice out of a repugnance for 
procreation—hence the term “buggery,” Cf. Contraception (Cambridge, Mass.,: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1986), p 188.
duality that is nothing more than violation and masochism. In those glimpses— as a 
child looking at the money, on the night when he discovers Margot’s adultery— he 
has found this “Secret” both terrifying and exhilarating. On the one hand, the sheer 
power of the feminine (as he sees it) to corrupt and engulf the fragile arc of masculine 
personality filled him with deep anxiety (what Lawson calls “maternal awe”39). On the 
other, this very knowledge promised gnostic liberation— particularly to a man who 
eagerly watched for the destruction of the “old world” and the opening up of the 
“new.”
However, on this night as Lance finally sees his implicit cosmology made 
explicit, and draws its deadly conclusions, he feels no exhilaration and no anxiety— 
feels almost nothing, in fact, except a cold numbness40 that allows him to persevere 
until he has created this “new world” in a man-made apocalypse. The dark cosmos in 
which God has imprisoned man will be shattered and made anew, not by works of 
faith or even reason, but by sheer will In effect, Lance echoes Ed Barrett’s willful 
declaration just before his suicide: “But I don’t have to choose that” (LG, p. 259) — a 
variation on the Luciferian “non serviam.” 41
In his moment of dark revelation, Lance sees the same bleak vision that Barrett
spied from his porch: a world in which sexual taboos were collapsing, and with them
the very social distinctions that gave the southern hero his purpose and identity. Long
before, Lance had enthusiastically embraced one aspect of this change:
The very behavior I used to abhor in others I carried on 
with her and never a second thought or care in the world; 
touch her in public. Neck! Go to the A&P with her, heft 
the cold red beef flesh in one hand and hold her warm 
hand with the other and in the parking lot at four o’ clock
39Lawson, “Will Barrett," pp. 62-64.
40Perhaps a foreshadowing of that icy circle in Dante’s Hell reserved for those who are violent 
to guests.
41 Jeering at Fr. Percival: “You say we are redeemed. Look out there. Does it look like we have 
been redeemed?” (L, p. 224), Lance also recalls O’Connor’s gnostic prophet Hazel Motes. Compare 
Wise Blood: “‘If you’ve been redeemed,' he said, “I wouldn’t want to be.” (p. 13)
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in the afternoon neck! Spoon! We'd drive down the road 
like white trash in a pickup truck. (L, pp. 89-90)
Such a state of affairs could not long be endured. At bottom, Lance is driven by the
same code that motivates Aunt Emily (M, pp. 176-177), Ed Barrett (LG, p. 85), and
their real-life exemplar, William Alexander Percy (JLoL, pp. 306-315)— each of
whom specifically deplored the sexually-driven collapse of social differentiation.
Unlike the other “despairing monumentalists”42 in Percy’s world of fiction and
memory, Lance has betrayed that code, allowing a key element of his identity to be lost
in the unredeemed feminine mire. In sharp contrast to their tight-lipped, Stoic
resignation, Lance will reclaim that identity by violence.
If the “new world” in which Lance hopes to dwell includes the domination of
feminine nature by force of masculine will (reason seems to play no part in Lance's
vision), another key feature is the transformation of time. As Lawson suggests, Lance
takes the discovery of Margot’s adultery as a fulcrum that divides his life into two
distinct periods— “Before and After.” However, in order to explicate the meaning of
this division, he must return to the memory of another great discovery, that of the bribe
money in his father’s drawer. Equating the two events, Lance creates for himself a
sense of liberation from the tyranny of the feminine. The time Before is a long dream
(or Big Sleep), dominated by the past that came before it; the time After is waking
reality, dominated by the future that Lance has envisioned. The past is feminine and
mechanistic, the future masculine and teleological. Nor does Lance limit these
assessments of the meaning of time to his own experience; true to his gnostic habit, he
elaborates from the personal to the cosmological:
[I]t is the banality of the past which puts me off. There is 
only one reason I am telling you about these old sad 
things, or rather frying to remember them...It is because 
the past, any past, is intolerable, not because it is violent or 
terrible or dooms truck or any such thing, but just because
42King, p. 36.
it is so goddamn banal and feckless and useless. (L, p.
105)
Having established that Lance associates his own past with the dangerous power
of the anima to engulf his identity, it should not suiprise us that he employs an image
with strongly sexual connotations to embody the structure of time as he sees it:
As you get older you begin to realize the trick time is 
playing, and that unless you do something about it, the 
passage of time is nothing but the encroachment of the 
horrible banality of the past on the pure future. The past 
devours die future like a tape recorder, converting pure 
possibility into banality. Ib e  present is the tape head, the 
mouth of time. (L, p. 106)
Even though Lance soon interprets this image otherwise, suggesting “I am aware
of being the tape head” and “I am aware of this room being a tape head,” the image he
chooses evokes as clearly as any camellia the female sexuality that obsesses him.
Lance’s great fear is absorption and dissolution in the feminine, and he Ends his
liberation not in nostalgia (where his father looked for it) but in fantasies about the
future. The past, where women dominated, is “banality,” while the future, which he
will dominate, is “the new life.” His moment of conversion comes in his discovery
that each of the flowers he has tongued or eyed (from Margot’s “unique propensity" to
the money that incarnated his father’s impotence and his mother’s adultery) is really
one flower—  the devouring cannibalistic Venus who consumes the future and turns
life into death. On one level he is actually relieved that another man has taken up the
task of plugging this terrible chasm: “The moment I knew for a fact that Margot has
been fucked by another man, it was as if I'd  been waked from a twenty-year
dream...In an instant I became sober, alert, watchful I could act.” Lawson interprets
Lance’s experience, this second birth he believes he has undergone, in doctrinal terms:
Lance has experienced the Gnostic eleutheria, the freedom 
from domination by this world and the freedom to do
170
anything in order to achieve and maintain total 
independence.43
Only by escaping time itself, by provoking a catastrophe that will change the 
order of being itself, can Lance attain to the transcendence he seeks, and bum off the 
dross of history in the blazing light of the heroic future. Thus he makes a claim to join 
the ranks of Southern and Western heroes— “Lee and Richard and Saladin and 
Leonidas and Hector and Agamemnon and Richthofen and Charlemagne and Clovis 
and Martel” (L, p. 178) — men whose cultural function is to “supplant history in 
the...imagination as the explanation of the nature of things...to establish unity where 
history supplies only contingency.”44 By rejecting the banality of the past, Lance ties 
himself to a tradition that transcends history, and virtually identifies himself with 
“Christ the King” while refusing to embrace or emulate “sweet Jesus.” Thus Lance 
adopts the critique of sentimentalized, liberal, and individualist Christianity advanced 
by serious traditionalists 45 to the service of his own peculiar creed, his astonishing 
hubris.
If Lance sees himself as a modem type of Christ the King, what is the nature of 
the kingdom that he proposes to establish? As we will see, in many ways it is the very 
opposite of the Paradise described in Genesis— which is fitting, since Lance believes 
that God botched creation, by unleashing the demonic force of sexuality (itself the 
Original Sin), which constitutes “something God did to man, so monstrous that to this 
day man cannot understand what happened to him.” (L, p, 222) Indeed, if (as I have 
argued throughout) the feminine must be seen allegorically as the sign of the creature in 
its relation to the Creator, then Lance's attempt to establish a new dispensation that will 
suppress the feminine is revealed as a metaphysical rebellion of the highest order, an 
attempt to usurp God’s role as transcendent Creator. The nature of this rebellion
43Lawson, Following Percy, p. 216.
^Kreyling, p. 29.
45Abp, Marcel Lefebvre, They Have Uncrowned Him (Kansas City: Angelus Press, 1988), p. 
245 ff.
becomes clear from Lance's imaginative attempts to picture what his counter-paradise 
would be like.
Perhaps the central motif in Genesis is that of an untroubled garden, fertile and
overflowing with life. This does not fit in with Lance’s vision:
I’ll prophesy: This country is going to turn into a desert 
and it won’t be a bad thing. TTiirst and hunger are better 
than jungle ro t We will begin in the Wilderness where 
Lee lost Deserts are clean places. Corpses turn quickly 
into simple pure chemicals. (L, p. 158)
If Lance once dove into Dionysian communion with Margot and (through her) “ail of
goldgreen Louisiana,” (L, p. 119) he has certainly learned his lesson, and now
embraces the sterile purity of death, as preferable to the liquefying dissolution entailed
in biological life.46 In obedience to this preference, he elects to stay in Belle Isle as it
explodes, surviving by sheer accident— or perhaps by virtue of some demonic
immunity, “like Lucifer blown out of Hell.” (L, p. 246) The realm he leaves behind
— forever— is the order of being infected by its Creator with the energy of sexual
desire, that dark force whose downward pull affects nearly everyone, especially
^ In  Male Fantasies, Volumes I  and II (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 
Klaus Theweleit documents the writing styles, metaphors, and massacres of the proto-Nazi Freikorps 
who fought against Bolshevik armies in the Germany of the 1920’s. While his theoretical framework 
— that of Gilles Deleuze— is unsound, entailing a wholesale rejection of the animus as we have 
defined it here (including the faculty of reason), his observations about the aesthetic preferences of 
misogynist, militaristic males in the heroic tradition are illuminating to a study of Lance Lamar. As 
he points out, a male obsession with the dangers of “engulfment" in the “morass” of femininity can 
lead to a preoccupation with cleanliness, sterility, structure, and strict social differentiation—as the 
only alternatives to liquification and dissolution of the masculine ego. If drowning is the danger, then 
a desert is the safest refuge (pp. 392-402). One more interesting avenue of investigation suggested in 
Theweleit’s text is this: He discusses Elaine Morgan’s The Descent o f Woman (New York: Stein and 
Day, 1972), a rather fanciful feminist attempt to reconstruct anthropology along more politically 
correct lines. One point which Theweleit cites is strikingly reminiscent of Lance’s speculations about 
human sexuality. Morgan suggests that face-to-face copulation, the development of the menstrual 
cycle to replace the simian estrus cycle, and the apparent violence of sexual penetration contributed to 
a permanent association between sex and violence in the male psyche. As Theweleit sums it up:
“This view, if correct, implies a truly lethal juxtaposition of male copulatory behavior and the 
unlimited application of violence.” (p. 293) The striking similarities between these two theories 
suggests that Percy may have modelled Lance's Manichaean account of sexuality on Morgan’s— 
particularly since each of the problematic aspects of human sexuality critiqued by Morgan are remedied 
by the villains of The Thanatos Syndrome through the infusion of heavy sodium. These observations 
ought to discomfit those who would put a feminist reading on Percy’s corpus.
women. Even Margot’s daughter Siobhan suffers the taint* “At seven she was as
sexual a creature as her mother...She could curve her lips richly but her eyes were as
opaque as a doll’s. She liked to show her body and would sit, dress pulled up, arms
clasping knees, her little biscuit showing.’’ (L, p. 117)
With what sort of Eve will the self-creating Adam consent to share his desert anti-
Eden? Only such women as have been purified from the sexual taint, by dint of some
natural frailty or violence suffered. He believes that his fellow-patient Anna has been
restored by the gang-rape she suffered to the virginity that Lucy had maintained until
their wedding night, and he confesses to “want the same thing of her I wanted from
Lucy: to come close but keep a little distance between us.’’ (L, p. 86) Lance desires a
mate who will not threaten his identity with too potent a communion, someone like
Lucy, “a dream, a slim brown dancer in a bell jar” (L, p. 119) —  that is, someone in a
sterile laboratory environment drained of air. Another motif that unites the women
who fit Lance’s cautious standard of feminine frailty is that of the scar. Note Lance’s
description of his Erst encounter with Anna, which gives us some idea of what he -
looks for in a wife:
Her thin brown face reminded me of Lucy, except she 
didn’t have Lucy’s funny quirky expression and the tiny 
scar on her lip. Her face was blank, lips slightly parted 
and dry, like a woman asleep. She had a scar all right, not 
like Lucy’s, but a big white raised scar curving from 
forehead to cheek where she had been cut in the rape and 
beating. Her scar was like a whore’s.
The same passage continues, ending in what are surely the most wrenching lines in
any of Percy’s novels:
Do you remember our both making the observation that all 
whores have scars, belly scars from hysterectomies and 
abortions, face scars from beatings, leg scars from car 
wrecks? (L, p. 109)
Lance observes the terrible abuse that women have suffered at the hands of male
aggression— and by extension, that nature and the feminine have endured at the hands
of modem man— and endorses it approvingly. This is what he looks for in a woman 
—  someone battered into virtual silence, wounded or barely alive. His first wife, 
Lucy, exhibited all these qualities but— as he notes coolly —“she died.” Perhaps she 
was too frail for the contemporary world. Lance’s gnostic answer is to remake the 
world, rather than adapt his desires. He will construct an Eden in which his new, half- 
articulate Eve can survive and pose no threat to him. Thus, instead of wedding an Eve 
who was taken from his own flesh (and thereby whom he must love as his own body, 
according to St. Paul),47 he will choose a woman whose own flesh has been breached 
and broken. She will not partake of his nature, and he will not love her as Christ does 
the Church: “[I]f there cannot be love— you call that love out there? — there will be a 
tight-lipped courtesy between men. And chivalry toward women.” (L, p. 158) From 
the picture Lance paints, the women will need all the help they can get
It is in this image of battered, speechless woman that we see at last the motivation 
for Lance’s destruction of Belle Isle. Unable to win back Margot’s affections on the 
old terms— in fact quite unwilling to attempt anything like another Dionysian self­
abandon —  he embarks on his own project of historical restoration: he decides to 
return his current wife to the condition of his first Apart from the scar, we see another 
common thread in the women Lance loves— or at least those with whom he mates. 
Another image of woman recurs throughout the novel, until we cannot but believe that 
it is for Lance an internal image that he feels driven to reenact Thus he describes his 
very first glimpse of Anna:
Her door was open. She was thin and black-haired but I 
couldn’t see her face; it was turned to the wall, that wall, 
her knees drawn up. Her calves were, slim but well- 
developed and still surprisingly suntanned. Had she been 
a dancer? a tennis player? She reminded me of Lucy. (L,
p. 62)
47Ephesians 5: 30-32.
Much later in the novel, in the very first sexual act that Lance performs after his
“awakening," he encounters Raine in bed on the night of the planned explosion, even
as the gas fills the house: “Her legs were short but well-developed She looked like a
fourteen-year old girl who had spent twelve years dancing.” (L, p. 231) After a surge
of (justified) hatred allows him to become aroused, he buggers her, then leaves her
behind in the same fetal position in which he first discovered Anna and still remembers
Lucy: “[S]he closed her eyes and curled around me like a burning leaf. I left her
asleep next to Troy, the two nested like spoons.” (JL, p. 236)
This image recurs a final time at the very moment of truth, when Lance stirs •
groggily from Margot’s bed to light a lamp, having finally brought her around to his
point of view. Delirious with gas and grief, Margot has suggested, “We can start a
new life,” (JL, p. 244) and Lance jumps at the chance, crawling on all fours to get a
light so that they can plan a trip together. While he disclaims any serious intention to
Fr. Percival (“I was delirious too”), on a certain level he has achieved what he wanted
all along: he has tamed Margot, made her sickly and compliant Even as the room
explodes, he sees Margot in this light:
For a tenth of a second I could see her in the flaring, lying 
on her side like Anna, knees drawn up, cheek against her 
hands pressed palms together, dark eyes gazing at me. (L, 
p. 246)
Tragically, from his point of view, Margot cannot endure in this condition any 
more than Lucy could; indeed, her half-life is only one-tenth of a second. Gearly, he 
must discover a new partner, one who has already been victimized (and thereby 
“restored” in the perverse meaning he gives to virginity), and create for her a utopia in 
which her frailty can survive. In Lawson’s terms, he must cleanse the maternal garden 
by fire, and find a paradise with neither serpents nor trees, where temptation is
impossible, and from which he can never again be expelled— since he is the 
creator.48
In Lance’s masculine anti-paradise, it is unclear that sexual intercourse of any sort
will have a place. One of his earliest dreams depicts his future state:
We ate in silence, looking at each other. There was much 
to be done. We were making a new life. It was not the 
Old West and there was no frontier but we were making a 
new life, starting from scratch. There was no thought of 
“romance” or “sex” but only of making a new life. There 
was much to be done. (L, p. 37)
He later makes more explicit his plans for the proper place of sexuality in paradise:
There will be virtuous women who are proud of their 
virtue and there will be women of the street who are there 
to be fucked and everyone will know which is which....
A man, a youth, a boy will know which women are to be 
fucked and which to be honored and one will know who to 
fuck and who to honor.... Don’t talk to me of love until 
we shovel out the shit (JL, pp. 178-179)
Since Lance literally makes no provision for marriage and marital relations— and 
indeed, by the end of the novel has adopted a Sadean creed ( “the Great Secret of 
Life”) that equates all intercourse with rape— perhaps we ought to take him at his 
word. Insofar as he has thought the matter through, in his utopia sexual intercourse 
will be limited to “whoremongers” trafficking with “whores.” (L, p. 179) What 
motivates Lance to adopt such a desperately impractical creed, one so much more 
restrictive than the Southern tradition demands, is a radical demand for clarity. By 
virtue of his long episode of Dionysian abandon, and the loss of self that entailed, 
Lance feels his very identity assailed by the elision of distinctions— social, moral, 
sexual, personal— and will go to any lengths to preserve them.49 The nuanced
48Lawson, ‘"Spiritually in Los Angeles,’" pp. 754-764.
49Ren6 Girard traces the social origins of sacrificial violence to the anxiety attendant upon the 
breakdown of firm distinctions among people. It is not surprising that the same dynamic might apply 
within the psyche as w ell Cf. Violence and the Sacred, Patrick Gregory tr. (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins, 1977), p. 51.
Catholic doctrine on sexuality strikes him as particularly appalling, for its casuistic 
attention to context, intention, and subjective responsibility: “I won't have it your way 
with your God-bless-everything-because-it’s-good-only-don’t-but if you-do-it’s-not- 
so-bad. Just say whether a sweet hot cunt is good or no t" (L, p. 177)
Of course, such an inquiry makes no more sense to Fr. Percival than would the 
question of whether a shiny new Bowie knife is good or not— without any 
information on what Lance planned to do with i t  (In the event Lance makes good use 
of neither.) Lance is bright enough that he should be able to understand that his 
demand is impossible to satisfy; however, he has so overthrown the primacy of reason
—  long years before, perhaps in disgust at his father’s intellectual dilettantism—  that
he is not habituated to its use. Many of the objections he raises to Christianity (and
even to liberal modernity, which is finally impossible to defend) are susceptible to
rational response and debate— but Lance is far beyond listening to any such thing.
He has radically collapsed the levels of his own soul as described in D’Arcy's schema,
until his animus is a truncated vestige of the great, speculative masculine selves with
whom he identifies. Simpson points out this internal collapse:
[Although he dreams of the campaigns of the noble stoic 
Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Lancelot is a vividly 
degraded Stoic. Essentially he knows only the godhead of 
Twitch. Having undergone no spiritual metamorphosis 
like Jack Burden, he has simply returned eastward bearing 
the .44 of the Los Angeles private dick instead of the six- 
shooter of the cowboy.50
Since Lance has eschewed the use of a reason that might liberate him from Twitch
— by Platonic speculation on the nous, or by leading him to embrace the anima in an 
act of faith— he has in fact constructed his identity on the shaky foundation of sheer 
will. While in its highest moments of hubris, this will expresses itself as a world- 
shattering rebellion against the Creator, in cold fact it is little more than a petulant,
50Simpson, “Home By Way of California," p. 68.
futile resistance (such as Paglia celebrates) to nature itself, which Lance has defined as 
an omnivorous, omnipotent, cannibalistic womb. Lance's City on a Hill is built on 
sand, on the brink of the abyss.
Of the three novels we have so far considered, Lancelot contains the fewest overt
glimpses of the beatitude that is possible for an alienated man when he makes peace
with the feminine. Because the narrative is entirely presented from Lance’s point of
view, narrated by him to a (mostly) silent auditor Father John (Percival), our
knowledge of the narrative is thoroughly filtered through Lance’s own narrative
screen. Being intelligent, articulate and obsessed with his new spiritual vision, Lance
weaves this screen tightly— as if an internal propaganda ministry were already
censoring his broadcasts.51 Because his vision of the anima is so impoverished,
Lance is virtually unable to offer us a glimpse of that beatitude which the young Will
Barrett sought, which Binx Bolling characterized as
a place of quiet breathing and a deep sleep under the stars 
and next to the sweet earth. (M, p. 72)
Lance’s experience of the anima has been of engulfment, a Dionysian descent into 
the immanent during which his personality was nearly extinguished; it is unlikely that 
his carefully-constructed narrative should provide many glimpses into the healthier 
vision of the anima that Percy himself struggled to regain in the course of this troubling 
novel. That being so, it is easy for readers to come away from this novel with the 
impression that no salvation is possible for Lance (or perhaps for Southern man), that 
the gnomic series of responses Fr. John (Percival) finally offers at the end of the novel 
is simply a device, a weak attempt to impose an "open,” hopeful, Percyesque ending 
on the story of a soul that is closed.
51Lance Lamar’s messianic self-conception is the most vivid example in all of Percy’s fiction of 
what Voegelin calls a “Second Reality” (Voegelin, What is History? p. 112 ip , a self-consistent 
ideological construct that largely obscures ex distorts the objective order of being.
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Certainly, Fr. John does not offer us much to go on, much of a refutation to the 
dizzying gnostic summa to which he has subjected himself. Indeed, the novel ends 
just as he is about to begin his answer, to start explaining to Lance the “something you 
think I don’t know" (L, p. 256). Percy leaves us to imagine of what that response 
would consist, based on our knowledge of Fr. John’s character — gleaned entirely 
from Lance’s narration. For the reader, it is not enough simply to examine the 
deficiencies in Lance’s world view and character to determine what he needs to hear, 
then assume that this is what Fr. John will offer him. It is perfectly possible that the 
priest might (like Will Barrett) miss the point, or share some of Lance’s own blind 
spots, or prove as unpersuasive as the inarticulate Jesuit Ignatius Vogle in Flannery O* 
Connor’s “The Enduring Chill.”
Rather, we must briefly explore Fr. John’s character as Lance presents him to us 
throughout the narrative, to determine whether or not he is likely to offer Lance the sort 
of insights about the feminine that could help him correct his jaundiced vision — 
whether, indeed, Fr. John is any closer to an understanding of the anima than Lance.
I suggest he is, that Fr. John does indeed offer a glimpse into the anima, which if 
Lance were to pursue he might follow to the very edge of beatitude (then with the help 
of Grace, beyond). In his role within the text, that of a (virtually) silent auditor, 
offering support, implicit criticism, empathy and intuitive wisdom, Fr. John seems to 
be a practitioner of intellectus, the mode of knowing traditionally regarded as 
feminine.52 This mode depends more on the creation of a ground of connaturality with 
the object to be known than on the icy objectivity of Cartesian reason— which is one 
reason why Lance is so impatient with i t  Thus, Fr. John tries to understand Lance’s 
sin by listening to his story, and sharing in his feelings; when Lance investigates sin,
52Stem, p. 42.
he does so with hidden cameras, and his results resemble the findings of a particle 
accelerator.
Over and over again throughout the novel, Lance demands of Fr. John that the 
priest reduce his thought to sharp, rigid dichotomies, and complains bitterly when his 
demand is refused or disarmed:
You know the main difference between you and me?
With you everything seems to get dissolved in a kind of 
sorrowful solution. Poor weak mankind! The trouble is 
that in your old tolerant Catholic world-weariness you lose 
all distinctions. Love everything. Yes, but at midnight all 
cats are black, so what difference does anything make? (L, 
pp. 130—131)
This demand for absolute difference, for the discovery of radically incompatible 
polar oppositions (good/evil, male/female, etc.) in every aspect of human life is 
Lance's defense against the melting and dissolution of his identity that he experienced 
in his Dionysian, alcoholic past If Lance has reacted against the perceived tyranny of 
the anima by turning wholly against it, Fr. Percival has assimilated it as a normal 
element within his soul While Lance constantly demands distinctions, Fr. John 
responds by asking him repeatedly about love, the principle of unity. (Of course, such 
questions leave Lance puzzled.)
The priest’s very presence in the unrewarding environment of Lance’s cell 
suggests that he is capable of profound empathy and charity. He responds humbly to 
Lance’s dark suggestions that he may be troubled by sexual or romantic yearnings. 
Clearly, he has not transcended the human condition, by overcoming the regular 
friction between animus and anima that troubles the most balanced of souls. Equally, 
he has never descended into the depths of self-obliteration which Lance plumbed while 
under the spell of the bottle, nor has he felt the need to reject the anima in order to 
preserve his identity. For all that he seems a little melancholy, Fr. John appears to be a 
fairly healthy, balanced individual
This is all the more surprising, given that “Percival” used to frequent 
whorehouses — indeed he was “only happy in whorehouses” — the site where the 
feminine appears most clearly as pure object, absolutely Other. What are we to make 
of this? Perhaps that in his youth “Percival" felt as alienated from the anima as every 
other Percy hero, and sought out some form of non-threatening connection with i t  
What allowed him to grow spiritually, to move from a state where he sought sex 
without intimacy, to one where he can attain intimacy without sex? We don't know 
very much about “Percival,” but Lance does suggest that he was a young man given to 
sudden “leaps” — into rivers, into decisions, etc. —  someone for whom the “leap of 
faith” and even the “leapfrogging” from unbeliever to missionary priest would not be 
uncharacteristic. What Lance misses in his description of his friend is the gift of self 
that Fr. John's willingness to leap entailed. Whereas Lance assumes that it must be 
—  like “Percival’s” fondness for Verlaine— “a bit of an act,” a gesture made partly to 
impress onlookers, we see that there is something deeper going on. Fr. John would 
not have travelled to Africa, and certainly would not endure Lance’s abusive tirade, if 
he had not assimilated the principle of Christian charity that calls for self-sacrifice.
This is the level on which D’Arcy’s Dionysian principle of self-immolation (so often 
distorted by Romantic writers) receives its baptism, and becomes a mode of 
sanctification.
The whorehouse trips that Lance recalls taking with “Percival” also offer us
insights about the relationship between the friends:
Did it ever occur to you [asks Lance] that after we went to 
college we never touched each other. Do you remember 
walking down Bourbon Street behind two Russian 
soldiers who were holding hands? Do you remember 
sleeping in a motel bed in Jackson, Mississippi, with a 
whore between us? Why was it all right for us to 
simultaneously assault the poor whore between us but 
never once touch each other? (JL, p. 94)
Of course, there is some homosexual suggestion in this passage, where the 
female body appears as a matrix of connection between two males who seem to desire 
intimacy with each other. Such suggestions on Lance’s part occur elsewhere in the 
novel, as in the repeated allusions to the poet Verlaine. However, in line with the 
inverse-Freudianism that Percy employed, let me suggest that here the sexual 
dimension mainly stands in for something else. Trapped in the isolation of the Stoic 
self, the young Lance could not conceive of real intimacy with a woman, nor of 
physical affection (however muted) with a man. Thus, the two dimensions on which 
connection with another person are possible appear as irreconcilable to Lance; in fact, 
the prohibition against acknowledging female subjectivity turns out to be more 
powerful than the cultural prohibition of homosexuality— hence his “understanding” 
of his son’s sexuality. Literal buggery is more tolerable to Lance than the figurative 
buggery enacted by modem society, in its blurring of absolute sexual and moral 
distinctions.
In this passage, we see that “Percival” does indeed represent for Lance a figure of 
the feminine,33 an Other with whom empathy and intersubjectivity are possible, and 
from whom he may accept these without shame or the threat of engulfment Shelley 
Jackson suggests that Fr. John serves Lance as a maternal figure,54 offering him the 
nurturance and understanding he needs in a form that he can feel safe accepting. 
Certainly, Fr. John’s repeated affirmations at the end (“Yes," he says, over and over 
again) mirror the “fiat” attributed to the Blessed Virgin at the Annunciation— that 
exemplary moment of feminine virtue responding perfectly to the overtures of 
transcendent Grace. As both a man and (now) a celibate, Fr. John is doubly free of 
the taint of female sexual energy that Lance finds so threatening— and hence he is an
53It is no accident that one of the nicknames for Percival that Lance remembers is 'Pussy.' (L,
>
^Shelley Jackson, “The Privilege of Maternity," in Lawson, ed., p. 93.
acceptable audience before whom Lance can perform, a sort of Virgin with a few 
attributes of S t Michael
But the connection Lance forges with Fr. John is of limited depth and duration. 
Lance still feels both sexual desire and— more strongly— the heroic imperative to 
establish a familial household as the core element in the new order he intends to found. 
Therefore, he turns to Anna for companionship in his strange new endeavors, and 
decides that he will go off and live with her. The perversity of his intentions towards 
Anna leaves the reader (and Fr. John) feeling uneasy about his plan, hoping that 
whatever Fr. John has to say will make some impression on him before the officials 
unleash him on society. But one is not optimistic about this prospect
It is a sign of the profound personal struggle this novel represented for Percy that 
in his next work, The Second Coming, he was able to present the feminine not in the 
form of an androgynous, dying adolescent boy or a celibate priest, but as a young, 
physically vigorous woman with real sexual desire and a sharply intellectual 
subjectivity. Having worked through the most vicious truncations of the feminine at 
the hands of Lance, Percy was apparently able to conquer many of the Stoic/heroic 
expectations that had previously held him back. It is to this work that we now turn.
C hapter Five: The Second Coming — The Ecstasy in the Garden
In Percy’s fifth novel, the last that I will treat in the present study, we see the 
author striving to present for the first time in his fiction a clear, affirmative vision of 
what it would mean for a male character to accept and embrace the anima in all its 
complexity, and assimilate its contents as part of his own psyche— rather than as the 
unnameable, threatening or desirable Other. Conversely, we see here for the only time 
in Percy’s work a female figure who becomes the center of consciousness for much of 
the novel Many have agreed with Percy’s estimation that Allie is his most completely 
satisfactory woman; certainly she is the most fleshed-out, fully dimensional feminine 
character to inhabit his work. Remembering what we established in Chapter One— 
that the minor characters in Percy's novels (and thus most of the females) serve mainly 
to mirror aspects of the protagonist’s soul— we can see why it was artistically 
necessary for Percy to create Allie in such rich detail If he wished to depict a man 
who has come to be “un-alienated” — who has reconciled the gnostic spirit of negation 
with his thirst for a place where he can be at home in the world and “coincide with 
himself’— Percy needed a female love interest who could lead the hero in that direc­
tion. Will Barrett’s second story required a female protagonist, one who could serve 
as more than a weak or troubled dependent (like Kate in The Moviegoer, Lucy and 
Anna in Lancelot), a giggling cipher (like Kitty in The Last Gentleman and Moira in 
Love in the Ruins), or an embodiment of phony Southern tradition and sensuality (like 
Lola in Love in the Ruins and Margot in Lancelot).
In the course of this novel, as I will demonstrate, Will Barrett for the first time be­
comes reconciled to his status as a creature, a spirit incarnate in flesh. Consequently, 
the woman whom he comes to love (in an allegory of that reconciliation) must herself 
be balanced, intelligent and open to transcendence. Were she any less worthy, she 
would inspire in Will neither love nor learning, and he would go right on his
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melancholy dualistic way— looking to her for fulfillment of his emotional and sensual 
needs, even as he despised her for weighing down his transcendent, masculine spirit 
He would end like his father, or Lance Lamar, or at best Sutter Vaught
More clearly than in any of Percy’s other novels, The Second Coming 
demonstrates the spiritual importance of the anima, conceived of at its highest level 
(especially in Catholic Marian theology) as the receptive, life-giving power of the 
creature to respond positively to the Creator and to imbue the world of the flesh with 
meaning and value. In joining himself to Allie, Will does not risk the fate so dreaded 
by men in the heroic and Pierrotic traditions— the obliteration of his rationality, will 
and liberty.1 Rather, Will finds in Allie a powerful and positive counterbalance to the 
force of negation that unchecked animus has become in his soul, thanks to the 
materialist, Stoic heritage transmitted to Will from his father. Will sees in Allie a 
feminine sexual power that is not inimical but complementary to his spiritual 
aspirations, and that leads him at last to renounce the opposition between animus and 
anima, spirit and flesh, that has troubled him since his motherless infancy. He learns 
at last to see in eros a positive sign of agape.
For her part, Allie is not a figure of archetypal, “pure” femininity, nor a caricature 
of exaggerated, socially-constructed feminine traits. Rather, she is a three-dimensional 
character, a person with spiritual aspirations, a speculative rationality and a skeptical 
turn of mind. Oleksy suggests that we ought to see in her a reincarnation of the 
various mute or silent female characters who recur in Percy's fiction, whom male 
protagonists attempt to awaken into speech. If so, then Allie takes their stories to the 
next logical step, depicting what would happen if one of these women should talk back 
and extend the conversation into an ongoing exchange between equals. Oleksy gives 
this characteristic of Allie’s a feminist interpretation— tying her rediscovery of
1Kreyling, p. 125 if. As we saw in Chapter Four above, this is the fate to which Lance Lamar 
succumbed during his marriage to Margot.
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language to the endeavor o f‘‘reinventing the world of knowledge, of symbols, of 
images’* to accord with the aspirations to power of certain politicized women of the 
left2
While this is on the surface a plausible interpretation, it seems to me an 
impoverishing one. Allie*s recovery of speech resonates on many more levels than the 
political, as we see when we consider the role of language in the body of Percy’s 
work. He believes — and tries mightily to prove in The Message in the Bottle and 
Lost in the Cosmos— that man’s power to convey meaning through language is in 
itself the sign that marks the species apart from the mute world of nature, of 
mechanistic (“dyadic”) energy exchanges. The “triadic" nature of human 
communication differentiates his symbol-mongering from the signal-transmission of 
chimps, birds and bees— and serves both to constitute his kinship to the transcendent 
God and to threaten him with alienation from himself. This “delta factor” makes it 
impossible for him ever entirely to “coincide with himself’ in the manner of a cat, or to 
be satisfied with the satisfaction of his needs. Man must always look beyond himself, 
whether drawn by glimmers of the infinite o r— more likely, for Percy— goaded by a 
sense that this world is “farcical,” devoid of self-sufficient meaning, which can only 
come from elsewhere, from above.
Hie quest for transcendence on which Percy’s characters find themselves, all 
unwilling, can take wholesome and unwholesome forms, as we have seen throughout 
his novels— resulting in everything from the heroic good works of Val Vaught to the 
angelism/bestialism of her brother Sutter and the Stoic nihilism of Ed Barrett It is a 
quest that each of Percy’s heroes and anti-heroes undertakes, and that most of his 
minor characters evade. Because the quest is a source of terrible anxiety and danger, 
the temptation is strong to avoid it, to pretend that the satisfaction of immanent needs
Oleksy, p. 64.
(perhaps laid over with a veneer of religious practice or rhetoric) will suffice to quell 
the troubled human heart As I noted in Chapter Four, such intellectually dishonest 
stratagems rarely fool the skeptical Percy protagonist for long; from Kate Cutrer to 
Sutter Vaught, their keen sense of smell detects such "merde” with ease. Frequently, 
they experience a sense of suffocation or tenor when someone proselytizes them on 
behalf of such a world view; above, I used the term “spiritual castration" to describe 
this phenomenon, in which a putative authority figure attempts to sever the 
protagonist’s access to the divine Masculine.
In The Second.Coming, Allie is threatened with this fate, as authority figures 
(from Daddy to Sarge to Kitty Vaught and Dr. Duk) try to mold her into social roles 
for which she is ill-suited, threatening to explode her fragile identity into a “red giant," 
(SC, p. 90) a hollow shell that is defined only by external boundaries. In D’Arcy’s 
terms, we might say that in Allie the anima has become distorted and domineering, and 
if unchecked will dissolve her vital core of selfhood into a Dionysian sea of otherness 
— other people’s expectations, commands and definitions. To avoid this fate, Allie 
has turned in on herself, in search of the core (or animus) where self-interest, rational 
analysis and independent adulthood reside. Alas, to her parents this withdrawal seems 
like nothing but the final stage of a suicidal depression, and Allie is hospitalized and 
subjected to electroshock therapy in an effort to drive her back out into the world.
Allie herself diagnoses the flaw in this treatment option:
I have to go down first. You’re trying to keep me up.
Down?
I have to go down down down before I go up. Down 
down in me to i t  You shouldn’t try to keep me up by 
buzzing me up .... I need to go down to my white 
dwarf....
A red giant collapses into a white dwarf. Hard and 
bright as a diamond. That’s what I was trying to do when 
my mother found me in the closet going down to my white 
dwarf. (SC, p. 90)
Because she resists her parents' and her doctor's attempts to dissolve her 
individuality, making a key distinction between “the meow I and the inside deep-I- 
defy,” (SC, p. 89) Allie qualifies as an authentic existential hero, of the sort Percy 
admired in the works of Sartre, Kierkegaard, and Camus. Not so much by a 
conscious act of rebellion as out of necessity, in order to survive, Allie reinvents 
herself after her escape from the hospital, using the vital medium of writing to inscribe 
“INSTRUCTIONS FROM MYSELF TO MYSELF’ (SC, p. 27) On a practical level 
these journal entries are a means to evade the amnesia induced by electroshock therapy. 
Viewed figuratively, they represent Allie's rational core (animus) attempting to impose 
order on her anima, the part of her most subject to manipulation and external control. 
We might say that the masculine elements in her soul are awakening, in order to define 
and defend reasonable limits between her will and what others have imposed upon her, 
between her identity and the social pressures that have threatened it. The woman who 
emerges from the awakening will be, for all her eccentricities and weaknesses, a fully- 
grown adult whose penetrating mind can see through social pretensions and linguistic 
frauds. It is precisely this quality of mind that Will celebrates late in the novel when he 
tells Allie: “You’re Sutter turned happy!” (SC, p. 263) To be more specific, we see in 
Allie someone who has assimilated the skeptical/ Stoic/existentialist critique of society 
and convention, the ascetic search for authentic selfhood, without coming to the 
corrosive conclusions embraced by Sutter Vaught and other failed seekers, from Aunt 
Emily to Ed Barrett.
What has made the difference in Allie's case? What allows her to reject mother 
and father, go forth into the wilderness, and reinvent language from scratch— without 
falling victim to the utopian fantasies of a Lance Lamar, the contemptuous despair of 
her uncle Sutter? Put briefly, the answer is: humility. Fully aware that she is 
wounded (fallen), Allie is unafraid to rethink her hesitant conclusions about the 
mysterious world of language and other language-users that she has re-entered,
unashamed finally to ask Will to “be my guardian." (SC, p. 263) Unlike Sutter— 
who has embraced cynicism as a persona and a vocation, a shield that renders him 
invulnerable— Allie is willing cautiously to climb beyond the restrictions of her 
(reinvigorated) animus, to extend herself through the mystery of love to another 
wounded soul. Before she can do that, however, she must clearly demarcate for 
herself what her independent abilities are, what she wants from the world, which of its 
values are fraudulent and which legitimate. Only then, once her task of individuation 
is complete, can she enter an interdependent relationship whose complementary nature 
mirrors the balance within her newly ordered soul.
As Oleksy points out, Allie Huger is the culmination of a series of wounded, 
inarticulate or mute female characters who appear in most of Percy’s novels (such as 
Kate Cutrer, Lancelots Anna, the mute girl in The Last Gentleman and several 
women patients in The Thanatos Syndrome). Oleksy suggests that these figures 
“bring to mind what recent feminist criticism has to say on the subject of the repression 
of femininity."3 I propose that the converse is true; that these women have indeed 
suffered repression, but it is the masculine aspects of their souls that have been 
stunted or thwarted by violence or disability— the verbal, self-assertive, analytical 
self,4 the animus. For a philosophical author such as Percy who makes language the 
key to his anthropology, the loss of verbal power is a vivid emblem of dehumanization 
and suffering— equal in seriousness to the suicidal fantasies that haunt most of his 
male protagonists. (It is no accident that so autobiographical an author draws upon his 
daughter's deafness and his father’s suicide for the two central icons of pathos in his 
fiction.)
301eksy, p. 62.
4Here I use “analytical" as the converse of “synthetic” to distinguish two modes of reasoning; 
see the distinction between intellectus and ratio articulated in Chapter One and in Stem, p. S3 ff.
In fact, the figure of a silenced woman— a human being cut off from half of her 
self — is the mirror image of the suffering Percy hero. For he is alienated by a 
Manichaean heritage from the world of nature, the body, knowledge by synthesis 
(intellectus), and all the other powers of the anima— a debility at least as serious as 
muteness, indeed often fatal. To achieve salvation, or at least its earthly analogue, 
Percy’s male character must overcome this spiritual imbalance and learn to see the 
positive value in the anima, the feminine. Similarly, Percy’s mute or wounded woman 
must awaken into the world of language, the human power that (Percy holds) raises 
man above the animals and marks him with a transcendent destiny.
In each of Percy’s novels before The Second Coming, this process of mutual 
salvation was imperfect, incomplete or aborted. This fact is clearest in Lancelot, 
Percy’s most Jungian novel; in it, the overly articulate and violently dualistic Lance 
thinks he has found a lifemate in Anna, who has been raped into silence and sexual 
passivity (“a kind of virginity”). Rather than seeking someone who can both represent 
the feminine and awaken its power within him— and thereby re-connect his sundered 
self—  Lance has sought instead a passive icon of “pure” femininity, who can assist 
him in living out a fantasy of “pure” masculinity that amounts at last to demonism. 
While Lance learns in the course of the novel that there is a certain value to the 
feminine, he never learns to consider it as a part of his own soul, something that 
prepares him for union with other people and with God. Consequently, when Anna 
begins again to speak, she disappoints Lance’s fantasies and deflates them with a 
cutting remark that indicates how futile his dreams of political and sexual utopia have 
been. She is not “pure” femininity, but a human being, an amalgam of animus and 
anima; by implication, so is Lance. His desire to become purely masculine is thereby 
unmasked as the ambition to become a god, who creates and dominates his own
universe. Lance suffers from an extreme form of the gnostic impulse, about which 
Voegelin and Finlay write.5
Only in The Second Coming does Percy find the means to represent both aspects 
of the struggle for wholeness, that of the silenced woman as well as that of the 
alienated man, which is perhaps why many readers find it so uplifting. In depicting 
both poles of human alienation, and attempting to reconcile them within the space of a 
contemporary novel, Percy undertook his most ambitious literary project; this is 
perhaps why so many critics were disappointed. Without attempting to decide how 
artistically successful was the result, I hope to demonstrate in this chapter that The 
Second Coming does resolve many of the tensions and answer many of the questions 
raised by earlier Percy novels, and that his use of masculine and feminine imagery to 
represent principles within the human soul is more sophisticated here than in his 
previous novels. Consequently, the theological allegory is clearer, and the novel’s 
affirmation of a sacramental world view more resounding.
The split that divides Percy’s characters has always been connected, causally or 
symbolically, with violence. In The Moviegoer, the Stoic refusal to partake in the 
world of creatures is represented by a tiny sword in Aunt Emily’s hands, and enacted 
in the suicidal heroism that drove Binx’s father to die in the “wine dark sea.’’ In The 
Last Gentleman, young Will’s sexual confusion (most vividly experienced as he seeks 
out Kitty in Central Park) recalls for him Ed Barrett’s rigid sexual mores— and the 
night of his suicide. Without going into all the real and sublimated violence that marks 
Lance Lamar’s relations with women, one need only point to Anna, who has been 
deprived by an act of hideous violence of both speech and sanity. (The correlation 
between self-division and violence can be seen in Love in the Ruins and The Thanatos 
Syndrome, as well.)
5Voegelin, New Science, p. 124; Finlay, p. 17.
In The Second Coming, violence is the continuing metaphor for this self-division, 
the means by which it is peipetuated, and finally, we will see, the means by which it is 
overcome. Violence— imposed from outside, or contemplated against oneself— 
dominates this story of a boy who was traumatized by his father’s attempt to murder 
him, and a girl whose vety ego has been almost erased through electroshock (with her 
parents' approval). Each character has suffered from the abuse of parental authority, 
and each has been violated and split off from vital internal resources, without which he 
(she) will languish and perhaps perish. Beginning the story at opposite poles, so to 
speak— one of them alienated from anima, the other from animus— they are drawn 
together by their complementary quests for completion. As each explores the extent 
and nature of the mysterious lack that troubles him (her), their mutual attraction 
deepens, and when force of circumstances drives them together, their union is hardly 
surprising to the reader. What I will explore in the remainder of this chapter is the 
nature of the lack that each feels, viewed psychologically and metaphysically; the 
process of discovery by which it is unveiled and addressed; and the theological 
allegory that underlies their mutual redemption.
The presence of violence and suffering, and their meaning within the moral 
universe of the novel, are key to the proper understanding of this story. Susan Derwin 
suggests, in her ingenious deconstructive reading of the novel, that the very nature and 
limitations of human language dictate that attempts to represent the self linguistically— 
to “name” it, in Percy’s terms— must entail an act of violence, the brutal suppression 
of that part of the self that resists or refuses representation. In this light that interprets 
Will Barrett’s memory of his father’s suicide/murder attempt, and virtually every other 
act of violence in the story; for her, these acts are Percy's attempt to portray the 
ambivalence inherent in the use of language and in self-representation. Here is how 
she allegorizes Ed Barrett’s suicide, and its meaning for his son:
(T]he “unspeakable” process of naming is here taken back 
into the mouth in the form of the gun. The method of the 
father’s suicide dramatizes the interrelation of death and the 
constitution of the self: the orality of taking a double-barrel 
gun into the mouth reflects both the desire to reincorporate 
the lost part of the self that has been split through the 
creation of identity, to take it back into oneself, and the 
sado-masochistic aggressivity of the self vis-k-vis its 
expropriated other, which is stimulated by the need to keep 
the other out of bounds of the self.
Neither the phallocentricity of the suicide nor its 
ambivalence can be assimilated to distinctions of gender.
Rather, the act of naming, to which both sexes are subject, 
is itself gendered. Both Will and Allie react against this 
phallocentricity.6
Derwin disputes the conventional reading of the novel as a redemptive tale of the 
rediscovery of language and the renunciation of death, pointing to the lingering images 
of violence that haunt the novel even after Will’s supposed conversion, and the 
inevitable violence that (for her) attends the use of language. The only redemption that 
occurs in the novel on her reading results from the skepticism towards language and 
naming that Allie acquires and passes along to Will (and presumably to the reader).
While I must dispute her conclusion— that is a direct result of her (apparently 
Lacanian) definition of language— Derwin’s essay offers important insights for the 
more “orthodox” reading that I am attempting here. According to Percy’s own theory 
of language— explicated in various essays, most exhaustively in Lost in the Cosmos 
—  the fundamental anxiety and unhappiness that pervade human life derive from the 
unique problems created by a linguistic attempt to “name” the self, or “place” it “within 
a world.” (LC, p. 110) While he often celebrates the power of language to generate 
meaning and create communion between selves, (MB, p. 45) Percy also locates in 
man’s linguistic nature the root of his discontent:
The self in a world is rich or poor accordingly as it 
succeeds in identifying its otherwise unspeakable self, e.g. 
mythically, by identifying itself with a world-sign, such as
6Susan Derwin, “Orality, Aggression, and Epistemology in Walker Percy's The Second 
ComingArizona Quarterly, 45:2 (Summer 1989), p. 80.
a totem; religiously, by identifying itself as a creature of 
God....
In a post-religious age the only recourses of the self are 
self as transcendent and self as immanent. (LC, p. 122)
While here Percy emphasizes the increase in human alienation caused by recent
intellectual history— the arrival of a “post-religious age” — in other passages he
makes it clear that this problem is perennial, rooted in man’s very (fallen) nature:
The exile from Eden is, semiodcally, the banishment of the 
self-conscious self from its own world of signs....
The semiodc history of this creature thereafter could be 
written in terms of the successive attempts, both heroic and 
absurd, of the signifying creature to escape its nakedness 
and to find a permanent semiodc habilment for itself— 
often by identifying itself with other creatures in its world.
(LC, p. 109)
This opdon of identification with creatures of a lesser dignity than man (birds, 
animals, nations), Percy calls “totemism.” In D’Arcy’s terms, this interpretation of the 
self assimilates the whole person to the anima, and seeks to extinguish the 
(transcendent) spark of human individuality in the mass of (immanent) nature or 
culture. Percy distinguishes primitive totemisms from modem attempts to construe the 
“self as immanent” by pointing out that the latter mode is certified by a “lay reading” of 
the results of science, an easy assumption on the part of educated, modem people that 
reductionist theories of man have been “proven” by experiment, and the claims of 
Jewish-Christian anthropology disproved.7 This second-hand science entails in the lay 
reader
a perceived loss of sovereignty to “them,” the transcending 
scientists and experts of society. As a consequence, the 
self sees its only recourse as an endless round of work, 
diversion, and consumption of goods and services.
Failing this and having some inkling of its plight, it sees 
no way out because it has come to see itself as an organism 
in an environment and so can’t understand why it feels so
7Tolson documents Percy’s own youthful flirtation with this point of view, especially as 
summed up by H.G. Wells and Julian Huxley in their catechism of scientism, The Science o f Life. In 
his search for certainty amidst a chaotic family life, Percy turned to the apparent certainties of 
progress, rationality and positivism. Cf. Tolson, pp. 96-97. For a fictional parallel, see Jack Burden’s 
brief devotion to the HGod of the Great Twitch” in All the King’s Men.
bad in the best of all possible environments. (LC, pp. 123- 
124)
The other option Percy specifies, to view the self as transcendent by identifying it 
exclusively with the animus, I have discussed in detail in previous chapters, with 
attention to characters' attempts to deny their status as creatures and deify themselves 
through gnostic or Stoic speculation, or Cartesian abstraction.
Over and over again in his novels Percy has depicted the plight of these would-be 
transcenders; only in The Second Coming does he explore the inner world of one o f 
the transcended. Wounded and hampered by the rigid social demands imposed upon 
her, by parents and lovers who have educated her to remain within the narrow 
boundaries of immanent, consumerist existence, Allie comes to realize that throughout 
her previous life “I was following instructions." (SC, p. 40) Her decision to escape 
from the asylum results from an awakening experience, which she recalls in an internal 
dialogue between animus and anima:
It took me (you, us?) all my life to make the discovery.
Why so long? And then I (you, we) had to go crazy to do 
it?
... What was my (your, our) discovery? That I could act.
I was free  to act
This awakening from the sphere of pure immanence— of the self anesthetize, 
functioning not as a self in a world but as an organism in an environment— parallels 
closely the “discovery" Lance Lamar makes after discovering his wife's adultery. (L, 
p. 65) Like Lance, Allie compares herself to Rip Van Winkle, (SC, p. 25) and goes 
off to groom herself, to cut away the dross of the immanent past in preparing for a 
future in which transcendence will be possible again.
But such parallels are imperfect and these two characters will awaken to very 
different versions of transcendence. First Lance was himself responsible for his 
anesthetize condition, having drunk himself into oblivion; Allie was largely the victim 
of bad parents and inappropriate therapy. Whereas Lance responds to his “discovery" 
by retreating into his pigeonnaire to research the nature of evil through hidden cameras
and spying, Allie ventures forth into the world of other people, seeing them afresh 
with the curiousity of a highly intelligent child. If Lance retires to his bath to shave 
alone and brood on his own naked image in the minor, Allie goes cheerfully to a hair 
salon to have her locks clipped by a friendly beautician. At the end of his story, Lance 
Lamar creates an infernal hearth, tapping into the deadly, explosive gas that lies under 
his house in order to blow the place sky-high; in her story, Allie transports and 
rebuilds a functioning hearth, and taps into the “cave air” that arises in her own ruined 
house, which she can use to grow orchids (those emblems of the feminine that 
disturbed Lance so much).
Even as she develops her internal resources, especially that animus that is 
essential to individual autonomy, Allie never turns away from the world of others. 
While Lance creates for himself a long heritage of heroes who became leaders, and 
dreams of a future in which he can command followers to recreate a world in accord 
with his demands, Allie seeks to establish her own independent existence and psychic 
identity so that she may interact with other people without being dominated by them.
In the end, whereas Lance Lamar wishes to transcend his condition as a creature, Allie 
looks only to locate that part of herself that is free, which transcends explanation (and 
manipulation) by parent or doctor.
In this contrast lies the key to interpreting so many of Percy’s characters— and 
perhaps the author himself. Each of his heroes, to one degree or another, is troubled 
by the modem, mechanistic views of man (from Hegel right on through Marx, Freud 
and Skinner) that threaten to reduce individuals to ciphers, predictable units devoid of 
free will, operating according to immutable laws. Percy characters who rebel against 
such schemes usually do so by adopting an arc of transcendence that exempts them 
from the general deterministic system. So the Stoicism of Aunt Emily, the scientism of 
young Will Barrett and Dr. Tom More, and the gnostic demonism of Lance Lamar. 
Each adopted world-view represents an attempted avenue of escape, of self-delivery
(or auto-salvation) from the world of meaningless immanence. If these escape 
attempts do not end in suicide or murder, they frequently involve violence of some 
kind, as characters attempt to demonstrate their freedom by refusing to take the path of 
rational self-interest, choosing like Dostoevsky’s Underground Man to thwart 
determinism by behaving iiradonally. (At best, the violence they entail is internal, and 
amounts to the brutal suppression of aspects of the self, something of which Derwin 
spoke more sweepingly, e.g., Aunt Emily’s stem self-discipline.)
The problem with these attempts from an orthodox Christian point of view is that 
they are self-driven and ultimately self-centered. Rather than representing an openness 
to the Grace that alone makes virtuous actions and salvation possible (in both Catholic 
and Protestant theology), these schemes represent attempts by immanent beings to 
create transcendence from their own resources— a quest doomed to futility, absent an 
intervening miracle.
Arguably, that is what many of Percy’s characters are looking for Sutter in the 
desert with Jamie and the emptied water bottles; Ed Barrett attempting a murder/suicide 
that does not come off; finally, Will Barrett descending into the bowels of the earth to 
demand (!) that God give him a sign of His existence.8 In none of these cases does the 
character receive a sign he can recognize as miraculous— yet in each instance, there is 
something mysterious that could point to Divine intervention. Neither Sutter nor Ed 
Barrett interprets the events in that light, and each one goes still further into his 
despair. Will Barrett, alone of Percy’s unbelieving characters, moves within the space 
of the novel from a gnostic to an orthodox Christian position— and key to his 
conversion is a sequence of events that can arguably be called miraculous.
8Hiis recalls a line of W Ji Auden’s: "We who must die demand a miracle,” For the Time 
Being: A Christmas Oratorio in Martin Halverson, ed., Religious Drama I  (New York: Meridian 
Books, 1957), p. 17.
In going down into the cave to await a sign from God, Will attempts to place 
himself in the prophetic tradition of the Old and New Testaments, using language that 
recalls the experiences of Isaiah and S t John the Baptist, among others: “My 
experiment is simply this: I shall go to a desert place and wait for God to give me a 
sign.” (SC, p. 193)
Interestingly, Will does not in fact go into a desert (as Sutter did) but rather makes 
a descent into the underworld, a trip that echoes the Western epic tradition. For 
Orpheus, Odysseus, Aeneas, Dante and Jesus (the primary type of the hero for two 
millennia9) a trip into the world of shadows inhabited by monsters and unredeemed 
souls was a key element in the story of their triumph over the forces of darkness and 
death. At the same time, Will Barrett’s trip partakes of the modem scientific spirit; like 
every good empirical scientist since the Renaissance, Will seeks empirical evidence 
obtained by experiment that can guarantee the veracity of his results, without the need 
for Faith. Witness his own words:
If no sign is forthcoming I shall die. But people will 
know why I died: because there is no sign. The cause of 
my death will be either his nonexistence or his refusal to 
manifest himself, which comes to the same thing as far as 
we are concerned Only you [Sutter] know the nature of 
the experiment. I give you permission to publish the 
results in a scientific journal of your choice. (SC, p. 193)
The Faustian nature of Will’s endeavor becomes all the clearer from the Cartesian
language he uses to describe it:
My project is the first scientific experiment in history to 
settle once and for all the question of God’s existence....
We have had five thousand years of maybes and that is 
enough. Can you find a single flaw in this logic?
I’ve got him!
No more tricks!
No more deus absconditus!
No, I do not mean to joke. What I am doing is asking 
God with the utmost respect to break his silence.
No, not asking. Requiring. (SC, p. 192)
9Kreyling, p. 4.
By looking for religious truth in this manner, Will reveals that his attitude towards
transcendence is gnostic, according to the textbook description given by Voegelin,
which I cited above in Chapter One. It is worth recalling here:
The attempt at immanendzmg the meaning of existence is 
fundamentally an attempt at bringing our knowledge of 
transcendence into a firmer grip than the cognitiofidei, the 
cognition of faith, will afford; and Gnostic experiences 
offer this firmer grip in so far as they are an expansion of 
the soul to the point where God is drawn into the existence 
of man.10
Thus in attempting to compel God to answer, to offer a positive revelation of His 
existence, M il Barrett brings together all the masculine types that we have found 
throughout Percy’s previous novels: most prominently the Southern Stoic hero and the 
Cartesian scientist Combining these two types and bringing their hubris into 
desperately sharp focus as he stakes his very life on this mad experiment Will Barrett 
fancies himself fulfilling a third type, that of a pro phet who will (even in death) 
proclaim the truth or falsity of God. In the event Will does not fulfill any of the 
expectations created by these types. Receiving no public revelation, M il cannot 
imagine himself a prophet who will answer the tel igious doubts of others. Unlike the 
Southern Stoic hero, he does not through his force of will energize a community to 
restore the social order, or the Faith that undergirded it; he simply undertakes a solitary 
misadventure. M il’s sole contact with the Southern tradition in the cave comes 
through the traces of a Confederate sniper that he finds (or imagines) in the cave, traces 
that are mute and meaningless. His scientific quest fails, because the sign he receives 
from God, if it is a sign, is merely a toothache— an event capable of a purely natural 
explanation. (Hardly likely convince to unbelievers of God’s existence, this sign 
would not pass muster with the religious authorities at Lourdes.) Descartes would not 
be satisfied.
10Voegelin, New Science, p. 124.
Will Barrett, however, does not opt out of the entire masculine tradition, rejecting 
heroic conventions and pretensions to transcendent meaning in favor of a feminist 
pantheism. Far from i t  Percy goes out of his way to ridicule believers in such 
systems (“Californians” according to his shorthand), particularly in his treatment of 
Kitty and her absurd notions about reincarnation. Given Percy's ongoing 
preoccupation (especially in Lost in the Cosmos and The Thanatos Syndrome) with 
defending the transcendent dignity and destiny of man — and Percy's respect for 
objective science —  it is hardly likely that he would have seen salvation as lying in an 
immanentist “Goddess" theology that minimizes man’s distinctness from and dominion 
over nature.
As Kreyling points out, Will Barrett, like Percy’s other heroes, still partakes in
the broader tradition of the Western epic:
Walker Percy’s fiction seeks to reimplant the hero at the 
center of a world order, revoke the feeling of being 
extraneous that has hampered him, and assert his necessity 
once again.11
As we see at the end of the novel, when Will organizes a group of patients from his de­
ceased wife’s nursing home to resume productive activity, after rescuing Allie from the 
schemes of parent and psychiatrist, he undertakes precisely this endeavor; he attempts 
on a small scale to restore a community that has been endangered or destroyed by 
modem ideologies (in this case reductionist scientism fueled by a paternalist 
humanism). There is one key difference, one spiritual advance that places the mature 
Will Barrett on a higher spiritual plane than Lance Lamar, who also hoped to do restore 
community after a fashion: Will has been transformed in the image of the Western 
hero after the type o f Christ. I f Kreyling is right to assert that the figure of Jesus 
exerted a determinative force on subsequent heroes in the West, it is equally true that
K̂reyling, p. 166,
many later permutations of this figure perverted the meaning of the Incarnation and
Crucifixion. (For instance, in popular Southern usage the theological term
“Redeemer” was used to describe the white aristocrats who defeated Reconstruction
government and brought back white supremacy.) Certainly, we find such perversions
in most of the Southern narratives that Kreyling cites, wherein the hero is primarily
military and authoritarian in his endeavors. For the space of a novel, Will Barrett
brings the Christian, Western hero back to his roots, to the figure of the Suffering
Christ Himself. (SC, p. 236)
While many Percy characters have temporarily overcome the anxiety induced by
transcendence through violence or accidents— see Binx’s foxhole experience, M il
crouching under Ewell McBee’s sniper fire, Sutter with part of his cheek blown off—
Will is the first Percy hero whom one can say is in any sense a Christ-figure.12 Just as
in previous novels, the characters embodying the feminine tended to reside outside the
protagonist (viz. Anna in Lancelot), so in Percy’s earlier works Christ figures occurred
in the form of young adolescents (Lonnie and Jamie) to whom the protagonist related
as a friend or protector. Their sufferings had religious meaning, to be sure, if one
looked for it, but it was a meaning that Binx and Will were free to miss, since it
resided outside them. In the present novel, the hero himself undergoes a kind of
Passion. The rebirth he experiences under the care of Allie stands as an answer to the
question he posed earlier in the novel:
When [Leslie] was five years old and we were living in 
New York, she got hit by a car in Central Park. I thought 
she was going to die. She was in great pain. When she lay 
in her hospital bed she looked up at me and asked me:
“Why?” “Why what?” I said, but I knew what she meant 
I opened my mouth to say something, but there was 
nothing to say except that I didn’t know why and that I 
would gladly have given my life to stop her from hurting,
12Hus is emphatically not to suggest that Will Barrett is a perfect or even particularly likeable 
figure; but then, neither was O’Connor’s Misfit.
but she didn't want to hear that I gnawed at my arm at the 
prospect of her suffering. Is that love? (SC, pp. 196-197)
For a Christian, the answer is clearly yes— particularly for a Catholic who 
believes that the economy of salvation allows for substitutionary suffering by 
creatures.13 Far from being a meaningless side effect of the mechanistic function of a 
godless universe— as Percy’s Stoic heroes have believed— suffering can have a 
profound significance for human life, and not simply under the Classical rubric of 
pathos that leads to tragic knowledge. Rather, within the Christian scheme to which 
Percy subscribed, suffering is an essential part of the process of divinization, of the 
transformation of the individual into an alter Christus, another Christ, through 
incorporation into the Mystical Body, the Church. Seen in this light, Susan Derwin’s 
assertions14 about the inherent violence entailed in the creation of the self gain new 
validity: as she noted, even on the natural level there is always a mortification involved 
in the creation (or transformation) of a human self.
It seems clear that for Percy, insofar as a self recognizes its transcendent destiny 
and undertakes to attain it by submitting to Grace, that self must indeed commit 
violence upon itself.15 It must prune away the tendencies towards spiritual extremity 
that tempt it away from the middle path, and resist the polarities of “pure” anima or 
animus, of materialism and gnosticism, cleaving firmly to the embodied transcendence- 
made-historical that is the Jewish-Christian Revelation. Specifically, Percy’s
13 Perhaps the most concise statement of this theological precept can be found in the work of 
the great English Catholic Fr. Frederick Wilhelm Faber: ‘The law of the Incarnation is a law of 
suffering. Our Blessed Lord was the man of sorrows, and by suffering He redeemed the world. His 
passion was not a mystery detached from the rest of His life, but only the fitting and congruous end of 
i t  Calvary was not unlike Bethelehem and Nazareth. It exceeded them in degree; it did not differ from 
them in kind. The whole of the Three and Thirty Years was spent in consistent suffering, though it 
was of various kinds, and was not of uniform intensity. This same law of suffering, which belongs to 
Jesus, touches all who come nigh Him, and in proportion to their holiness, envelops them, and claims 
them wholly for itself.” The Foot o f the Cross (Rockford, IL: TAN Books, 1978), p. 13.
14Derwin, p. 80 ff.
15“If any man would come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me. 
For whoever would save his life will lose it; and whoever loses his life for my sake and the gospel’s 
will save it" (Mark 9:34-45).
protagonist must emerge from the “wintry kingdom of self* and renounce the lonely
Stoic throne (SSL, p. 86); in a world of other people (and finally in a corporate
Church) he may work out his salvation— and even find a profitable use for his heroic
ambitions. However, this salvation is only possible for the Percy protagonist—
burdened as he is with all the hubris of Stoic and Cartesian “transcendence” — if he
undergoes a mortification, and a metamorphosis. Insofar as he defines himself
according to what I called in Chapters One and Two “the demonic masculine” — the
icy Apollonian self of Paglia, Sartre and de Sade— he must “die.” A rebirth is
possible— even a resurrection of the hero— but only in the likeness of a very
different hero, after the image of Christ
This mortification and metamorphosis of which I speak begins in the depths of
the earth, in the cave. We see the first obscure allusions to this process in the
(otherwise puzzling) hallucination sequence. Beside him Will sees an ancient tiger:
As he absently explored the beast, hide now hardened and 
chitinous as a locust, his hand felt along the spine as if it 
were looking for the slit where the creature escaped. There 
was no slit, but the skin had loosened in preparation for 
the molt... Whatever is here is more than a dying tiger.
Yet it is not a tiger giving birth or a tiger molting and being 
transformed like a cicada. It is the same tiger but different 
He watched curiously until he saw the joke. Then he 
grew sleepy and lay down beside the beast (SC, p. 222)
This creature “is more than a dying tiger”; indeed, it resonates on a number of
levels. First of all, it is a cat, reminding Will of the cat whose comfortable self-identity
he envied earlier in the novel:
Sitting there in the sun with its needs satisfied, for whom 
one place was the same as any other place as long as it was 
sunny— no nonsense about old haunted patches of weeds 
in Mississippi or a brand-new life in a brand-new place in 
Carolina— the cat was exactly a hundred percent cat, no 
more no less. As for Will Barrett, as for people nowadays 
—  they were never one hundred percent themselves.
... There was his diagnosis, then. A person nowadays is 
two percent himself. And to arrive at a diagnosis is 
already to have anticipated the cure: how to restore the 
ninety-eight percent? (SC, p. 16)
Thus a cat for Will is an emblem of organic, non-linguistic creation— man in his
animality, a condition in which he cannot remain content because of the upward pull of
language. This analysis of the human quandary — whose outline comes from a
Sartrean notion of the “self-as-nothingness” (or “suck of Self’ in Percy’s language)—
typically finds its solution in Percy’s novels through episodes of violence such as
Binx’s foxhole epiphany in Korea, young Will's accident in the art museum, Sutter’s
suicide attempts, and (in this novel) Ewell McBee’s sniper attack. As the narrator
muses while the bullets fly:
[I]n the next instant he was transformed. It was as if the 
sting in his calf had been the injection of a powerful drug.
Quicker than any drug, in the instant in fact of hearing and 
recognizing the gunshot, he was, as he expressed it, 
miraculously restored to himself. The cat of course had 
jumped four feet straight up and fled in terror, as any 
sensible animal would, reduced instantly to zero percentile 
of its well-being. But Barrett? The missing ninety-eight 
percent is magically restored. (SC, p. 17)
As he lies in the cave growing weaker from hunger, Will agqin undergoes this
restoration, as the narrator notes:
The joke was that for the first time in the history of the uni­
verse it was the man who knew who he was, who was as 
snug as a bug in his rock cocoon, and the beast who did 
not, who was fretful, unsure of himself and the future, 
unsure what he was doing here. The tiger asked: Is this 
the place for me? Will I be happy here? Will the others 
like me? Will my death be a growth experience?
But how can you be dead and grow? Dead is dead.
(SC, p. 222)
The joke here— really a piece of gallows humor on Will’s part— is that he feels 
he has switched places with the cat, achieved that acceptance of mortality usually 
attributed to animals even as the animal has acquired all-too-human angst in the face of 
death (and begins to “speak” like a nervous “Californian"). Will feels “restored" to 
himself, “snug" in his place, having achieved a kind of “re-entry” through violence 
from the orbit of transcendence undertaken with his grand, Cartesian experiment The
immediate proximity of death has restored him (temporarily, as usual) to a comfortable 
acceptance of his mortal limits and of his implication in the world of the anima.
We might call this dangerous technique (so popular among Percy's heroes) “re­
entry through mortification." His descent into the underworld represents his most 
serious employment of this technique, as he enters into a place that embodies the anima 
as he conceives it— a barren, empty place of chaos and death. So his modem 
(Stoic/Cartesian) imagination pictures the realm of the feminine. His “experiment” 
aims to determine whether, in the very depths of this deadly womb of anima, some 
glimmer of the animus can be found. Can the transcendent self make contact with the 
Transcendent Self (God) despite its own embodied, immanent condition?
He is asking the wrong question, which is why he gets no clear answer. What 
must change, if Will is indeed to learn anything useful from this experience, is his 
impoverished and perverse notion of the feminine, his ingrained Promethean disdain 
for the mortal condition and his gnostic distrust of the flesh. Rather than uncover 
clinically unassailable proof of the immortality of the soul, Will must correct his 
interpretation of mortal life, before he can see (as he does at the end of the novel) in 
something so fleshly as a lover’s arms and hands “a gift and therefore a sign of a 
giver” (SC, p. 360). He must learn that the incarnation of divine animus within human 
anima is possible— indeed, that has already taken place.
This interpretative shift begins in the cave, with the ironic sign of the tiger. For 
while on the literal level the dying tiger appears simply to succumb to the brutal 
mechanisms of an impersonal universe that so appalled the Stoics and Gnostics, seen 
allegorically this animal (and its anthropomorphized death) invokes the incarnation and 
sacrifice of Christ The tiger appears repeatedly in English literature as a symbol of 
Christ, occurring in Lancelot Andrewes, William Blake and finally in Eliot’s
“Gerontion”16— the likely source text for Percy’s allusion here. If Gerontion is an 
old man suffering from spiritual exhaustion,Will Barrett is a middle-aged man who 
feels older than his years, at a moment perilously close to death.
In keeping with Percy’s sly (Kierkegaardian) use of humor, sarcasm and the 
grotesque to screen his scenes of religious epiphany (such as Jamie's baptism in The 
Last Gentleman) from appearing as “edifying” literature, here the Christian 
associations are buried, or presented ironically. The possibility that mortification 
might be necessary for redemption, death for resurrection, is hinted at behind a screen 
of psychobabble: The tiger wonders whether his death will be a “growth experience.” 
The Son of God taking the form of a slave is transmuted into a tiger taking on human 
anxieties, even as its flesh descends into inanimate nature. If God became man so that 
man might become God (as S t Augustine said), in this case the tiger becomes as man 
so that man may become as tiger. Will lies down beside this exemplar, noting that the 
very skin of the tiger is loose like a garment— perhaps so that he might put on the 
skin (as S t Paul urged his readers to “put on Christ” Gal. 4:27.) Having begun the 
descent as an inveterate gnostic, a consumer sunk in immanence troubled by 
nightmares of transcendence, Will has plumbed the very depths of creation, entering 
the inorganic womb of matter, to emerge as a human being marked with Christ’s 
salvific dignity, bearing the marks of a Passion, as Allie observes while she takes care 
of him:
The abdomen dropping away hollow under his ribs, the 
thin arms and legs with their heavy slack straps of muscle, 
cold as clay, reminded her of some paintings of the body 
of Christ taken down from the crucifix, the white flesh 
gone blue with death. (SC, p. 236)
Thus the figure of the tiger, in its allusive power, spans the levels of being (to 
which Voegelin refers in “Reason: The Classic Experience”) from the Divine Nous as
16 “In the juvescence of the year/Came Christ the tiger.” T.S. Eliot, The Complete Poems and 
Plays, 1909— 1950 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1952), p. 21.
mediated through Christ the Logos, down to Inorganic Nature and even the Apeiron 
(or Depth) of undifferentiated Being. By observing this figure's metamorphosis, Will 
begins to learn what Gnostics fail to understand: that man dwells in the metaxy that lies 
between these two extremes, while participating in both.11 Will has long been 
conditioned by the Stoic heritage of his father and the Cartesian atmosphere of his 
education to see truth only at the two extremes, to look for the satisfaction of animus in 
self-deification— in the full knowledge that this must end in failure and the triumph of 
immanence (anima) in the form of death and dissolution.
When he explodes into Allie’s bower, that crafty blend of culture and nature, 
artifice and Edenic fertility, Will finds in his nurse/lover a someone who has reconciled 
anima with animus, in whom their true human meanings— as points along the 
continuum of being within the metaxy of human existence, rather than polar opposites 
— have flowered18 and come to fruit She stands for Will as a positive sign that this 
reconciliation is possible, and as a means to bring it about Allie, an emblem of human 
femininity,19 is a living refutation of the doubts that so many Pierrotic Southern heroes 
felt about women and sexuality, and their compatibility with consciousness and 
spirituality.20 In fact Percy depicts Will and Allie’s union in terms that seem 
specifically designed to quell the anxieties of the Quentin Compsons, Will Barretts and 
other Pierrots who populate so much modem fiction:
Though he hardly touched her, his words seemed to 
flow across all parts of her body. Were they meant to? A
17 Voegelin, Anamnesis, p. 114.
18Aptly enough, the first time Will sees Allie in the novel, he notes that “her skin was as white 
as a camellia petal, yet not unhealthy." (SC, p. 76) Contrast with this the use of camellias in 
Lancelot, where they stand for female sexuality as a corrupting, poisonous force.
19 In “Rereading Allison Huger,” Elinor Ann Walker points out the following from her analysis 
of Percy’s early rough notes for the novel: “[UJntil he gives them the names that appear in the final 
version, Percy represents the characters using only the signs for a woman and a man.” in Lawson, ed., 
p. 105. Hiis supports my contention that Percy was in part attempting to create a sexual allegory 
within the broad tapestry of this novel.
20Kreyling, p. 142.
pleasure she had never known before blossomed deep in 
her body. Was this a way of making love? (SC, p. 262)
Within this relationship at least, sexuality and language, the emblems of 
immanence and transcendence, function together reciprocally and in harmony. It is 
significant, too, that this observation is Allie's; it is she who (before Will) comes to 
understand and accept this harmony, to treasure it in her heart. In fact, as Shelley M. 
Jackson points out, Allie herself seems to have a superior grasp of language to Will's:
Allie's sensitivity to language will be exactly that which 
will allow her to save Will by teaching him 
intersubjectivity and self-consciousness.21
Noting that in “Percy's fiction, mother-child relationships are problematic to say 
the least," and that this is a root cause of the isolation and abstraction of the male 
protagonists,22 Jackson suggests the discovery of alternative maternal figures— not 
all of them female, since she includes Fr. John (Percival) among them— is a key part 
of the Percy hero's search for salvation. This is certainly true in the case of Will 
Barrett, as my analysis in Chapter Three (above) shows.
For his part, Will has come to learn that human femininity-(the anima) does not 
reside in the soulless depths of immanence and matter— such as he explored in the 
cave— but rather in the varied and exciting metaxy that connects and partakes in 
higher and lower levels (in Divine Being and in non-being) as symbolized by the 
polyvalent Tiger, and embodied in Allie. For her part, Allie subverts negative 
stereotypes of the feminine by displaying rational calculation, planning and craft,
21Jackson, in Lawson, cd., p. 96. She goes on to explain Allie's unexpected linguistic
advantage with reference to sexual differences in language acquisition noted by Carol Gilligan and 
Nancy Chodorow: “Unlike Will, Allie sees herself not in opposition to the world, but in a position 
of finding ways to commune with it. Gilligan claims that although males see the world in either/or 
terms, females look for similarities among seemingly disparate choices and for ways to make 
connections rather than choose one option to the exclusion of the others. Allie illustrates Gilligan’s 
theory very well. If Chodorow is correct, that females are less differentiated from the external object- 
world and their inner object-world than males, then females should be able to pair word and object, and 
create language more easily, even when, like Allie, they have poor parental models." (p. 98) Whether 
or not these assertions can be verified scientifically, they certainly concur with the traditional 
understanding of animus and anima employed in this study, derived finom Karl Stem.
Ĵackson, p. 92.
especially in her painstaking endeavor to transport the stove to heat her greenhouse. 
Undertaking to do this under her own power (using only Will's “creepers"). Allie 
asserts her existence as something more than a victim or a dependent— asserts in fact, 
her own participation in the animus, even as Will learns of his implication in the anima. 
Their converse spiritual movements of discovery allow them to meet in the middle 
ground (metaxy) where mutual love is possible. Using one of Percy’s own terms, 
Elinor Ann Walker calls this meeting a “zone crossing." 23
In a lovely piece of dramatic irony, Allie no sooner has the stove assembled and 
functioning, before Will bursts in and renders it unnecessary— since that the cave air 
that has followed in his wake is sufficient to keep the greenhouse warm. Like a 
healthy living organism, the greenhouse will now maintain a regular temperature— 
one high enough to allow her to raise vegetables and flowers. Like the oak tree that 
grew around the iron hitching post, which provided Will’s Erst epiphany, {LG, p.
260) Allie’s stained-glass greenhouse is a metaphor for the successful reconciliation of 
alienated principles, of animus and anima within a single soul— her own.24 In a 
clever inversion of stereotype, here it is the woman whose rational planning allows her 
to dominate nature, and the man who unwittingly serves as a conduit for the healing, 
chthonic forces of the nurturing earth.
It is particularly appropriate, given Will’s terrible childhood separation from the 
motherly (see Chapter Three), that Allie is a strong maternal figure, as Jackson 
indicates:
Will’s rebirth from the womb of the cave, through the 
bat-infested birth canal into the Edenic setting of Allie’s 
greenhouse, serves its purpose in making Allie Will’s new 
surrogate mother.... As Will lies unconscious, she 
washes him, changes his clothes, feeds him, and tends his
^Elinor Ann Walker, "Rereading Allison Huger," in Lawson, ed., p. 109.
^W alker suggests that Allie "already claims as her own what Will Barrett seeks” — namely, 
the awareness that materiality and meaning are reconcilable, indeed inextricably bound together in 
language itself, (Walker, p. 104)
wounds until he becomes conscious. While in his drug- 
induced unconsciousness in the cave, he dreams of a 
mother gently washing his face. Now his dream has 
become a reality.25
The difference in their ages —  and the unnerving, quickly dismissed suggestion 
that Will could be Allie’s father—  help to counterbalance the maternal power that Allie 
must exert over Will, and make it possible for them to develop an erotic relationship on 
terms of basic equality. This equality implies interdependence and symbiosis: thus 
after Will submits to Allie's care, he soon turns around to employ his legal expertise to 
defend her freedom and individuality from those who would again subject her to 
helplessness and wordlessness.
This brings us to perhaps the most appalling image in all Percy’s work: that of 
Allie strapped to an electroshock table, her very consciousness “fried” and her 
linguistic nature suppressed through brute coercion. Here is the embodiment of Stoic 
terror: the mind itself and its individuality crushed in the wheels of mechanism. So it 
would appear to the classic Percy hero.
However looked at from a different point of view, here is also a Christ image — 
as Allie sums it up, “Fried is crucified.” (SC, p. 103) Unlike so many other Percy 
heroines, Allie is herself both an emblem and a source of grace, thanks to the wisdom 
she has attained from her redemptive suffering.26 In his youth, Will could not imagine 
that grace, erotic love, and knowledge were all compatible in the same relationship, so 
he looked for these qualities separately among (respectively) Jamie, Kitty, and Sutter. 
Now, in the person of Allie (“Sutter turned happy!”), Will finds them in peaceful 
coexistence. As he learns more about the true possibilities of intersubjectivity and love 
from a mother-figure who will neither abandon him nor suffocate him, Will begins to
^Jackson, p. 98.
^N ote, for contrast, the suffering of Anna, which Lancelot imagines has “purified’* her of the 
taint of feminine sexuality. Because of his delusions, her very real suffering cannot be redemptive, at 
least not for him. It seems in fact to be wasted— just like the suffering of Lucy, Margot, Raine and 
Lance’s other victims.
free himself from the cold grip of abstraction and alienation that has gripped him all his 
life. In return for the gift of maternal care that she gives him, Will offers her paternal 
protection from her parents, who would like to return her to the tender ministrations of 
the electroshock machine— impoverishing her both of sign (language) and signified 
(materiality, specifically her wealth).
Will’s fate at his family’s hands would be a little better: he would sit in the 
comfortable hospital wing that they prepared for him, bound to a Ph machine and the 
pills that manipulate his moods and suppress his (ordinary, human) anxieties before 
they even arise. Thus buffered from animus and anima, he would be immune to 
suffering and incapable of redemption.
Will’s final struggle against those well-meaning people who would abolish his
suffering and quelch his desire for transcendence within immanence is an extension of
the resistance he displays throughout the novel to ideologies of worldliness— even
those that come wrapped in religious rhetoric. In order to understand how he finally
comes to acknowledge the possibility that transcendence and immanence can co-exist,
we must realize why he has been so skeptical up to this point, and explore the
anodynes to anxiety upon which he has long relied, and now has finally rejected.
♦ * *
As the novel opens, Will Barrett seems to be a man who has taken a radically
different path from his father, avoiding the gnostic speculations, great melancholies
and grand illusions of the heroic past and the allure of scientific omniscience. In a
conscious rebellion against Ed Barrett’s stark heritage of despair, he has chosen a path
very like the one he sketched out to Sutter at the end of The Last Gentleman. If he has
not married Kitty, he has indeed snagged an heiress, and in turn inherited her millions
when she died. As Will sums up the matter, speaking as it were to his father’s ghost:
Ever since your death, all I ever wanted from you was out, 
out from you and from the Mississippi twilight, and from 
the shotguns thundering in musty attics and racketing
through funk-smelling Georgia swamps, out from the 
ancient hatreds and allegiances, allegiances unto death and 
love of war and rumors of war and under it all death and 
your secret love of death, yes that was your secret...
I went as far as I could go, manied a rich hardheaded 
pious decent crippled upstate Utica, New York, woman, 
practiced Trusts and Estates law in a paneled office on 
Wall Street kept a sailboat on the North Shore, played 
squash, lived at 76th and Fifth, walked my poodle m the 
park, went up in an elevator to get home, tipped three 
doormen and four elevator men at Christmas, thought 
happily about making money like everyone else (money is 
a land of happiness), made more money than some, 
married a great deal more money than most learned how 
to whistle down a cab two blocks away and get in and out 
of “21” in time for the theater, began to enjoy (thanks to 
you) Brahms and Mozart (no thanks to you).... And I was 
never so glad of anything as I was to get away from your 
doom and your death-dealing and your great honor and 
great hunts and great hates.... God, just to get away from 
all that and live an ordinary mild mercantile money-making 
life, do mild sailing, mild poodle-walking, mild music- 
loving among mild good-natured folks. I even tried to 
believe in the Christian God because you didn’t, and if you 
didn’t maybe that was what was wrong with you so why 
not do the exact opposite? (Imagine, having to leave the 
South to find God!) Yes I did all that and succeeded in 
everything except believing in the Christian God— maybe 
you were right about one thing after all— what’s more 
even beat you, made more money, wrote a law book, won 
an honorary degree, listened to better music. (SC, pp. 72- 
73)
The story is fueled by Will’s mounting realization that his whole adult life (that ar­
guably began in Santa Fe, with Sutter and Jamie) has been a headlong flight away 
from transcendent ambitions, a thoroughgoing attempt to dwell in the immanent— 
even to use the Christian Faith as a tool for remaining worldly. Rather than confront 
the heritage that poisoned his identity, the dominance his father exerted from the grave 
over the core of his individuality and freedom (animus), Will has tried to bury the 
spark of transcendence in a pile of possessions and petty secular concerns— just as 
Lance Lamar tried vainly to drown it in a bottle.
Will realizes, late in his life, the futility of his stratagems:
In two seconds, he saw that his little Yankee life had not 
worked after all, the nearly twenty years of making a life 
with a decent upstate woman and with decent Northern
folk and working in an honorable Wall Street firm and 
making a success of it too. The whole twenty years could 
just as easily have been a long night’s dream. (SC, p. 73)
Like Lance Lamar and Allie Huger, Will awakens from a dream of immanence,
and sets forth on a quest for meaning. The nature of what Will is looking for becomes
clear from the rest of this passage:
[A]nd here he was in old Carolina, thinking of Ethel 
Rosenblum and having fits and falling down on the golf 
course — what in God’s name was I doing there and what 
am I doing here? (SC, p. 73)
Why exactly is this middle-aged man’s realization that his life has been absurd 
tied associatively in his mind with considerations of sex and Jews— each of which 
occurs to him on his way to invoking the name of God? Because he is still worrying 
the same mysteries that haunted him throughout his youth, as chronicled in The Last 
Gentleman and analyzed above in Chapter 3: the meaning of the feminine, considered 
psychologically, historically, and theologically.
That Ethel Rosenblum represents more for Will than a simple nostalgic or erotic 
fantasy can be seen from the image that first awakens the thought of her in his 
memory. He recalls a “weedy stretch of railroad right-of-way.... [A] wedge-shaped 
salient of weeds...shaped like a bent triangle.” (SC, p. 7) Later in the novel, Will 
refers to this spot as a “nondescript weedy triangular public pubic sort of place, to 
make a sort of love or die a sort of death.” (SC, p. 162) Having gone to considerable 
narrative trouble to create an image that evokes both a woman’s pudendum and the 
Greek letter D (delta), Percy has marked for us the spot where his hero’s troubles all 
converge.
The “Delta factor” of which Percy writes so often is for him the unique faculty of 
human language that marks man apart from the mechanistic processes of the universe, 
the mysterious sign of transcendence from which his unique nature (and most of its 
troubles) arise. (MB, pp. 3-21; LC, p. 108 fl) Just how can the emblem of the soul's 
transcendence be joined to the very mouth of immanence— the organ of human birth
towards which his male protagonists have felt such ambivalence, even terror? Can 
these two coincide— and can earthly, carnal life then be reconciled with die higher 
destiny that the transcending spirit demands? They can, but only through the 
mysterious figure of Ethel Rosenblum.
Ethel resonates on many levels for Will, as we see in his first recollections of hen
[N]ature had endowed her with such beauty and grace of 
body, a dark satinity of skin, a sweet firm curve and com­
paction of limbs as not easily to be believed. She was 
smart in algebra and histoiy and English.... She could 
factor out equations after the whole class was stumped, 
stand at the blackboard, hip hiked out, one fist perched 
cheerleaderwise on her pelvis, other quick small hand 
squinched on the chalk, and cancel out great a^b2 
complexes zip zip slash, coming out at the end a/a=l.
1=1! Unity!
No matter how ungainly the equation, ugly and 
unbalanced, clotted with complexes, radicals, fractions, 
zip zip under Ethel Rosenblum’s quick sure hand and they 
factored out and cancelled and came down to unity, 
symmetry, beauty. (SC, p. 7)
This powerfully attractive, intelligent woman embodies eros for Will, in each of 
the several senses in which the word has historically been used: the physical need for 
union, the intellectual search for clarity, and the existential yearning for God. Note the 
theological language that the narrator employs to describe something so simple as a 
Jewish girl doing math problems: she brings about “unity, symmetry, beauty," 
attributes of God traditionally considered knowable by reason alone. Not 
coincidentally, these are qualities for which a physicist or cosmologist looks in a 
scientific theory.
It is deeply significant that Will’s remembered sweetheart is Jewish, a member of 
the people who first conceived of a monotheistic God that operated historically— and 
who for Percy are evidence that He did and still does so operate. Indeed, their very 
existence is a sign of Divine presence, Percy suggests (SC, p. 19). While the narrator 
pokes fun coyly at Will’s preoccupation with Jews and their supposed disappearance,
the author clearly means us to take seriously the notion that the Jews are a piece of 
physical* historical evidence that God exists and takes an interest in man’s life. Thus, 
they are a sign that the union of immanence and transcendence is possible, when God 
Himself takes the initiative. There is a long tradition in Jewish and Christian thought 
of referring to God’s people as wedded to Him, as His mystical bride. Hauke points 
to the extensive use of this symbol in the Old Testament, culminating in the the Song 
of Songs,27 whose significance I explored in Chapter One.28 By introducing the 
figure of a Jewish girl as the one who brings “unity, symmetry, beauty” out of chaotic 
multiplicity, as a kind of mandala of physical and spiritual fertility,29 Percy has 
consciously alluded to the richest symbolic tradition in the Jewish-Christian 
Revelation: the allegorical marriage of the individual soul with God. It is certainly no 
accident that the Jewish girl who attracts Will’s attention is of such an age that (given 
the time and social milieu) she is likely a virgin. This points both to the Old Testament 
typology of Israel of which we spoke above, and to the centrality of the Blessed Virgin 
in Catholic theology and ecclesiology.30
27Hauke, pp. 254-255.
^See also Bouyer, pp. 141-143. Since Percy is a Christian and not a Jewish writer, he takes 
the further step of suggesting that the Jews arc a sign that point beyond themselves, to the general 
redemption of man and his union with God through the Church, which is described variously as the 
New Israel, Christ’s Mystical Body, and His Bride. See Chapter One, pp. 46-52.
29Perhaps the very “mandala” for which Broughton was looking? Cf. Broughton, p. 112 ff.
30josef Cardinal Ratzinger summarizes her centrality in this way: “[S]he is in person the true 
Zion, toward whom hopes have yearned throughout all the devastations of history. She is the true 
Israel in whom Old and New Covenant, Israel and Church, are indivisibly one. She is the 'people of 
God’ bearing fruit through God’s gracious power.” Daughter Zion (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1983), p. 
43. As the sole source of Jesus’ physical body and human nature, the exemplary type of the Virginal 
Bride and Mystical Body that is the Church, (Ratzinger, pp. 67-68) the figure of Mary also serves to 
guarantee the inclusion of the feminine principle within the Christian Revelation; to inscribe at the 
heart of Christian ethics, as the model of human response to the Divine, one historical decision made 
by a Jewish girl at a particular moment in time; to enshrine in Christian piety the intercessory figure 
of a mother, whose particular love for her particular Child symbolizes the preciousness of individual 
souls in the eyes of their Creator. (Stern, pp. 287-288) Even the dogma of Mary’s virginity, which 
seems to many a curiousity of religious anthropology, contains a message of profound relevance to 
W ill— obsessed as he is with transcendence, immanence, and the question of a personal, Providential 
God. According to Ratzinger, this dogma raises and answers the question: “Is God a depth of being 
somewhere which, as it were, nourishes the deep roots of all things in some unimaginable way, or is 
he the one who acts with power, who knows and loves his creation, is present to it and effectively 
works in it from first to last, even today? The alternatives are simple; does God act or not? Can he
Will’s preoccupation with Ethel Rosenblum, the Jewish people, and theological 
implications of their ongoing presence (or disappearance) does not mean that he finds it 
easy to accept the Christian Gospel in this or any form. He does not fail to denounce 
every church he sees or hears about through the novel, most notably in his litany of the 
names of death:
Death in the guise of Christianity is not going to prevail 
over me. If Christ brought life, why do the churches smell 
of death?
Death in the guise of old Christendom in Carolina is not 
going to prevail over me. The old churches are houses of 
death.
Death in the form of the new Christendom in Carolina is 
not going to prevail over me. If the born-again are the 
twice-born, I'm  holding out for a third go-round.
Death in the guise of God and America and the happy 
life of home and family and friends is not going to prevail 
over me. (SC, p. 272)
What offends him so powerfully about these churches is their worldliness, the
thoroughness with which the transcendent message of Christianity has been subsumed
»
by Christendom (as Kierkegaard noted). The following passage indicates the nature of 
the problem, as Will sees it*
He lived in the most Christian nation in the world, the 
U.S. A., in the most Christian part of that nation, the 
South, in the most Christian state in the South, North 
Carolina, in the most Christian town in North Carolina.
(SC, p. 13)
Indeed, this “Christianity” is in the very air— or at least the airwaves— to a degree
that he finds suffocating:
As he drove along a gorge, he suffered another spell.
Again the brilliant sunlight grew dim. Light seemed to rise 
from the gorge. He slowed, turned off the radio, and tried 
to tune in a nonreligious program. He could not find  one.
(SC, p. 13, italics mine)
act at all? If not, is he really “God?" The affirmation of Jesus’ birth from the Virgin Mary bears 
witness to the God who has not let creation slip out of his hands.” (Ratzinger, p. 61)
The situation is not helped by the personal attributes of the Christians with whom
he is acquainted, for instance the acrimony and anti-intellectualism of his daughter
♦
Leslie, the cowardly bourgeois bonhomie of Rev. Jack Curb Most repellent, 
however, among these attributes must be counted the gluttony of his deceased wife, 
Marion. For all her good works and preoccupation with Episcopal Church affairs, 
Marion's fundamental worldliness is symbolized by her fanatical attachment to food. 
Marion certainly does not settle for bread alone, nor for the Word of God either, but 
also:
Celeste pizzas, Sara Lee cream pies, bottles of Plagniol, 
brownies, cream butter, eggs, gallons of custard ice cream 
... Smithfield hams, Yamaiuchi’s wife's shirred eggs,
Long Island Ducks. (SC, pp. 157-158)
The results are predictable, as Marion’s becomes a body of death:
Cholesterol sparkled like a golden rain in her blood, settled 
as a sludge winking with diamonds. A tiny stone lodged 
in her common bile duct A bacillus sprouted in the 
stagnant dammed bile. She turned yellow as butter and hot 
as fire. There was no finding the diamond through the 
cliffs of ocherous fa t She died. (SC, p. 158)
This grotesque passage, worthy of a medieval treatise on gluttony, conveys all the
Stoic’s anxiety at the body and its power to dominate and finally extinguish the spirit,
all the Gnostic’s disdain of the very flesh itself. Marion’s wealth and worldliness have
rendered her Christian faith null and void, so far as Will is concerned. Her life does
not offer an answer to the relentless, inner voice of cynicism that the voice of Ed
Barrett maintains inside Will’s mind; in fact, she seems to confirm those doubts.
When Will decides that Christianity has been so thoroughly digested by
immanence that it no long serves as a sign of transcendence, he finds himself drawn
back to his father's deadly heritage of auto-salvation through suicide.
In the comer of his eye a dark bird flew through the 
woods, keeping pace with him. He knew what to do.
Pulling off at an overlook, he took the Luger from the 
glove compartment of the Mercedes. (SC, p. 13)
He receives a sign to remind him of this option, in the form of a “dark bird” — 
the inverse of a Dove, symbol of the Holy Ghost This ghost is the “old mole” to 
whom Will speaks throughout the novel, in a self-conscious reference to Hamlet, like  
that famous ghost of a dead father, Ed Barrett plays a demonic role in this stoiy, 
standing always at Will’s elbow, urging Will to complete his heritage of violence and 
death. This being so, we might be tempted to take his presence literally, and say that 
he is a soul risen from Hell to inflict still more violence upon the earth (as Hamlet 
suspected of his father’s shade). The masculine would be revealed on such a reading 
to be a purely negative force— as radical feminist theologians assert
This would certainly be a mistake. Because Ed Barrett’s presence in this novel is 
not purely destructive, any more than Aunt Emily, Sutter Vaught, or Lance Lamar are 
purely negative characters, representing a tradition that Percy wishes to reject entirely. 
In the tradition of all Percy’s Stoic/Gnostic characters, Ed Barrett serves as a crucial 
skeptical voice, refusing all pat, easy answers to the theological and existential 
questions that plagued the author, long after his famous conversion to Catholicism.
Thanks to the nagging voice of his father, Will does not remain in the worn path 
of immanence, living the good life and playing golf in a haze of moneyed apathy; nor 
will Ed’s ghost allow him to slip into the shallow aesthetic humanism of Lewis 
Peckham, who entertains himself with deep questions and high art but is in fact quite 
satisfied to dwell on the surface of things, to “read Dante for structure." It is Ed 
Barrett’s lingering presence that prevents his son from adopting a shallow Christianity 
as an easy answer to his anxieties, from breathing transcendent meaning in with the 
immanent air(waves).
Only by taking the path that he follows, by descending into the depths of creation 
in search of the Creator, by making his crucial experiment into an experience on the 
cross and remaking himself in the image of Christ, can he satisfy the cynic within, 
having fulfilled the requirements of the heroic tradition and transcended them. Having
discovered the complex, intertwined reality of immanence and transcendence (metaxy) 
that defines human existence, having made peace with the anima, Will at last can 
liberate the animus from his father’s shadow. At last, the very core of his individuality 
can be separated from the figure who tried long ago to snuff it out; the terrible 
ambivalence that has afflicted him ever since now falls into the valley along with his 
father's Luger and shotgun.
But one thing remains. Free now of his old father, reconciled with the maternal
and the material, Will still feels the need for a spiritual father, a source of authority
more concrete and historical than the abstract notion of Divinity for which an ancient
Stoic (or Platonist) might have settled. (Whereas he once looked to Sutter to fill this
role, his own experience “in a desert place" has shown him the futility to which that
leads.) The “dark bird” that has followed him all his life must be replaced by another
symbol of transcendent authority, preferably one that is compatible with man’s histoiy
and Will’s own fleshly existence. (The Dove, symbol of the Holy Spirit, would seem
appropriate, but it makes no appearance in the novel.) Will sees such an authority, or
at least the glimmerings of it, in the figure of Fr. Weatherbee, the rather senile old
priest he meets in the novel’s final pages. He demands of the frightened old man:
“I cannot and will not accept all of your dogmas. Unless 
of course you have the authority to tell me something that I 
don’t know. Do you?" (SC, p. 358)31
The source of such authority, Will recognizes, would lie not in intellectual
refinement or speculative profundity, but rather in histoiy and the flesh:
“m h e  Apostolic Succession involved a laying on of 
hands, right? This goes back to Christ himself, a Jew, a
31It is a sign of Percy’s playfulness that he has chosen an Episcopal priest who is preoccupied 
with the Apostolic Succession to be the object of Will’s inquiries. According to the definitive 
teaching of Percy’s own (Catholic) Church (specifically of Pope Leo XIII), the Anglican/Episcopal 
churches have lost the Apostolic Succession, thanks to doctrinal and liturgical changes during the 17th 
century. This is a point on which the Vatican has never retreated, for all its ecumenical fervor. So, in 
Percy’s own terms, Fr. Weatherbee probably has no authority.
unique historical phenomenon, as unique as the Jews."
(SC, p. 357)
The Apostolic Succession, Fr. Weatherbee’s other pet interest (after model railroads), 
is one of the most tangibly incarnational doctrines in Christianity, being a sacramental 
(tangible, physical, and historical) analogue of the Jewish Levi tic priesthood that was 
passed along by blood. A masculine sign of the historicity and specificity of 
Christianity (to minor the feminine sign of virginity), the Apostolic Succession 
anchors the Church in time and place, ruling out forever any gnostic interpretations of 
the Incarnation.
More concretely for Will, the heritage of Apostles represents an alternative 
tradition to the blood lineage of suicidal Barretts, the Stoic lineage of military heroes 
(Marcus Flavinius, Robert E. Lee, Erwin Rommel, etc.), and the Faustian tradition of 
materialist scientists (Descartes, Skinner, even Freud). As de Lubac points out, the 
motherly aspect of the Church is mirrored by its heritage of fathers,32 of apostles who 
have handed along authority from one generation to the next— an authority that does 
'  not point inward, to the self as hero or god, but upward, to the Transcendent Father 
Who calls us back, through the means of an immaculate earthly Mother, a communal 
Church.
While Percy (mercifully) never goes so far as to draw out every fiber of the rich 
theological tapestry that underlies his complex psychological tales, it is clear from this 
study that his critique of modem, gnostic individualism is in part motivated by his faith 
in a religious communion that sees salvation as impossible fo r individuals; only within 
a community of signs (or sacraments) whose meaning is guaranteed by authority 
(tradition) can a soul incorporate himself in the body of the saved.
This inquiry began with Karl Stem, and perhaps it should conclude with him. At 
the end of The Flight From Woman, he points to Goethe as one whose work embodies
32de Lubac, pp. 85-93,
the conflict between masculinizing culture and the feminine principle in the souL He 
writes:
In his twenties, when Goethe was already beset by the 
conflicts which led to the conception of Faust, he wrote the 
famous Prometheus poem. Prometheus, who surges 
upward with the gesture of usurping power, was, 
incidentally, not only a symbol of the young poet. The 
image of frometheus forms a recurrent preoccupation of 
the last century. It plays a great role in the language of 
revolution— the prototype of Man who despises all aid 
from above, who strives upward himself to get his due.
This is precisely the opposite of the orans of the 
Annunciation. Thus, we see that Goethe's work spans the 
polarity of our existence. For the Promethean fever will be 
healed only by the attitude of childlike expectancy—
Man’s readiness for Grace.33
Through the Grace that comes to him through Allie, Will has been transformed from an
image of Prometheus to the image of Christ At the same time, with his support Allie
herself moves beyond the negative, modem stereotypes of the feminine with which
women have too long been burdened, to wield considerable powers of transcendent
reason and immanent eras— two powers that at last appear to operate in harmony. As
a post-type of Ethel Rosenblum and an ante-type of the Church, Allie exerts on Will
the power to change his interpretative screen, from a gnostic to an orthodox one.
Reflecting upon Allie,Will can look anew at the meaning of fatherhood and
motherhood, marriage and language, abstraction and desire and commit himself to their
peaceful coexistence— amidst all the uncertainty and suffering that attend fallen man
in this “valley of tears," the fallen Eden of the metaxy in which he dwells. At the
novel’s end, Will wonders in conclusion:
Could it be that the Lord is here, masquerading behind this 
simple silly holy face? Am I crazy to want both, her and 
Him? No, not want, must have. And will have. (SC, p.
360)
33Stem, pp. 270.
At last he recognizes in the earthly feminine a sign of its divine, masculine
paternity— and in the earthly masculine a sign of man’s feminine destiny, as creature
and Bride. He sees clearly what Goethe saw more dimly:
Here the ineffable 
Wins life through love;
Eternal Womanhood 
Leads us above.34
By examining the function of sexual archetypes in the four Walker Percy novels 
considered here in the light of S tem’s technique of Deutung, I believe that I have 
created a critical apparatus that nimbly moves between widely divergent levels of 
interpretation— from literal to moral to allegorical to anagogical; that takes full account 
of the insights of psychology, literary histoiy and biography; that intimately links our 
tentative understanding of childhood experience with the boldest speculative insights of 
the Western theological tradition about the relationship between the human and the 
divine; that employs the notion of “oveideteimination” creatively to liberate the text 
both from reductionism and arbitrariness, by placing the individual experience of the 
artist firmly within the context of philosophical histoiy and testing the truth-value of 
his insights against what we can know by reason and faith about the human condition. 
This apparatus, once developed and elaborated, can be employed in the study of other 
writers— both of those who embrace the Western tradition, and those who rebel 
against it; indeed, the very option of rebellion seems to be an inextricable part of that 
tradition. Insofar as the sexual allegoiy that I have employed here is a semiotically rich 
source of inteipretative insights about human existence, the field for its employment is 
vast and open. But that woik is for another time.
34As cited in Stem, p. 270.
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